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Gazing at Horror: Body performance in the wake of mass social trauma 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis explores various dilemmas in making theatre performances in the context of social 
disruption, trauma and death. Diverse discourses are drawn in to consider issues of body, 
subjectivity and spectatorship, refracted through the writer’s experiences of and discontent with 
making theatre. Written in a fractal-like structure, rather than a linear progression, this thesis 
unsettles discourses of truth, thus simultaneously intervening in debates about the 
epistemologies of the body and of theatre in context of the academy.  
 
Chapter 1: Methodological Anxieties 
Psychoanalytic theory provides a way in for investigating the dynamics of theatrical performance 
and its corporeal presence, by focusing on desire and its implication in the notions of loss and 
anxiety. The theories of the unconscious and the gaze have epistemological implications, shifting 
definitions of “presence” and “truth” in theatre performance and writing about theatre. This 
chapter tries to outline the rationale for, as well as to enact, an alternative methodology for 
writing, as an ethical response to loss that does not insist on consensus and truth.  
 
Chapter 2: (Refusing to) Look at Trauma 
This chapter examines the politics that strives to make suffering visible. Discursive binaries of 
public/private, dead/living, and invisible/visible underlie the politics of AIDS and sexuality. These 
discourses impact on the reception of Bill T. Jones's choreography, despite his use of modernist 
artistic processes in search of a bodily presence that aims to collapse the binary of representation 
(text) and its subject (being). The theory of the gaze shows this politics to be a phallocentric 
discourse; and narrative analysis traces the metanarrative that results in the commodification of 
oppositional identities, so that spectators participate in the politics as consumers. An ethical 
artistic response thus needs to shift its focus to the subjectivity of the spectator.  
 
Chapter 3: The Screen and the Viewer’s Blindness 
By appealing to a transcendent reality, and by constituting spectators as a participative 
community, ritual theatre claims to enact change. The “truth” of ritual rests not on rational 
knowledge, but on the performer’s competence to produce a shamanic presence, which director 
Brett Bailey embraces in his early work. Ritual presence operates by identification and belonging 
to a father/god as the source of meaning; but it represses the loss of this originary wholeness. 
Spectators of ritual theatre are drawn into an enactment of communion/community, the centre of 
which is, however, loss/emptiness. The claim of enacting change becomes problematic for its 
absence of truth. Bailey attempts to perform a hybrid, postcolonial aesthetics; but the problem 
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rests in the larger context of performing the notion of “South Africa”, a communal identity 
hardened around the metanarrative of suffering, abjecting those that do not belong to the land of 
the father/god – foreigners that unsettle the meaning of South African identity. 
 
Conclusion: Bodies of Discontent 
The South African stage is circumscribed by political and economic discourses; the 
problematization of national identity is also a problematization of image-identification in the 
theatre. In search for a way to unsettle these interrogative discourses, two moments of 
performing foreignness are examined, one fictional, one theatrical. These moments enact a 
parallel to the feminine hysteric, who disturbs the phallocentric truth of the psychoanalyst through 
body performance. These moments of disturbing spectatorship are reflected in the works of 
performance artist Marina Abramović. Her explorations into passive-aggression, shamanism and 
finally theatricality and the morality of spectatorship allow for an overview of the issues raised in 
this thesis regarding body, viewing, and subjecthood. Sensitivity to the body and its discontent on 
the part of the viewer becomes crucial to ethical performance.  
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A Note on Reading 
 
 
 
This thesis is written against the inexorable path towards meaning that characterizes 
the Cartesian rational subject and his epistemology. The writing of trauma, pain, 
violence and loss, necessarily interrupts this logic. Nor is such interruption the 
founding premise for this thesis – I have not sought to define and explain it at the 
beginning of chapter 1, making it the foundational truth of my thesis. Instead, it 
(without predetermining what “it” may be) accumulates resonances throughout the 
thesis. Its strange, meandering trajectory and halting rhythm make more and more 
“sense” only as the reader reads on. 
 
Most likely, the reader will read out of the habit of linear trajectory, starting from the 
beginning and finishing with the conclusion at the end. The text, however, reveals 
itself in a kind of fractal logic; for example, what is complex and difficult in chapter 
1 may be easier to digest after seeing its echoes in actual theatre productions, 
explored in chapter 2 and 3. The same ideas may come across as simple in the 
conclusion. Multiple readings, circular readings, hypertextual readings may be more 
appropriate, and in a modest way I have tried to help the reader by cross-referencing 
different sections of the text, and by providing a very brief summary at the beginning 
of each chapter. I cannot promise an easy journey, because the material is about dis-
ease.  
 
 
1 
Chapter 1 
 
Methodological Anxieties I: The habit of truth, and the search for an 
ethics for writing 
 
"I am always astonished that there is ... something that, as time goes on, 
still (encore) brings me here ... facing you." 
 – Jacques Lacan, Encore, cited in Benvenuto & Kennedy (1986: 183) 
 
 
Psychoanalytic theory provides a way in for investigating the dynamics of theatrical 
performance and its corporeal presence,1 by focusing on desire and its implication in the 
notions of loss and anxiety. The theory of the unconscious and the theory of the gaze have 
epistemological implications, shifting expectations regarding “presence” and “truth” in theatre 
performance and writing about theatre performance. This chapter tries to outline the 
rationale for, as well as to enact, an alternative methodology for writing, as an ethical 
response to loss that does not insist on consensus and truth.  
 
 
What compels us to be here, and do what we do – again? 
 
I am at a loss about how to write. In writing this thesis, I am spurred on by a sense of 
discontent with writing: writing of words on a page, writing of bodies on a stage. I 
feel discontent with representation (représentation – the French word for 
performance: Brook, 1972: 155) and its ineffectual, remote and indifferent quality 
that I sense, when I go see a theatre performance or read a book.  
 
Meanwhile, at the onset of a Masters degree, the University considerately provides 
each student with a handbook as a guide to writing. There are certain rules or 
boundaries around writing that will make it academically credible, in other words, 
identifiable as the genre of academic discourse.  
 
So, a contradiction haunts me from the start: my sense of loss throws me into a 
radically questioning, doubting (non-)stance regarding my subject matter and the 
way that I should write it. (I wonder/wander2: what is "loss"? Having lost something 
– competence? faith? Mourning a separation – from God? certainty? love? 
                                                 
1
 This thesis focuses on “body performance”. Examples of genres include dance, mime, performance 
art, physical theatre, and such like; although I am hesitant to let genre boundaries govern my 
investigation into the body. I am also aware that the word "theatre" does not apply aptly to all 
these disciplines; the word can however serves as a way to distinguish the performer’s body from 
the body's performativity in everyday terms, such as of social or gender identity.  
2This comparison of thinking to "wandering" will become clearer at the end of this chapter (p.44). The 
word eschews the assumption of a position, a "stance" regarding the subject of research; but a 
movement through it, characterized not by assertions of proven truths but doubting. 
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connection? Losing thoughts and memories, rootlessness, disconnected from 
tradition, incredulous towards history. Being lost, directionless, being indecisive, 
inarticulate …) At the same time there are boundaries all around me to guide me 
towards articulation. (Strive for clarity of expression. Articulate your subject 
position. Decide on the practitioners who will be examined, and the theories that will 
be used as lenses. Choose a South African subject matter to ensure relevance, but 
ensure that the theoretical lens is not Eurocentric.) It will be unfair of me to say that 
the University lays down the law as to how I should write my thesis; but through 
various institutional practices the discursive constraints are unmistakably set. 
 
Surely my quest is to resolve this contradiction and to find a way of 
writing/performing that satisfies me, instead of leaving me in discontent. But neither 
of these are individual pursuits; they entail given relationships, or contracts, that 
govern these activities. The contradiction – the anxiety, the discontent – is located in 
the writer/reader and performer/audience relationships. This chapter addresses the 
former while the rest of the thesis addresses the latter, but it is difficult to separate 
them, as shall become evident. 
 
As a performer-choreographer and a writer, and as a spectator of theatre and a reader 
of books, I find myself doing these activities out of habit ("because these are the 
things that a drama academic does"). Habits become problematic and in need of 
revision when they seem meaningless, hollow; in director and theatre theorist Peter 
Brook's term, "deadly" (Brook, 1972). My anxiety perhaps stems from a feeling that 
my very presence in these habitual activities are at stake. One does not need to have 
quantifiable data as evidence of the general lack of desire to go to the theatre; as a 
stage performer I can sense it when many more people are deriving more pleasure 
from attending popular music concerts, cinema, night clubs and watching television 
than watching my live performances. Even more importantly, the theatre productions 
that receive calls of "encore" from audiences (literally, or in the form of repeated 
seasons) often repel me. At an immediate level, this knowledge brings on an anxiety 
about my presence on stage. But this is only a trivial aspect of my discontent. 
 
One of the recurring themes that psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan talked about 
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in his seminars in 1972-3, entitled Encore,3 was the dilemma of his presence in 
giving a seminar: 
 
At stake is the stupidity that conditions what I named my seminar after this 
year and that is pronounced "encore". You see the risk involved. I am only 
telling you that to show you what constitutes the weight of my presence here – 
it's that you enjoy it. My sole presence – at least I dare believe it – my sole 
presence in my discourse, my sole presence is my stupidity. I should know that 
I have better things to do than to be here. That is why I might prefer that my 
presence not be guaranteed to you in each and every case. (Lacan, 1998: 12) 
 
Lacan's discourse is characteristically complex, and a wandering explication of this 
passage is warranted. The dilemma of "stupidity" is not unlike that of the 
analysand/analyst relationship in a clinical situation, and it is a dilemma in which the 
relation between language, speaker (or subject) and knowledge is thrown into 
question. 
 
The analyst has only the analysand's discourse to work with, and yet this discourse 
cannot be taken as the guarantee of the truth about the analysand's condition. Unlike 
a medical situation, for instance, where the doctor relies on the patient's descriptions 
of dis-ease to diagnose the disease, the analytic relation cannot take the analysand's 
discourse about his/her anxiety for what it is. The subject is not in possession of 
knowledge about him/herself in entirety; there is the unconscious to account for, 
whose repressed desires distort conscious representations of self. Psychoanalysis as 
initiated by Freud has thus always been concerned with unintended uses of language: 
the slips of the tongue, the hesitations and defences, the jokes that smuggle in 
unpoliced desires, the rebus that treats linguistic signs as objects, rather than 
representations of concepts.  
 
The speaking subject (the analysand) is thus incited to "say anything, without 
worrying about saying something stupid" (Lacan, 1998: 27). This "stupidity" (la 
bêtise), as translator Bruce Fink points out, is Lacan's own translation for Freud's 
term to name the symptoms of a patient.4 The unconscious material of the analysand 
                                                 
3While Encore is commonly known as Lacan's discourse on feminine sexuality, Lacan's editor 
Jacques-Alain Miller entitles the seminar as "On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and 
Knowledge". It is the discourse on knowledge, and the implications for the analytic relationship, 
that pertain to this chapter, contextualizing the exchange relations in performance and in writing. 
4The patient is the little boy Hans whose fear of horses revealed his Oedipal complex. Freud asked the 
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is contrasted with language, which comes from consciousness; Lacan proposes that 
the unconscious is structured like a language (through signifiers), the structure of 
which is different from linguistics and which is up to the analyst to decipher 
(Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 167). The knowledge of the unconscious cannot be 
consciously known and formalized in language, thus appearing to be "unacceptable, 
or inarticulate, appearing in fragments of thought ... all of which may appear at first 
sight to be merely stupid and of marginal significance" (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 
1986: 167).  
 
A brief aside: it is worth noting that Lacan differs from the Freudian tradition in 
focusing on the possibility that the unconscious has a logic, a structure of 
representations of feelings, rather than pure affect itself (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 
1986: 168). It is not an oppositional binary of conscious language versus unconscious 
affect, reminiscent of the age-old artistic dilemma of balancing form/technique, and 
inspiration/emotions – the Apollonian and the Dionysian.5 Rather than a 
"disorganized mass of drives", the unconscious is organized "in the form of 
questioning, which [Lacan] called an 'interrogative voice'" (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 
1986: 168). I will return to the idea of interrogation later on.  
 
This seems to explain how Lacan's "sole presence" can be his "stupidity". But he also 
said to his audience: "what constitutes the weight of my presence here – it's that you 
enjoy it". This seems to be the key to the dilemma of presence – and the phenomenon 
of "encore". In the first seminar of the Encore series, Lacan spoke on jouissance 
(enjoyment, with a sexual connotation of jouir – "to come"), specifically exploring 
feminine sexuality. After this seminar, word went out that Lacan had given a seminar 
on love, implying that the seminar dealt with problems in love or sexual relationship, 
an issue which features often in analytical work. But at the next meeting, he refuted 
this, and insisted that what he spoke on was "stupidity" (Lacan, 1998: 12) – in other 
words, the nature of analytic discourse, the very possibility of understanding and 
talking about sexuality and the woman. The significance of jouissance is thus to do 
with knowledge (of the subject) and its limit, and how it affects the analytic 
                                                                                                                                          
boy's father to use the word, translated as "stupid" or "nonsense", to name the symptom. (Lacan, 
1998: 11n42) 
5For example, Brook states that the actor "must bring into being an unconscious state of which he is 
completely in charge" (1972: 141). 
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relationship.  
 
From a common-sense understanding, enjoyment is, of course, crucial to the 
dilemma of presence: the audience only attends theatre for the pleasure of it. Or does 
it? Interestingly, Brook offers this provocation:  
 
Almost every season ... one play succeeds not despite but because of dullness. 
After all, one associates culture with a certain sense of duty, historical 
costumes and long speeches with the sensation of being bored; so conversely, 
just the right degree of boringness is a reassuring guarantee of a worthwhile 
event. (Brook, 1972: 13) 
 
Similarly, that sexual enjoyment should feature so frequently in analytic discourse is 
not because of its presence, but most often because of its failure. The truth that 
manifests as symptoms resides in the unconscious (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 
166), and can only be useful within the analyst/analysand relationship if the 
coherence of the subject's consciousness is broken. This gap, according to Lacan, 
comes from the subject's demand for love as an infant:  
 
as between mother and child, there was always something missing in the 
discourse between analyst and analysand. The analytic discourse 'turns around', 
'stops and stumbles over' the same symptom – the unfulfilled and unutterable 
demand for love, which takes place in the analytic relationship. ... The analytic 
discourse keeps bumping into an empty space, the area excluded by language. 
(Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 184)6  
 
The demand for love in an analytic relation stems from relations early in the child's 
development; the "empty space" that it leaves can be traced back to the emergence of 
the child as a subject out of the Oedipal complex. The infant sees the mother as the 
one who provides for the infant's needs, as an "'absolute being' ... who can recognize 
and love him" (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 174). The infant's physiological needs 
are bound up with the demand for love. But she cannot fulfil the absolute demand for 
love, even though she may satisfy the needs; she is also a subject who desires (the 
father). "The demand for love goes beyond the objects that satisfy need"; the infant 
thus perceives a lack in the mother (the love object), and this is what constitutes 
                                                 
6The correlation between what Benvenuto & Kennedy describe as the "empty space" that confronts 
the analytic relation, and what Brook proposes as the "empty space" that is the essence of theatre, 
is perhaps more than co-incidental. Both seem to point to the desires involved in the 
analysand/analyst and performer/audience relations – something which I attempt to explore in this 
thesis. 
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desire (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 174). This is where Lacan differs from 
Freudian theory: for Freud, the mother's lack is a biological lack of the penis, which 
is the basis for her desire. For Lacan, her lack is in relation to the father's authority 
(the Law of the Father); the castration (of the mother as a subject) is not anatomical, 
but at the level of the signifier, the phallus – as opposed to the penis – which she 
lacks and which she unconsciously desires (Grosz, 1990: 71).  
 
As the infant recognizes the desire of the m/other, he/she tries to identify with the 
object of the mother's desire – to be the phallus (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 132). 
The infant tries to make the absent phallus present in the form of its own body; it is a 
desire for and of the mother. This Oedipal desire is intervened into by the father; 
again, away from Freud's more biological account, for Lacan it is the name of the 
father (the one who has the phallic signifier) that lays down the law. The boy infant, 
in particular, renounces the oedipal relation with the mother and enters the symbolic 
order of the father, organized around the signifier of the phallus. He moves from a 
position of being a phallus to having one, repressing his unspoken desires as the 
unconscious. This is what enables the child to assume a subject position independent 
of the mother. As Elizabeth Grosz explains:  
 
The child's sacrifice of its primary love-object [the mother] in conformity with 
the law must be compensated ... by means of the acquisition of a position, a 
place as a subject in culture. ... The child ... is now bound to the law, in so far 
as he is implicated in the symbolic 'debt', given a name, and an authorized 
speaking position. The paternal metaphor is ... the formula by which the 
subject, through the construction of the unconscious, becomes an 'I', and can 
speak in its own name. (Grosz, 1990: 71) 
 
Subjecthood, and the attendant ability to use language, is thus dependent on the 
renunciation of pre-Oedipal sexuality and submission to the paternal law; conversely, 
the phallic signifier governs social relations, including the use of language: "the 
phallus is the crucial signifier in the distribution of power, authority and a speaking 
position, a kind of mark or badge of a social position" (Grosz, 1990: 125). 
 
For some psychologists, a person's psychic health or pathology can be traced to 
his/her success or failure of the castration process. Asocial behaviour testifies to the 
failure to resolve pre-Oedipal (perverse) desires; the failure to submit to the paternal 
law is seen to affect the subject's exchange relations within the social order, 
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including the use of language. In this sense, some psychoanalytical theory of the 
human subject is in harmony with the tradition of the Cartesian Cogito – the subject 
whose rationality guarantees his knowledge of himself ("I am thinking, therefore I 
am"). The outlaw is repressed, allowing the conscious subject to conduct his lawful 
social role.  
 
The nature of knowledge and the use of language is thus implicated in how the 
human subject is defined. This is what I have called the "habit of truth": the 
assumption of the speaking subject (thesis writer, or theatre performer) as possessing 
knowledge of himself gives rise to exchange relations that govern how the form and 
content of the exchange is judged. Traditionally, the contract of the thesis is premised 
upon the individual's effort in the adroit use of language ("adroit" from the French 
droit, meaning law; Lacan, 1998: 3) to achieve clarity of meaning, which creates the 
possibility of truth-telling, and which gives rise to the basis for judging his/her merit. 
Similarly with theatrical performances. An example is David Best's approach in 
applying philosophy to human movement (1978), which he argues is possible to be 
analyzed linguistically. He challenges the simplistic differentiation between language 
as strictly verbal, and movement as non-linguistic: "no line can usefully, or even 
coherently, be drawn between communication which employs words and that which 
does not ... language itself is a form of behaviour" (Best, 1978: 145). Thus the 
concept of "language" becomes applicable to an investigation of the human body's 
movement. "The crucial distinction is between non-intentional and intentional 
behaviour" (Best, 1978: 145); language, being intentional, "provides the standards of 
truth and falsity" (Best, 1978: 146). Artistic meanings, whether communicated 
through words or movements, depend on the artist's intention being correctly 
understood by the spectator.7 Crucially, the artist's intention is "expressed in and 
logically inseparable from the particular medium of expression" (Best, 1978: 148). 
Thus he concludes that the emotion of a performance, for example, cannot be known 
as having a separate existence to the language or form in which it is expressed (Best, 
1978: 152). The artist's skill (adroitness) in manipulating the form is thus the basis of 
meaning, truthfulness (regarding intention), and criteria for evaluation.  
                                                 
7
  Best’s position concerning artistic communication is less restrictive than linguistic communication; 
different interpretations of the artist’s intention are accounted for in the act of communication 
(Best, 1978: 148). The centrality of intention, however, remains. 
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However, Best's insistence on intention and clarity can be seen as a symptom of his 
method: "one might characterize the methods of philosophy as consisting in criticism 
and clarification, tracing out the logical consequences of what people say, and 
revealing the logical structure of language" (Best, 1978: 4; emphasis added). The 
intention of the speaking being and the exclusion of non-logical utterances are 
already assumed in the methodology. Perhaps unintentionally, Best's argument seems 
to result in the strange conclusions that a person will always know his/her feelings 
intentionally. Common sense tells us that this is not true. Psychoanalytical clinical 
data confirms this: the unconscious disturbs the subject and ruptures his/her 
language; the authority of intention is undercut. "What is at stake in analytic 
discourse is always the following – you give a different reading to the signifiers that 
are enunciated than what they signify" (Lacan, 1998: 37).  
 
Symptoms, anxieties, and feelings of dis-ease indicate that the castration process is 
not total; the indecent demand for love does not disappear. Some psychologists 
interpret this to be individual pathologies. But feminists (see for example, Irigaray 
1985, Grosz 1990) point out that within this logic, no woman can come out of 
castration as anything other than not-whole (lacking the phallus), and her desire for 
the phallus confines her to the maternal role: by bearing a child she has the 
possibility to possess a phallus (the baby). Luce Irigaray particularly points out that 
such accounts of feminine sexuality deny the "multiplicity of genital erogenous 
zones"; the discourse of psychoanalysis uses "masculine parameters" to understand 
something that is denied by its assumptions (Irigaray, 1985: 63-4). From this I draw a 
proposition: are all women then to be understood as pathological, or can the feminist 
critique point to the possibility that no-one comes out of the oedipal complex 
completely at ease with the symbolic order? 
 
This possibility can perhaps be found in Lacan's theory. The demand for love, that 
"empty space" in an analytic relationship (see p.5), is the demand for the "absolute 
being" – the mother who loves and recognizes the infant; the source of certainty and 
fullness.  The analysand speaks to the analyst as "the subject who is supposed to 
know", as an embodiment of the Other (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 175), and 
from the analyst a demand is spoken. The demand for love and the demand for 
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knowledge is intertwined: "I love the person I assume to have knowledge" (Lacan, 
1998: 67). And yet this certainty can only be a fantasy, unconsciously projected as 
the Other; or more accurately, the unconscious that was established through 
repression is the "internalized locus of the Other" (Grosz, 1990: 126). And the 
unconscious is organized by the signifier phallus, which is a signifier of lack, 
because in carrying with it the paternal law it signifies castration (Grosz, 1990: 125). 
The fantasy of the Other (according to Grosz, the Other is also the intervening 
symbolic father who prohibits Oedipal desire; 1990: 74) is thus a signifier of lack:  
 
In Lacan's view, the phallic signifier ... structures the unconscious as a 
language based on a 'defect in being'. Without this defect, or the essential 
constituting role of lack and absence, and the lacking object, nothing could be 
represented. ... Language represents in so far as it prohibits – it is marked by 
the phallic signifier, and hence by castration, lack, absence. (Benvenuto & 
Kennedy, 1986: 180) 
 
At this point I am able to pick up again on the dilemma of presence, and explore why 
the weight of the speaker's presence is that the audience enjoys it (see p.4). In 
Encore, Lacan does not speak of one kind of jouissance but two. The signifier 
phallus governs the unconscious which gives rise to the speaking being; the use of 
language also gives the speaker a jouissance, a phallic jouissance. Lacan also posits 
the possibility of an/Other jouissance, which he locates in feminine sexuality. 
Benvenuto & Kennedy explain:  
 
There is something about sexual enjoyment which does not make sense, and is 
of no use to phallic enjoyment, which for Lacan is based on the economy of 
pleasure. The economy of pleasure supports all the architecture of the words 
and knowledge based on the 'economy' of the phallus. The phallus is the 
symbolic and idealized substitute for the missing sexual unity, or one-ness. ... 
Talking about love is certainly enjoyable, but at the expense of sexual 
enjoyment 'having its say'. The latter fails to exist for the subject who speaks, 
who is submitted to the symbolic structure of language. There is a 'phallic' kind 
of enjoyment in the symbolic operations of language which stands for, and 
designates at the same time, another enjoyment, connected to sexual 
intercourse. (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 187-8) 
 
Phallic jouissance is the enjoyment of the mastery of language (Benvenuto & 
Kennedy, 1986: 188); and, by extension, artistic form. But it is an enjoyment that 
fails. The desires that emerge from the castration process cannot be satisfied by the 
Other, even as the subject unconsciously longs for it. Language has a remainder, 
something which it cannot signify (such as the empty space in analytic discourse), 
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except as a lacking object (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 176).  
 
On this point, Lacan picks up on his earlier work on desire, and the formulation of 
the objet a (objet autre, object other). It stems from desire for what is lacking in the 
mother, and what the mother desires (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 176). The 
voyeur's looking is, for example, not satisfied by the actual object of his sight; his 
sexual drive is satisfied by the imaginary object that does not fulfil his desire. So in 
looking at a "hairy athlete" he sees "the most graceful of girls" (Lacan, cited in 
Grosz, 1990: 78). Objet a is thus "the presence of a hollow, a void, which can be 
occupied ... by any object" (Lacan, cited in Grosz, 1990: 78). It is an empty space 
that invites to be filled – which induces desire; with its inability to be satisfied, desire 
keeps on calling out for more: More! More! Encore! Encore! (Robbins) 
 
Lacan offers this provocation:  
 
... for the moment, I am not fucking, I am talking to you. Well, I can have 
exactly the same satisfaction as if I were fucking. That's what it means. Indeed, 
it raises the question of whether in fact I am not fucking at this moment. 
(Lacan, cited in Grosz, 1990: 75) 
 
The weight of the speaker's presence – the audience's enjoyment – is thus a void that 
satisfies the sexual drive; but language is in fact a "standing in" for another 
jouissance. "[T]he risk involved" (see p.3) in speaking – in being present in front of 
an audience – perhaps, is the very speaking about a jouissance that escapes phallic 
identification, and thus capturing it in the phallic economy of words. And yet it is 
what guarantees the enjoyment (phallic jouissance) of the hearers, and induces them 
to come again and again.  
 
At stake is the relationship between analysand/analyst and speaker/hearer; and also 
between performer/audience, thesis writer/reader. If I write the objet a of desire 
(what desire/whose desire?) then what knowledge am I writing? How will my 
language be different to the adroitness of the writer with a presumption of his Cogito 
subjecthood? Would this not give rise to the same criteria for judgment? Irigaray's 
critique still stands: Lacan's theory ultimately returns to the mastery of the phallic 
signifier; feminine sexuality cannot be conceived as other than the remainder of the 
phallic economy; the analytic relation only has the stupidity of signifiers to work 
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with.8 The critique of psychoanalytic theory regarding sexuality is still open; but I 
cannot provide a response just yet. Already a host of ideas about subjecthood, 
knowledge and relations are raised, which needs to be worked through the activities 
of making and watching theatre, writing and reading. Epistemology is at the same 
time a question regarding exchange relations: if knowledge is governed around the 
phallic signifier, what criteria is there to judge a thesis except the droit, the mastery 
of language? Does a "Master's degree" pre-determine the impossibility of resistance? 
Is there an alternative, an/Other jouissance? 
 
The same questions apply to the skills of the adroit dancer or mime. What and whose 
desires are being induced by eliciting the calls of "encore" from an applauding 
audience?  
 
 
 
Truth-telling and the blindness of narratives 
 
It should now be more apparent how psychoanalytical theory may be relevant in a 
thesis on theatre. Beyond its ability to explain the themes and characters of plays and 
dances, the theory helps me think through the very relationship that theatre is based 
upon. By countering the Cartesian Cogito, "Lacan denounces the illusory mastery, 
unity, and self-knowledge that the subject, as a self-consciousness, accords itself" 
(Grosz, 1990: 148).9 The "theory of the socio-linguistic genesis of subjectivity" helps 
me investigate how one assumes a "speaking position within culture" (Grosz, 1990: 
148 & 122); in other words, it dispels the notion that each individual has equal access 
to language (words, or "theatre language") in order to speak his/her meanings. 
Instead it interrogates culture – the symbolic order – and how "exchange relations" 
are governed by the phallic signifier which is the basis of the cultural order (Grosz, 
1990: 126).  
                                                 
8Grosz notes that the point about the possibility of the woman to be talked about within the phallic 
economy has implications on how artists are able or unable to intervene in culture. Julia Kristeva, 
cited by Grosz as an example of a faithful follower of Lacan's theory, proposed that the avant-
garde transgressor artist/poet can only be male, because he alone occupies full speaking 
subjecthood, and can thus disrupt the symbolic order through his excess (Grosz, 1990: 164).  
9For the moment, I cite this statement discounting Lacan's return to mastery as proposed by Irigaray's 
critique of psychoanalysis, which is touched upon in the above section. 
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There is a shift of attention from individual authorship to the cultural order which 
regulates the speaking being and his/her exchange relations. This shift in method can 
perhaps help me explore the sense of loss, discontent and anxiety regarding my very 
presence – in performing/watching theatre, and in reading/writing this thesis – as 
something that is not confined to my own pathology.10 
 
At this point, I attempt a shift in writing method: I will tell a story. Throughout this 
thesis, I will be relating many narratives from different storytellers, storytellers who 
have journeyed through different landscapes – artistic (descriptions of performances; 
artistic manifestos; reflections on creative processes), spectatorial (reviews, 
critiques), and theoretical – and brought back their fireside tales, in the form of 
writings as representations of their journeys, their wanderings. 
 
Why story? It is not an aesthetic, but an ethical decision. Lacan proposes that 
psychoanalytic discourse "does not allow us to remain at the level of ... Aristotle's 
ethics", but encourages a slippage "to Bentham's utilitarianism, in other words, to the 
theory of fictions" (Lacan, 1998: 3). The Greek tradition, as Fink (Lacan's translator) 
explains, insists on "the doctrine that the basis of moral obligations is found in the 
tendency of 'right actions' to produce happiness" (Lacan, 1998: 58n19). With the 
anxiety over language that psychoanalysis (among other theories) introduced, the 
possibility of a subject with the knowledge of "right actions" is thrown in doubt. 
Utilitarianism, for Lacan, means that "we must think about the purpose served by the 
old words, those that already serve us" (Lacan, 1998: 58). In casting my words, and 
the words of other writers that I cite, as narratives – fictions – I hope to encourage a 
reading that pays attention to the loss that is hidden in language. This seems to be a 
more satisfactory basis for ethical writing; but more on ethics later. First a story. 
 
I began my own journey of writing this thesis (if the myth of origin can be believed 
in) after the dress rehearsal of the biggest choreographic work I had done. I was 
nominated for the DaimlerChrysler Award for South African Choreography; on that 
                                                 
10It is hypothetically possible, of course, that I am the sole outsider who experiences frustration and 
anxiety when it comes to theatre. But my reading and wandering led me to practitioners and 
aesthetic theorists who write of similar discontents (such as Salverson: see below). The possibility 
that this is symptomatic of a larger phenomenon such as culture is a basic premise of my thesis. 
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November evening in 2002 my cast and I would be presenting a 30-minute physical 
theatre work to compete for the prize.11  
 
Each choreographer was interviewed for a video documentary after his/her dress 
rehearsal. The first question I was asked, after what seemed a rather significant pause 
indicating, perhaps, hesitation: "All dance is communication. What are you trying to 
communicate in your piece?" Later, after the interview, the photographer took me 
outside for some publicity shots. She confessed, "I'll be honest, I did not understand 
your piece." 
 
My first unspoken reaction to both these comments was not to explain the subject 
matter of my work, to help them understand where I come from, my intentions (my 
subject position; my theoretical lens; my history; my community and place of origin). 
I wanted to pose a question in return, to express my own non-understanding of their 
comments: "where did your expectation come from that I should make you 
understand something?"  
 
My response, as recorded on the video documentary, was:  
 
I think I want to evoke through dance. I think a lot of people would want to 
come to a dance theatre and want a message given to them, but what I want to 
do is to make dance theatre as a place where memories, evocations, 
possibilities, associations are made possible. I don't think I want a single 
message to go out to the audience. I want the audience to invest their own 
memories and their own sense of who they are, where they are, what they like 
or don't like, what they find disturbing or exhilarating and invest it into the 
watching of dance theatre. (in Nasser, 2003) 
 
After the performance, I was talking to the audience in the foyer. From the portion of 
the audience that did not respond with indifference, a few positive comments were 
offered, not as outright praise, rather they seemed to have been spoken from minds 
grappling with something murky, unable to pin it down with certainty, unable even to 
                                                 
11The definition of "physical theatre", and all the styles, crafts, and theoretical underpinnings that the 
term could possibly embrace (which are not homogeneous but often contradictory), are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. To describe my own work as a physical theatre combining dance, visual 
imagery, music and text is not sufficient to address, for instance, how meaning-making processes 
in my work differ from conventional theatre dance works or plays; nor is the description adequate 
in addressing the political and economic pressures that condition the reception of physical theatre 
as an art form.  
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be sure what their response should be. To my ears, there was an unmistakable air of 
loss, a sense of "if only" (if only I could say I enjoyed it; if only I had understood it; 
if only I could say for certain how it affected me, if at all), an already belated relation 
between the audience's response and the performance. I excused myself to go 
outside, where I wept quite uncontrollably. The next evening I found out that I did 
not win the award; I had known it, in fact, in the moment of silent hesitation after the 
end of the performance and before the applause. 
 
The sense of loss (in this case, the disconnection or uncertainty of connection 
between performer and audience) is understandable, if one invokes philosophy of 
aesthetics to understand the processes that were at work during the performance of 
my choreography. Kantian aesthetics, for example, formulates the pleasure of the 
aesthetic experience as an agreement. For Kant, knowledge results when an object, 
presented by the senses (such as sight) to the human subject, is able to be matched 
with a concept. An aesthetic judgment (the concept of "taste") falls between the 
presentation and the conception, linking the object to the concept of beauty (Sim, 
1996: 99). Taste (or the grand-narrative of taste, according to postmodernists like 
Jean-Francois Lyotard) determines the aesthetic experience of pleasure as a 
consensus (Lyotard, cited in Readings, 1991: 24): the concept of beauty as a grand 
narrative is an agreement of art and its place in a community (Sim, 1996: 109). 
Furthermore, as Sandra Kemp argues, performing arts differ from other arts because 
it presents not a "being-object", but a "becoming-object"; because performance is 
processual rather than a completed product, the act of aesthetic interpretation always 
occurs in the collaboration between performer and audience (Kemp, 1996: 155-156). 
Thus the artistic judgment of "whether it works or not" happens at the moment of 
performance, is itself a performance by the audience: "We have no difficulty 
deciding whether someone is good or bad at telling jokes, for instance" (Kemp, 1996: 
156). Performance is thus "sociable": 
 
A joke is not a joke if no one laughs ... but our laughter, our sense of the 
situation, cannot be disentangled from the fact that everyone else is laughing, 
too. We are embarrassed by an unshared or inappropriate response; if, for 
instance, we are the only person in the audience to be laughing. (Kemp, 1996: 
160)  
 
The pleasure of watching a performance is therefore premised on social consensus. If 
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one then compares this model of aesthetic perception and pleasure to my manifesto 
of what dance theatre should be, it is clear that my conception of how an audience 
should respond runs contrary to aesthetic pleasure. I was asking audience members 
not to match what was presented to their eyes with what they can mentally conceive, 
nor to rely on notions of beauty that were agreed upon by the temporary community 
of the audience. No wonder, then, the sense of loss and disconnection that followed 
the performance.  
 
At this point I interrupt my narrative, and make two related observations about my 
writing, both disputing the stake as to the truth value of this thesis. Firstly, the form 
of the narrative has clearly emerged: a hero's journey; an obstacle which disrupts the 
hero's relation to his community and brings on a crisis of self; the tears of regret, 
implying loss, mourning, contrition; a retrospective reflection to draw out a moral of 
the story that re-affirms the social order. The form or logic of the narrative 
inexorably leads on to the closure that implies the suturing of ruptures and gaps. The 
writing itself – that I am able to narrate the event – is a sign of having dealt with the 
sense of loss, according to some psychological models of wellness.12  
 
What does this say about the writing of my thesis, then? Perhaps this: By forming my 
trauma into words, by representing it in a narrative, I am able to turn my emotional 
experience into knowledge. Then I can verify my discontent, now represented in 
statements of hypothesis. Perhaps I would be able to prove that traditional aesthetics 
do not and should not hold in contemporary South Africa, and my faith in an avant 
garde mode of art making and reception would be proven right, even if only defiantly 
and misunderstood by the public (which would, however, indicate the failure to find 
closure). Or else, I may be proven wrong, and this thesis would be a narrative of 
mourning, an Oedipal process where I renounce infantile ideals and take up a useful 
position in "the real world" (often uttered in trepidation by my peers, and as an 
authoritative decree by older adults), to enter the social order of the theatre industry 
where the mature desire of satisfying the audience replaces pre-Oedipal narcissism.  
                                                 
12Peggy Phelan (1996), for example, traces the origins of psychoanalysis in the construction of 
narrative for the symptom of hysteria by Freud and Breuer. The narrating of the symptom's history 
joins the traumatic event into time; thus the act of narrating, or interpreting the trauma, is a sign of 
healing. Narrative psychology more explicitly relies on the act of narration for the subject to enact 
a healing process.  
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But in fact, the thesis is neither of these. I still live with the memory of the event, this 
personal sense of loss; but it does not burn in my side as an anger that spurs me onto 
defiance (at least, not nearly as strongly). Nor is it any longer a paralyzing reminder 
of my pathology, my deviation from social norms, my need to renunciate infantile 
desires. How I have survived through this event, then, falls through the cracks of that 
inexorable logic of my narrative, and the (self-)knowledge it represents. 
 
The second observation is lengthier. The narrative of my loss is written in the mode 
of a confession or testimony, whose truth value rests on the telling of self, of 
subjective truth (the truth of the subject). There is almost no way for readers to verify 
it objectively, because they have no other ways to access to my thoughts, feelings 
and memories. One can check if I had really been nominated for the award, if I had 
really cried (through witnesses' testimony of their own memories), if my citation of 
Kant via Lyotard is defensible. It does not change the fact that these were my 
processes and were "true" to my consciousness; as such a confession is beyond 
criticism.13 Confession that is done correctly is beyond criticism. As in the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings, testimony is not treated as legal 
evidence to be tested but as a performance of the soul and conscience of the self: 
 
The past decade in South Africa has seen us exploring once again the 
implications of a legal-judicial process which invoked confession rather than 
material verification for its primary instrument. As a nation we watched and 
listened, and felt ourselves competent to determine who amongst the amnesty 
applicants was bearing false witness, and who was truly contrite and seeking 
reconciliation. (Taylor, 2004) 
 
The word "truth", as Lacan points out, is of juridical origin; yet the purpose of truth-
telling is at odds with what is being confessed:  
 
Even in our times, a witness is asked to tell the truth, nothing but the truth, and, 
what’s more, the whole truth, if he can – but how, alas, could he? We demand 
of him the whole truth about what he knows. But, in fact, what is sought – 
especially in legal testimony – is [how things stand with] his jouissance. The 
goal is that jouissance be avowed, precisely insofar as it may be unavowable. 
The truth sought is the one that is unavowable with respect to the law that 
regulates jouissance (Lacan, cited in Caudill, 2000: 249, emphasis added). 
                                                 
13Chapter 2 elaborates on the idea of something being beyond criticism, because of its subjective 
premise. 
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The hearer of confession desires the certainty of truth – Was his torture sadistic, or 
was he reluctant? Is he really remorseful? – and yet this desire is impossible to 
satisfy (psychologically – see p.10 – but also on a common-sense level). The person 
who is confessing does not have access to his whole being/truth; the truth of the 
subject cannot be total. David Caudill describes this dilemma in a legal context: "we 
are asking for a confession of that which is not 'confessable' due to the very structure 
of the subject of law" (Caudill, 2000: 249).  
 
If confession (or the desire for it) is apparently so futile, what is its fascination? Why 
does confession appear credible; what makes it recognizable as correctly performed, 
and its truthfulness trustworthy? What makes a confessing perpetrator appear "truly 
contrite"; what makes readers of a choreographer writing about his own art agree that 
he is convincing as to the integrity of his processes and beliefs? More disturbingly, 
Jane Taylor, academic and theatre writer, asks of the TRC: "what is it in us that 
makes us seek out the stories of another's grief? ... what makes us follow the stories 
of torturers?" (Taylor, 1998: v) 
 
Jacques Derrida's discussion on self-portraits deconstructs the discourse of 
confession, and so I will relate his narrative here, in the hope of responding to some 
of the (ethical) questions above. Derrida confesses his anxiety regarding drawing: 
 
In truth, I feel myself incapable of following with my hand [by drawing on 
paper] the prescription of a model: it is as if, just as I was about to draw, I no 
longer saw the thing. For it immediately flees, drops out of sight, and almost 
nothing of it remains; it disappears before my eyes, which, in truth, no longer 
perceives anything but the mocking arrogance of this disappearing apparition. 
As long as it remains in front of me, the thing defies me, producing, as if by 
emanation, an invisibility that it reserves for me, a night of which I would be, 
in some way, the chosen one. (Derrida, 1993: 36) 
 
The last phrase needs to be elaborated before dealing with what Derrida might be 
confessing here. Derrida traces the confession of "the chosen one" through the 
lineage of blind men in the bible, whose blindness became allegoric of the fall; the 
divine vision (an angel, an appearance of the Lord) that visits upon the blind man 
opens his eyes and grants him spiritual truth. In biblical hermeneutics this is the 
allegory for the union of the Church with God: "Now we see but a poor reflection as 
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in a mirror; then [i.e. "when perfection comes"] we shall see face to face. Now I 
know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known" (1 Corinthians 13: 
12). This event of giving sight/truth by the transcendent Being is a debt that must be 
inscribed, remembered and proclaimed (Derrida, 1993: 29) – hence the writing of 
scriptures, the proclamation of the gospel through evangelism, the confession of faith 
that is simultaneously a confession of guilt (sin) and a giving thanks of salvation. 
 
Confession is thus the performance of the chosen, and the chosen is marked by a 
wound (Derrida, 1993: 33), a loss of sight, a traumatic event, a fall. It is a confession 
of the blind (testifying to eventual salvation and communion with God, the origin, 
truth and certainty). As such the blindness is a sacrifice, in the type of Christ’s 
affliction; and for Derrida, what meets the eye – "the narrative, spectacle, or 
representation of the blind" – is a "sacrificial event", a blindness at the heart of 
seeing/drawing/confessing (Derrida, 1993: 41).  
 
Drawing14 – in particular the self-portrait, the seeing and representing of self – does 
not transform the self into visible object; confession is instead a testament of 
invisibility, of an object that, as Derrida confesses, "disappears before my eyes"; "it 
immediately flees, drops out of sight, and almost nothing of it remains". It is as if 
Derrida is describing the seeing of a performance, what Kemp calls the "becoming-
object" (1996: 156 – see p. 9 above). The affliction on the chosen confessor also 
closely resembles the call of the stage performer: Rachel Karafistan compares the 
"'calling' towards performance, the 'urge' to be on stage" which actors recount (or 
confess), to the calling of a shaman through illnesses and psychic disturbance (2003: 
158&151). 
                                                 
14In "drawing" Derrida refers to all performances or confessions of self. "The drawing of men [the 
patriarchal implication of which is developed throughout my thesis], in any case, never goes 
without being articulated with articulation, without the order being given with words ... without 
some order, without the order of narrative, and thus of memory, without the order to bury, the 
order of prayer, the order of names to be given or blessed. Drawing comes in the place of the 
name, which comes in the place of drawing ... As soon as a name comes to haunt drawing, even 
the without-name of God that first opens up the space of naming, the blind are tied in with those 
who see. An internal duel breaks out at the very heart of drawing." (1993: 56-57) Drawing – the 
seeing of object and the performance of the hand (body) – never goes without the structure or 
authority or lineage proceeding from the giving and blessing of the name (language) – the 
choosing of the blind men. And so: "If what is called a self-portrait depends on the fact that it is 
called 'self-portrait,' and act of naming should allow or entitle me to call just about anything a self-
portrait, not only any drawing ... but anything that happens to me, anything by which I can be 
affected or let myself be affected." (1993: 65) Self-portrait becomes a performance (a confessing, a 
naming) of self as the chosen one, the blind confessor of salvation.  
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The martyrdom of the confessor (writer, performer; seer, spectator) is thus what 
makes his witnessing credible, and its truthfulness trustworthy. Whereas, in common 
usage, the "witness" is the one who serves the legal purpose of reporting, 
transparently, what he/she had seen – as if seeing (French: voir) is knowing (savoir) 
(cf. Derrida, 1993: 12); confession, in fact, concerns spiritual light: 
 
the blind man thus becomes the best witness, a chosen witness ... Witnessing 
substitutes narrative for perception. ... No authentication can show in the 
present what the most reliable of witnesses sees, or rather, has seen and now 
keeps in memory ... (Derrida, 1993: 104)  
 
The performance of confession is "seen only through the blindness that it produces 
as its truth" (Derrida, 1993: 65): 
 
In Christian culture there is no self-portrait without confession. The author of 
the self-portrait does not show himself; he does not teach anything to God, who 
knows everything in advance ... The self-portratist thus does not lead one to 
knowledge, he admits a fault and asks for forgiveness. (Derrida, 1993: 117) 
 
Confession thus still holds a hearer in fascination despite the impossibility of truth; 
the "truth" of the narrative, for instance, the story about my existential crisis as a 
choreographer, testifies not to knowledge, but to a performative imploring for 
forgiveness, acknowledgment, reconciliation, recognition of my art. I am a practising 
artist, writing about the conditions of the making and reception of art. The 
convention of academic discourse, based on rationality, relies on my being a witness 
who transparently (without interference from the observer) reports what he has seen; 
the language with which a report is made of what is seen must also assume a 
transparency of representation. But if I watch performances and read writings 
through my blindness/loss, what truth will my thesis tell? On the other hand, what 
discursive model is adequate for the blindness that conditions performance and its 
seeing? Perhaps, my writing inevitably becomes a self-portrait, an artistic manifesto; 
my readings of other practitioners a function of my blindness: a narration of my 
memory, my calling; the wound, the name with which I was chosen (the name of the 
father?), becomes the (only) story I tell.  
 
Like the testimonies at the TRC, confession generates perhaps not so much 
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knowledge but a plea.15 Antjie Krog, who led the South African Broadcast 
Corporation radio reportage of the TRC, writes this relation between testifier and 
hearer with the analogy of a husband demanding the truth of an affair from his wife: 
 
Why? Where? How? From when to when – all of that is negotiable with the 
things I already know. So the more I know, the more you will confess. What 
truth I don't know, you will never tell me. (Krog, 1999: 300) 
 
The details, the verifiable information, only add to what is already known; or perhaps 
one should say, the already named – the guilty, the saviour, the confessor. In the 
TRC's case, the elements of "the guilt of apartheid atrocities", "the national 
reconciliation process and amnesty", and "the public act of testifying and promising 
to tell the truth", are all already named. In the case of my narrative, the elements of 
"my sense of loss", "aesthetic principles", and "the writing of my thesis" stand in the 
same relation.  
 
If this were the case (and please note the "if"), what is there for the reader to do 
except, in the same manner as TRC chairman Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the 
commissioners, to sympathize with the victims, and to make decisions about granting 
amnesty?  
 
The mark that gives credit to the confessor – the wound, the trauma, the loss – is 
made evident in tears. Tears, by veiling sight, reveals "the truth of the eyes", which is 
not to see (and know) but to implore (to God, the origin of names) (Derrida, 1993: 
126). Within the mode of confession, the spectator feels that s/he has the ability to 
tell apart the "truly contrite", and one of the most telling evidences that confession 
has been "performed correctly", is tears. In my own narrative, the climax, the 
moment of truth, of reckoning, was in my weeping. But what truth did my tears 
guarantee – the truth of my confession narrative? Or the truth of the narrative of fall 
and salvation? And thus what truth can the reader identify with or grant amnesty to – 
the subjective truth of my art which is already named? 
                                                 
15Or, the point of testimony is not so much knowledge as a plea. It seems problematic to think that 
knowledge in itself, such as the location where a victim is buried, would be enough to offer closure 
to the bereaved. That the knowledge could be articulated at all is dependent on the discourse of 
forgiveness; the speaker testifies because forgiveness is sought. Even if the bereaved refuses to 
grant forgiveness, the perpetrator's speaking at least signals the end of the hatred or madness that 
killed the victim, and so giving rest to the departed. 
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Ethical anxieties: identification and the dramatic hero 
 
Words fail me. How am I to tell the story of my discontent and loss? Words cannot 
objectively represent meanings allowing knowledge (savoir) to be transparently seen; 
I can act as my own analyst and diagnose my artistic pathology, but a neat, well-
argued interpretation is no cure. Words cannot purport to bypass rational objectivity 
and confess the truth of the subject; such pre-determined "truth" that is already 
named is not knowledge, and can never satisfy the hearer's demand for certainty. If I 
may be so bold, I think I am approaching a crude (un-adroit) understanding of why 
Lacan's words are so notoriously obscure, why he seemed ambivalent about his 
relation with the hearers of his seminars, and why he "might prefer that [his] 
presence not be guaranteed to [the audience] in each and every case" (Lacan, 1998: 
12).16  
 
All this anxiety! Why am I flaunting my angst, passing off personal pathology as 
academic knowledge? Why am I displaying my adolescent fantasy of being a social 
misfit? This, I anticipate, is how some readers will respond, in exasperation. And I 
anticipate this less out of paranoia, and more out of hearing what some people, both 
within and outside the theatre industry, have said to me or my colleagues, expressing 
disapproval when certain types of theatre are made. These are not worth repeating; 
the silent pressure to make certain types of theatre (in terms of style or content, to 
elicit responses from audiences that are considered politically, aesthetically or 
economically appropriate) is that much louder.  
 
The audacity in my thesis, I believe, lies not in the seeming complexity of subject 
matter or writing style, but in my making this following argument: that my anxiety 
and discontent should be understood as ethical discontent. In other words, in this 
thesis I will dare to evaluate art according to ethics. It is audacious, because I refuse 
to settle my differences with the disapproving voices as "a difference of taste"; 
                                                 
16Elizabeth Grosz writes of Lacan's seminars:  
Many saw these seminars as a kind of intellectual/sexual tease; his indirect, elliptical, evasive, 
but always suggestive lecture techniques remains striking for the promise of a 'knowledge' (the 
gratification of a desire to know) which recedes the closer it comes. (Grosz, 1990: 15) 
 Lacan was also reputed for his emphasis on the ending or interruption of analysis sessions, rather 
than the standard 50-minute sessions that guarantees the presence of the analyst/analysand for a set 
amount of time (Grosz, 1990: 15). 
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rather, I am implying that they are unethical. Once again, some wandering is needed 
to unravel these ideas. I return to my narrative of artistic failure, still in search of 
what caused the failure to offer pleasure to the audience. What, in theatre terms, is 
the audience's desire?  
 
In Freud's account of drama, the pleasure of the audience rests on the ability to 
identify with the hero's struggle against God (Freud, 1997: 88). Modern (Western) 
dramas move the hero's quest from rebellion in the spiritual terrain to the social and 
the psychological. Freud posits Hamlet as the first instance of a drama that deals with 
psychopathological suffering in the hero; the hero's struggle is between his conscious 
and repressed impulses, and the pleasure comes from identifying the hero's neurosis 
as also existing in the spectator (Freud, 1997: 91).  
 
However, Freud also posits a "precondition" to the audience's pleasure: while they 
can invest their desires in the hero's quest, his presence must protect the audience 
from actual suffering. The game of make-believe that is drama makes pleasure from 
suffering, but on the condition that no suffering is caused in the audience (Freud, 
1997: 89). The identification is an unconscious one; Freud considers this drama 
impossible unless the audience's identification with the neurosis can be achieved 
"with [the spectator's] attention averted, allowing repressed material to surface" 
(Freud, 1997: 92).  
 
In dramas that deal with the psychological terrain, it means that the struggle between 
the conscious and the unconscious must end "in a renunciation" (Freud, 1997: 91). 
Having struggled with the unconscious, as Jacob struggled with the angel, the hero 
must ultimately succumb (renounce Oedipal impulses) and receive the blessing (of 
divine vision, the name). The hero must enter into the symbolic order.  
 
So far, this account of the desire at work in a theatrical exchange relation between 
performer and audience seem well within what is ethical. I have already mentioned 
Lacan's attack on the Greek tradition of ethics as based on the subject's knowledge of 
"right actions" (see p.13). To presume the subject as able to know the rightness of 
his/her intentions and actions could be dangerous: a startling and extreme example is 
provided by political and aesthetic theorist Theodor Adorno. He asserts that if 
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rational thought is not checked by what can elude it (perhaps, what the subject cannot 
know), it is "in the nature of the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to 
drown out the screams of its victims" (Adorno, cited in Eagleton, 1990: 41-2). In this 
example, there is a radical separation between the sophistication of language or form 
and the ethics of the action. For Freud, drama provides a framework for balancing 
conscious form and unconscious desires, allowing repressed material to surface, but 
ultimately to be renounced for the social order to return. If the unconscious material 
is not carefully drawn out while the audience's attention is diverted; if the repressed 
desires of the hero are not ultimately renounced, causing the audience to be 
implicated in the suffering; if the conditions of pleasure are not adhered to, Freud 
claims, the drama simply would not work, the audience would resist it (Freud: 1997: 
92-3). I have already mentioned this age-old dialectic between the Apollonian and 
the Dionysian (see p.4). 
 
However, the identification with the hero, on which the audience's enjoyment is 
based, needs a closer examination. Lacan relates a story about identification:  
 
I can tell you a little tale, that of a parakeet that was in love with Picasso. How 
could one tell? From the way the parakeet nibbled the collar of his shirt and the 
flaps of his jacket. Indeed, the parakeet was in love with what was essential to 
man, namely, his attire ... The parakeet was like Descartes, to whom men were 
merely clothes (habits) ... Clothes promise debauchery ... when one takes them 
off. But this is only a myth ... To enjoy a body ... when there are no more 
clothes leaves intact the question of what makes the One, that is, the question 
of identification. The parakeet identified with Picasso clothed. ... [W]hat lies 
under the habit, what we call the body, is perhaps but the remainder ... I call 
object a. (Lacan, 1998: 6) 
 
With what does the audience identify? If clothing (that the parakeet loves) is opposed 
to the debauchery promised by its absence, then language and meaning 
(signification) similarly promises the chaotic, unspeakable, outlawed pre-Oedipal 
impulses hidden under the social order – the repressed unconscious. But the clothes's 
promise of debauchery is "only a myth"; even when unclothed, the body is 
constituted and regulated by signifiers: "It enjoys itself only by 'corporizing' the body 
in a signifying way" (Lacan, 1998: 23). The debauchery of the body, the sexualized 
body, is produced within the economy of the phallus through castration; objet a, that 
which fuels desire again and again (encore), is but a remainder "produced by the 
operation of language" (Irigaray, 1985: 90). The clothes, the signifiers – the "habit" – 
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reproduces the "truth" of the unconscious which, at every performance of Hamlet and 
other such dramas according to Freud, must be confronted and brought to Oedipal 
resolution.  
 
As such, the audience's desire can never be satisfied: phallic jouissance depends on 
the identification with a hero who tries to stand up to God/repressed impulses; 
literally, someone who tries to be the phallic signifier, an attempt to recover the lost 
Other.17 This is what induces the call of "encore"; Freud describes how these 
conditions on the audience's pleasure can produce endless combinations of stories 
and themes, "just as endless, in fact, as the erotic day-dreams of men" (Freud, 1997: 
91).  
 
What seems to be left unsaid in Freud's essay is that, if the hero does not renounce 
his rebellion (against God; the fantasy of the Other that is repressed), the audience, 
with their libidinal investments in the hero, will also come face to face with 
suffering. If identification brings phallic jouissance, then what is this "suffering" that 
comes from the refusal of or escape from castration?  
 
Irigaray develops Lacan's theory of feminine sexuality, showing that if sexual 
relations are governed by the phallic signifier, a woman's body always serves as the 
objet a, as the "not-whole" that requires the injection of the male phallus, ignoring 
the many different erogenous zones of the body (see p.8). Irigaray critiques Lacan for 
not seeing beyond his own logic; perhaps, like David Best with his philosophical 
method (see p.8), Lacan is trapped by his own language of phallic jouissance: 
 
The production of ejaculations of all sorts, often prematurely emitted, makes 
him miss, in the desire for identification with the lady, what her own pleasure 
might be all about. (Irigaray, 1985: 91) 
 
Responding to one such "ejaculation" of Lacan's, that the body "enjoys itself only by 
'corporizing' the body in a signifying way", she asks, "How, how many times, are we 
going to have to be cut into 'parts,' 'hammered,' 'recast ...' in order to become 
                                                 
17Lacan writes: "If an angel has such a stupid smile, that is because it is up to its ears in the supreme 
signifier. To find itself on dry land would do it some good – perhaps it wouldn't smile anymore" 
(Lacan, 1998: 20). 
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sufficiently signifying?"18 (Irigaray, 1985: 92) Lacan cannot admit to another logic, 
Irigaray argues, because he would have become vulnerable to another logic "that 
challenges mastery" (Irigaray, 1985: 90). She thus exposes a significant blindness in 
Lacanian theory:  
 
woman has no unconscious except the one man gives her. Mastery clearly 
acknowledges itself, except that no one notices it. Enjoying a woman, 
psychoanalyzing a woman, amounts then, for a man, to reappropriating for 
himself the unconscious that he has lent her. All the same, she continues to 
pay, and then some ... with her body. (Irigaray: 1985: 94) 
 
The theory of the unconscious, located as the truth of psychoanalysis, is found 
problematic if only for its partiality, its inability to explain the sexuality of about 
one-half of humanity. Furthermore, even as Lacan distinguishes analytic discourse 
from philosophical discourse (Lacan, 1998: 16), Irigaray reveals it to be another 
discourse "that tells the truth about the logic of truth" (Irigaray, 1985: 86). Insisting 
on the centrality of the phallic signifier as the determinant in social, sexual and 
linguistic organization,  
 
we might suspect the phallus (Phallus) of being the contemporary figure of a 
god jealous of his prerogatives; we might suspect it of claiming, on this basis, 
to be the ultimate meaning of all discourse, the standard of truth and propriety, 
in particular as regards sex, the signifier and/or the ultimate signified of all 
desire, in addition to continuing, as emblem and agent of the patriarchal 
system, to shore up the name of the father (Father).  (Irigaray, 1985: 67) 
 
If psychoanalysis is a phallocentric discourse that insists on truth, then its 
postulations of psychic health or pathology becomes problematic (see pp.8-9); like 
the blessing of god's name on the confessor, the discourse already names the 
knowledge produced by psychoanalysis before it is spoken.  
 
If it is asserted – as can be inferred from Freud – that the failure of the dramatic hero 
to renounce his repressed desires would lead to the audience's coming face to face 
with suffering, then one should pose a question in response: suffering from whose 
                                                 
18I would like to insert a personal intuitive correlation here, although it is not backed by analysis: the 
hammering and separation of the parts of the body in order to produce a signifying body – and the 
artistic pleasure that results from it – reminds me of ballet training, with the repetitions of standard 
barre exercises that recast each part of the body so that it is "sufficiently signifying". (Most other 
dance trainings achieves this in different ways.) The forcefulness with which Irigaray writes 
somehow echoes the discontent that I feel towards the logic of mastery in theatrical body 
performances.  
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perspective? And conversely, from whose perspective is it pleasurable to identify 
with the hero in his quest? Recognizing the partiality of psychoanalytic discourse, 
one glimpses the possibility that the desires of the audience, hitherto considered quite 
obvious and commonly understood, are in fact manifold. To recall Brook, some may 
find a widely praised theatre event to be dull, not because of unrefined taste but 
because the others find the barrenness of "culture" reassuring (see p.5). And, to recall 
Kemp, we may have difficulty deciding whether someone is good or bad at telling 
jokes after all (see p.15).  
 
The idea that an audience deprived of phallic pleasure can be confronted with 
suffering is a significant one. If the phallic signifier is revealed to be what it is – a 
signifier of lack (see p.9) – the fantasy of the Other (god) as the one who possesses 
certainty and fullness can be shattered. The desire to be One with the Other (Freud 
describes Eros as the drive to combine two into one) is revealed to be hollow, 
"fraudulent" (Franses, 2001). The audience's confrontation with a jouissance that 
escapes the signifier can bring on suffering – horror – since the master signifier that 
governs meaning no longer holds.  
 
Psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva calls this place of horror the abject. If through 
repression the subject is constituted by drawing lawful boundaries between self and 
other subjects in the social order, between conscious and unconscious, between 
body's inside and outside, then "acts or materials that cross or question [these 
boundaries] are defined as 'abject’, to be viewed with disgust" (Counsell & Wolf, 
2001: 140). "I" find horror in the abject – the jettisoned parts of self – because "it 
draws me toward the place where meaning collapses" (Kristeva, 1982: 2). The abject 
– the unclean and the improper, the physically disgusting and the socially disruptive 
– "attests to the perilous and provisional nature of the symbolic control" of my 
subjectivity, revealing the fragility of "identity, order, and stability" (Grosz, in 
Counsell & Wolf, 2001: 143). The abject, "as in true theater, without makeup or 
masks ... [shows] me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live" (Kristeva, 
1982: 3). The horror of facing the abject does not allow the audience the fantasies on 
which subjectivities depend.  
 
I will elaborate on Kristeva's theory in chapter 3. Keeping my focus on the exchange 
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relation between performer and audience, and the ethical anxieties that arise, I hope 
to explain the horror of this "true theater", citing Lacan's theory of the gaze.  
 
The common sense understanding of the process of watching theatre, perhaps 
influenced by film theory, is the gaze of the audience at the objects of representation 
on stage. In this sense, the gaze gives the looker the power as the subject, who sees 
and knows. The cone of vision allows the object to be focused as an image, and the 
subject looks from what Lacan calls a geometral point of viewing; this is the familiar 
perspective instituted by Renaissance painting (Hal Foster, 1996: 139).19  
 
 
 
        Object        Image     Geometral point  
 
 
 
The geometral perspective constructs the looker as a Cartesian subject (Grosz, 1990: 
78): "I assure myself as a consciousness that knows that it is only representation, and 
that there is, beyond, the thing, the thing itself" (Lacan, in Mirzoeff, 2002: 127). This 
looking is the basis for theatre's make believe: the image represents the thing, but is 
not the thing itself, an obvious example being the use of trompe-l'oeil. It is 
understandable even by the blind, because "[w]hat is at issue in geometral 
perspective is simply the mapping of space, not sight" (Lacan, cited in Grosz, 1990: 
78).20 For Lacan, that a subject has sight also entails the subject being looked at, 
hence the notion of the gaze.  
 
A second cone of vision is added, where the subject who is looking is the picture that 
is seen. 
 
 
  Point of light       Screen    Picture 
 
 
                                                 
19The following drawings are reproduced from Hal Foster (1996: 139). 
20Descartes's "Optics" explains light rays with the analogy of the blind man's walking stick, as an 
extension of the senses sending signals back to the subject (in Mirzoeff, 2002: 117). 
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The gaze is not the look of another subject (another person looking back at me); it is  
"not carried by any specific set of eyes ... the gaze ... is the person looking being seen 
... by objects" (Franses, 2001).  
 
How can an object be said to be looking back at the subject? It is in fact a gaze that is 
imagined by the subject "in the field of the Other" (Lacan, cited in Franses, 2001, 
emphasis added). It is the subject's desire in relation to the Other that constitutes the 
gaze, as an excess over perspectival optics (Grosz, 1990: 78). "The objet a in the field 
of the visible is the gaze" (Lacan, in Mirzoeff, 2002: 126). In the same way that pre-
Oedipal impulses threaten to disrupt the law of the father and must be renounced in 
order to become a speaking being, i.e. the ability to use language; so the gaze, as a 
fantasmatic projection by the desiring subject, can unsettle the position of the looker. 
"The gaze is ... the drive under which the subject's identity and certainty fail" (Grosz, 
1990: 79). Citing from Lacan, Hal Foster notes that the subject,  
 
"looked at from all sides," is but a "stain" in "the spectacle of the world". Thus 
positioned, the subject tends to feel the gaze as a threat, as if it queried him or 
her; and so it is, according to Lacan, that "the gaze, qua objet a, may come to 
symbolize this central lack expressed in the phenomenon of castration". (Hal 
Foster, 1996: 138) 
 
The link between the threat of the object-gaze and the fear of castration is echoed in 
Freud's essay, "The Uncanny", where the "substitutive relation between the eye and 
the male organ" is analyzed (Freud, 1997: 206).21 Both fears demonstrate the process 
through which the subject – who can use language and who can be represented in the 
visible field – comes into being by regulating desire.  
 
Thus the screen, similar to language, alleviates the threat of the objet a. Hal Foster 
understands the screen as  
 
the cultural reserve of which each image is one instance. Call it the conventions 
of art, the schemata of representation, the codes of visual culture, this screen 
mediates the object-gaze for the subject, but it also protects the subject from 
this object-gaze. That is, it captures the gaze ... and tames it in an image. (Hal 
Foster, 1996: 140) 
 
Mirzoeff notes that Lacan invented the term "dompte-regard", based on the verb 
                                                 
21Derrida's analysis of the self-portrait also cites Freud's essay on the uncanny. 
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"dompter", to tame/to subdue; the term refers to "a situation in which the gaze is 
tamed by some object, such as a picture" (Mirzoeff, 2002: 128n1).  
 
Visual representation is thus not only the image, but its superimposition on the 
screen: 
 
 
 
  The gaze     image   The subject of representation 
       screen 
 
 
Art is not only the manipulation of the image, capturing the object of representation 
within a perspectival gaze; but because the human subject, with access to the 
symbolic order, is a desiring subject, the screen becomes "the site of picture making 
and viewing" where the subject manipulates and moderates the gaze (Hal Foster, 
1996: 140).  
 
Such is aesthetic contemplation according to Lacan: some art may attempt a 
trompe-l'oeil, a tricking of the eye, but all art aspires to a dompte-regard, a 
taming of the gaze. (Hal Foster, 1996: 140) 
 
Freud's analysis of drama as the identifying with the hero's quest can thus be 
explained as the taming of gaze. The horror that confronts the audience, should the 
hero fail to renounce his repressed desires (see p.27), is the horror of revealing the 
objet a, the lack that constitutes the subject's desire in the field of the Other. It is a 
glimpse of the jouissance that the subject cannot know. 
 
The theory of the gaze, along with the theory of the unconscious and the role of 
language, thus offers me a dual method to explore the exchange relation between 
performer/audience. The theatre, particularly the physically oriented performance 
forms which are the focus of this thesis, involves both visuality and narrative. But – 
to restate my anxiety and discontent – does the subject necessarily come out of 
castration completely at ease with the symbolic order (see p.8)? Must all narratives 
confess the blindness (the castration) of the patriarchal order? Must all art tame the 
gaze? Foster argues that some contemporary work aims "not only to attack the image 
but to tear at the screen, or to suggest that it is already torn" (Hal Foster, 1996: 141). 
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The implication is that these artistic innovations are not merely the renewal of form, 
but a questioning of the very act of looking. 
 
I have already mentioned that the motivation behind this questioning, this anxiety, is 
an ethical one. The perspectival gaze can give the illusion that the world can be 
captured as an image within the subject's knowledge. Heidegger states,  
 
The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as 
picture. The word "picture" now means the structured image that is the creature 
of man's producing which represents and sets before. In such a producing, man 
contends for the position in which he can be that particular being who gives the 
measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is. (cited in McKenzie, 
2001: 157) 
 
This humanism is described by Heidegger as a "moral-aesthetic anthropology" (cited 
in McKenzie, 2001: 157), in other words, the aesthetics of seeing gives rise to a 
moral order. The screen on which such an image is captured, however, can cover up 
the truly horrifying. Slavoj Žižek uses the theory of the gaze to explain the horror of 
Nazi Germany:  
 
the imaginary screen of satisfactions, myths, and so on ... enable the subjects to 
maintain a distance towards the horrors they are involved in ... and, above all, 
the real of the perverse (sadistic) jouissance in what they were doing (torturing, 
killing, dismembering bodies...) (Žižek, cited in Kunkle, 2000) 
 
The stability of subjectivity (having "successfully" gone through the Oedipal 
complex) is thus no guarantee for the subject's non-pathological social functioning. 
The social order can institute an image of the ideal citizen as the "measure" and 
"guideline" for right action, which is in fact an inability to confront repressed 
horror.22  
 
It thus becomes an ethical imperative to explore and explode the pleasure of 
identification – the phallocentric search for Oneness (see p.26) – in theatrical 
exchange relations. As an example, I cite a story told by Julia Salverson regarding 
her theatre work in Canada. Salverson creates community (or "popular", as opposed 
to mainstream commercial) theatre from testimonies of people who experience 
violence. She recounts the story of her attendance at a Theater of the Oppressed 
                                                 
22This idea of the heimlich (as opposed to the unheimlich, the uncanny) nation, which prescribes the 
image for its citizenry within a communal unity, is further explored in chapter 3. 
31 
workshop led by Augusto Boal, whose work often consists of games and exercises to 
encourage active contribution to the moment-to-moment creation of the drama, 
usually with the aim of bringing about political, social or psychological change. The 
people at the workshop, hailing from across Canada, have been through a day which 
has left everyone "tired, excited, disoriented, curious" (Salverson, 2001: 119).  After 
Boal ended the day's session,   
 
someone involved with the workshop asks us to form a circle and join hands. 
We have been doing what we're told all day, happily embarking on a 
succession of games and exercises. Glad for once not to be the teachers, the 
leaders, we are pleased to oblige. The organizer then asks us to repeat: "We are 
from near, we are from far, we are one. We are one." I open my mouth, start to 
repeat, and become immediately uncomfortable. Something inside me refuses 
this glib recitation of unity. I sense discomfort in the friend and colleague 
beside me. Later in the evening he asks me, "Isn't it strange? Here we are, a 
group of people who fight oppression every day. Myself, I have survived 
torture, imprisonment, exile from my country. And yet I couldn't bring myself 
to speak up, to say, 'No, excuse me, I don't wish to repeat this phrase that 
makes me so uneasy: We are one.'" (Salverson, 2001: 119) 
 
The oneness that is aspired towards in this small theatrical act, seemingly positive, 
causes anxiety in Salverson and her colleague. The desire for oneness is constituted, 
firstly, by the verbal narrative that aims to create identification; and secondly, by 
body performance. The simple performance of joining hands in a circle seems to 
form a screen that does not sit easily with, for instance, Salverson's colleague's real 
world experiences of horror. Yet it seems to produce such a powerful contract of 
behaviour in this group of theatre practitioners that they find it hard to rebel. 
Salverson and her colleague, in effect, have to renounce their struggle, much like the 
hero submitting to what Freud considers the necessary conditions of theatre.  
 
If exile can be understood as an ejection of the not-self from the (One/whole) nation, 
Salverson's colleague had strong motivation for feeling "uneasy" – anxious – about 
the forced identification. Adorno, with the scars of Nazi Germany fresh in his mind, 
pointed out the violence when (mental) concept is identified with phenomenon 
("reality"): "Auschwitz confirmed the philosopheme23 of pure identity as death" 
(Eagleton, 1990: 43). For Adorno, if history can be universalized (made One), "it is 
not a tale of cumulative happiness but ... the narrative that leads from the slingshot to 
                                                 
23Crudely defined: a basic principle of reasoning. 
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the megaton bomb" (Eagleton, 1990: 42). If there is a Oneness, Adorno argues, it 
"would teleologically be the absolute of suffering" (Adorno, cited in Eagleton, 1990: 
42).  
 
What I clumsily named "mass social trauma" (social, in order to distinguish the 
human agency of atrocities from natural disasters) is no less than the pervasive 
condition that affect thinking, seeing, speaking, and being. As for theatre,  
 
It is no longer enough – if it ever was – to assume that theater is by its very 
nature about connection; now those of us who practice theater that engages 
with people's accounts of violent events must articulate the nature of that 
contact. (Salverson, 2001: 119) 
 
Theatre practitioners repeatedly rehearse statements that praise the “liveness” of 
theatre; it is the quality that supposedly makes theatre indispensable even when faced 
with the onslaught of film, television and other entertainments and therapeutic 
channels that now occupy the major portion of the public's time and imagination. We 
rehearse phrases such as "sense of connection", "communal experience" and 
"immediacy" as articles of faith that legitimate our livelihood. But the traditional 
agreement of aesthetic experience, what Andrew Benjamin identifies as "a set of 
expectations about mimesis and representation ... no longer makes sense of what art 
(and the experience of art) may be" (cited in Kemp, 1996: 154). The important point 
to note is that, to insist on outdated modes of understanding (and producing) the 
experience of theatre is not naivety, nostalgia or a matter of taste, so much as a 
blindness to the dissolution of certainty (the transcendental subject/Being based on 
which hope can be believed in) that mass social trauma has introduced to living and 
meaning making. The pleasure of identification becomes ethically questionable, 
stirring anxieties and discontent. God's blessing and conferring of the name produces 
a blindness that screens out horror. The confession of the hero, his imploring gestures 
for forgiveness, reconciliation and Oneness rings hollow.  
 
 
 
Dissensus and the role of the artist/writer 
 
With the overwhelming tide of traumatic social atrocities in the twentieth century 
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came the emphasis on the importance of space for dissent.24 It is this space of 
dissensus that I search for in the theatre. But a proviso must be stated: there is a 
danger in treating consensus as inherently oppressive. The rejection of consensus can 
become a fetish for championing western individualism, the Enlightenment ideal of 
the autonomous, unattached individual (van Heerden, 2002: 9); of art as unfettered 
from social, political and economic concerns. It should be added that this view of art 
as having a transcendental Being does not result only in effete notions of "beauty" 
that retreat from any engagement with the political and social. Another product of 
this ideology is the transgressive artist, who plays the role of the liberator by 
transgressing restrictive social norms – the pure negation of droit, the embodiment of 
pure jouissance. Anthony Julius traces the rise of the transgressive aesthetic in visual 
art from the paintings of Manet to its exhaustion in today's cultural order. A hint of 
the political ineffectiveness of transgression can be seen in the following anecdote:  
 
The story is told of the postwar performance artist Tomislav Gotovac who 
would walk naked through Zagreb [in the former Yugoslavia]. His purpose was 
to offer himself as a metaphor to passers-by, similarly without cover before the 
totalitarian state, however layered in actual clothing they might be. Arrested 
and tried, he attempted an explanation: 'I am an artist, and my métier consists 
of stripping, and walking.' To which the judges responded: 'Yes, and our métier 
consists of gaoling you.' (Julius, 2002: 222). 
 
Some theories also embrace this pure negation as the basis of political action. 
Eagleton critiques poststructuralists (who did much work on the regulatory function 
of language) for mistaking consensus or collectivity as always oppressive (Eagleton, 
1990: 56): 
 
Those who indiscriminately demonize such concepts as unity, identity, 
consensus, regulation have forgotten that there are, after all, different 
modalities of these things, which are not all equivalently repressive. (Eagleton, 
1990: 57) 
 
                                                 
24The rise of democratic forms of government in the twentieth century can be seen as an indication of  
either the value that is placed on the possibility of dissent, or as an increasing recognition by states 
of the heterogeneity and dissent that exists within their nations' boundaries. It is true that much can 
be found wanting in democratic governance: whether the form of democracy indeed allows true 
dissent, and the collusion of democracy with unbridled capitalism and the new imperialism of the 
Washington Consensus; these will be touched on in chapter 2. However, the twentieth century was 
unarguably characterized by the ends of many empires and totalitarian regimes, be they imperial 
(British empire), communist (USSR and its satellite states), fascist, militaristic and/or other 
totalitarian forms of government (the Third Reich of Germany, expansionist Japanese empire, 
African states such as Uganda, DRC and South Africa).  
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To insist on the absolute rejection of phallic jouissance, after all, besides being 
impossible, is but another kind of repression; Eagleton puts it aptly: "Pure difference 
... is as blank and tedious as pure identity" (Eagleton, 1990: 56). (The implications of 
pure negation will be elaborated later in this chapter.) 
 
In the following chapters I explore the complex dynamic between dissent and 
consensus through two theatre controversies: in chapter 2, I attempt to re-tell the 
narratives that surrounded the "victim art" controversy that arose from American 
choreographer Bill T. Jones's work, Still/Here, and the "review" of critic Arlene 
Croce that sparked a furore of public debate. In chapter 3, I re-tell the stories of 
controversial South African director Brett Bailey and some of the dissent that he had 
stirred through his theatre, which blends ritual with spectacle. Each of the 
controversies offers clues as to how the cultural order in question was destabilized 
and in trauma. Jones's art is intimately linked to the traumatic losses of life from the 
AIDS pandemic; Bailey's art is made from the wreckage of colonialism and 
apartheid. That these artists should have aroused controversy indicates that consensus 
about the truth of theatre and the role of art was at stake. Concluding my thesis, I re-
examine the work of Marina Abramović, whose range of practices from performance 
art to ritual seems to re-trace my investigations into the above controversies. 
Emerging from the totalitarian regime in Yugoslavia, Abramović’s performances are 
also located within the crisis of meaning-making. Yet her work also points to ways of 
negotiating heterogeneity; my reason for citing her work is to find out how one can 
construct ethical relations in performances out of a space of anxiety and discontent.   
 
The point of the proviso (not to treat consensus as inherently oppressive) is that, 
while the loss of consensus opens the possibility of dissent, the role of the artist 
within the cultural order must also be questioned. There is a temptation for me to 
write about the controversies in order to deliver a judgment on whose aesthetic is 
ethical, whose is not. (For example, my predilection is to side with the transgressive 
artist's political project.) However, if my writing method is to attempt to be ethical as 
claimed, the writer's role must be brought into the investigation as well. What 
justifies my existence, my work, my being paid? I must ask about what/whose 
desires I satisfy in writing this thesis, just as I must ask the same about my 
performing on stage.  
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To answer these questions, I relate the story of Antjie Krog's struggle to write the 
story of the TRC. As the head of a radio team reporting on the TRC and as a literary 
writer, her anxiety is in trying to find the position from which she could write in the 
wake of gross human rights violations. 
 
Krog traces the inheritance or lineage of her writing through her mother, citing an 
essay that she wrote when Hendrik Verwoerd was stabbed in Parliament, an essay 
"picturing the Afrikaner psyche" (Krog, 1999: 147). Krog's mother wrote that she 
was alone on the veld far from her house in the Orange Free State, when an 
aeroplane flew overhead possibly containing the coffin with Verwoerd's body. She 
wrote, 
 
In this moment the life of the man I only saw and admired from afar, had 
touched my life ... It moved in my soul. And I was wondering what I should 
do? Should I go out on the streets and call upon people to consider what is 
happening to our country? Should I call on them with the only call that I know 
– that of concentration camps, tears and blood? ... And I prayed that my hand 
should fall off if I ever write something for my personal honour at the cost of 
my people and what has been negotiated for them through years of tears and 
blood; that I will always remember that to write in Afrikaans ... brings with it 
heavy responsibilities. (cited in Krog, 1999: 148) 
 
While Krog's own coverage of the TRC led to this response: 
 
No poetry should come forth from this. May my hand fall off if I write this. 
 So I sit around. Naturally and unnaturally without words. Stunned by the 
knowledge of the price people have paid for their words. If I write this, I 
exploit and betray. If I don't, I die. (Krog, 1999: 74) 
 
The paralysis of the writer (performer) is directly linked to the traumatic encounter 
with violence and loss. To write, to represent, becomes a betrayal that takes the 
sacrifice too lightly. But in Krog's writing one can also sense a conflict about the use 
of language itself: that words are not neutral tools but paid for by loss. Within the 
emerging post-Apartheid South Africa, Krog has to negotiate the lineage that paid for 
her own writing; "It has been stated openly that Afrikaans is the price that Afrikaners 
will have to pay for Apartheid" (Krog, 1999: 149). For which nation – which 
consensus – does she write?  
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Krog negotiates the conflicting authorities and responsibilities that act upon writing; 
coping with heterogeneity disrupts the natural consensus offered to the artist in a 
homogeneous society. Putting her dilemma in perspective, Krog includes a passage 
recounting a poetry festival off the coast of Senegal. She asked two Senegalese poets 
and a Berber poet what makes a good poet, after describing that the West considers 
good poetry as finding new ways to write old themes. A Senegalese poet replied that 
the position of a poet is accepted after scrutinizing the candidate's ancestry and 
ability. The apprentice poet then learns the nation's poetry with the chief poet. The 
poet thus keeps (preserves) the nation's poetry, and "your people's poetry is your 
people's lyrical soul, their history". For the Berber nomad, poetry remembers 
watering places; the survival of the tribe depends on the poet. The poetry must not 
reveal the positions of these crucial positions to other groups, or the poet will be cast 
out into the desert (Krog, 1999: 336). The construction of nationhood is enmeshed in 
art; to the extent that the nation is intact, consensus is provided for the artist to work. 
The nomadic poet's tradition is telling: the artist guards the boundary between his 
own people and others. To betray "us" results in ejection: not only is the poet's role 
as artist, but the poet's very life, is threatened.  
 
Even though Krog hopes for a time when she can write for a reconciled nation: "I 
want this hand of mine to write it. For us all; all voices, all victims" (Krog, 1999: 
422); she is aware that "it is difficult to make sense of our daily diet of contradictory 
codes" (Krog, 1999: 435). As a writer, she finds it difficult to write for preserving the 
nation's truth, in the manner of the Senegalese poet: "The word 'Truth' makes me 
uncomfortable" (Krog, 1999: 53). She is told by the radio technical assistant that her 
voice tightens up when she says the word; when she types it, the words comes up "as 
either turth or trth". She describes that when she writes:  
 
neither truth nor reconciliation is part of my graphite when sitting in front of a 
blank page, rubber close at hand. Everything else fades away. ... Truth and 
reconciliation do not enter my anarchy. They choke on betrayal and rage, they 
fall off my refusal to be moral. I write the broken line. (Krog, 1999: 54) 
 
For Krog the writer, language slips through the cracks of her anxieties over truth. She 
seems to realize that language is the law (droit) of a nation – a cultural order, and 
truth is the standard set by language (see p.7). Her anxiety about truth is her anxiety 
about her writing that was inherited from the Afrikaner cultural order, the exclusivity 
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of which is being put to test in the new South Africa.  
 
The anxiety about belonging induces a desire to birth a new language, one that does 
not re-state the truth of her partial lineage; words take on motions, they are 
performative as if corporeal: "To seize the surge of language by its soft, bare skull" 
(Krog, 1999: 39). Perhaps, the desire is that if such an origin of language can be 
traced, her words (representation) will not betray the trauma that she must write. 
 
Is this, then, the ethical role of the writer? To rescue writing from detached 
representation, to return writing to its corporeality? Before hastening to answer this, 
the relation between language and body needs further exploring; I do so by relating 
the story of Antonin Artaud's search for a language of the body. 
 
 
 
The corporeality of writing and the longing for origin 
 
Artaud's notion of the "Theatre of Cruelty" is famous for his rejection of the banal 
literary tradition in French theatre. Through the immersion into the body, his theatre 
aimed to bring about total transformation, of the performer, the audience, and by 
extension the social order. Commonly his theatre is associated with painful, writhing 
or naked bodies, as the word "cruelty" seems to suggest. This image was propagated 
by theatre groups that subsequently claimed inspiration from Artaud, such as The 
Living Theatre.25  
 
Derrida's reading of Artaud, however, points not to the destruction of language to 
return to a primitive state; Artaud's rage was against the devaluation of "true" 
language. Artaud wanted to birth words that are gestures, living hieroglyphs; the 
                                                 
25For example, Paradise Now (1968) was conceived by American group The Living Theatre as a 
performance that is also "a revolutionary situation" against capitalist society orientated towards 
money and power. To make this possible, "the first step was Artaud's declaration that the texts had 
to be burned, that the theatre of intellect had to be abandoned, that the actor would have to find 
feeling through inner resources" (Tytell, 1997: 226). Sexual repression is the target in a scene 
called "the Rite of Universal Intercourse". "In a pile of practically naked figures on the stage floor, 
the actors making a low humming sound caress each other, undulating and embracing" (Tytell, 
1997: 228). At Yale University, the actors in this scene "were joined by almost two hundred 
spectators, many of whom were partially or totally disrobed" (Tytell, 1997: 240). 
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word is body. His was a metaphysics of flesh: 
 
The integrity of the flesh torn by all these differences must be restored in the 
theater. Thus the metaphysics of flesh which determines Being as life, and the 
mind as the body itself, as unseparated thought ... (Derrida, 1978: 179) 
 
This language is not representation but "the autopresentation of pure visibility" 
(Derrida, 1978: 238) which is not a citation of a master-text (i.e. regulated by 
metanarrative, an overarching discourse that regulates the meanings of narratives). 
 
But the wholeness of the origin of language is but a mythic dream of unity. Artaud 
knew that his language and his body, his words and his breaths, are separated even 
from birth; flesh is "purloined", words stolen for logical and discursive use (Derrida, 
1978: 240). His origin is a void, the orifice of birth, which is the purloining of the 
body by the Other:  
 
My body has been stolen from me by effraction. The Other, the Thief, the great 
Furtive One, has a proper name: God. His history has taken place. It has its 
own place. The place of effraction can be only the opening of an orifice. The 
orifice of birth, the orifice of defecation to which all other gaps refer, as if to 
their origin. "It is filled, / it is not filled, / there is a void, / a lack / a missing 
something / which is always taken by a parasite on flight" (Artaud: August 
1947). (Derrida, 1978: 180) 
 
The "Cruelty" thus refers not to its representation, depicting "sadism," "horror," 
"bloodshed," and "crucified enemies" (Derrida, 1978: 239). These are mere 
spectacles of horror.26 The horror of violence and loss of life points to the horror that 
is revealed when God – the certainty that the Other promised – turns out to be a void, 
a mere signifier, the objet a that promises but does not satisfy.27 Without the 
Christian promise of "the belated unification of life and fate or destiny" (Jameson, 
2003: 708) – the promise of deferred desire by the patriarchal order that encouraged 
the subject to renunciation (see p.6) – there remains only the purloined body, the 
existential body of the present (rather than of a teleological destiny); a body 
"alienated from itself ... a 'zero-point' within a phenomenal world" (Sanchez-Colberg, 
1996: 44).  
                                                 
26The phrase "horror pornography" is used by Basil Jones and Adrian Kohler of the Handspring 
Puppet Company, co-creators of Ubu and the Truth Commission (in Taylor, 1998: xvii).  
27Lacan defines the objet a metonymically by the erotogenic rim, orifice, or cut on the body's surface; 
the gap in the body (metonymic of the lack in the unconscious) invites the filling of desire, which 
must necessarily return by returning or withdrawing. (see Grosz, 1990: 75-7) 
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Writing about trauma (apartheid and TRC, AIDS, totalitarian regimes) is thus to 
revisit the gap that is the subject; the suffering of the subject is a reminder of the 
body that is already stolen. The horror is in the mantle of the name (God; Other; the 
Name of the Father) from which language comes, a fantasy of "a place of wholeness 
of unity which will reflect its truth" (Rimmer, 1993: 204). But it is always already in 
a state of loss; writing comes from an "inspiration of loss and dispossession" 
(Derrida: 1978: 179). The identification with the hero turns out to be hollow, and the 
audience is no longer protected from suffering.  
 
The writer Krog is similarly left exposed to the horror of her people (Afrikaners) and 
the horror of the name which she has inherited and which gave her writing, leaving 
her paralyzed and feeling the guilt of betrayal. As Krog stumbles over saying the 
word "truth", and misspelling it when typing, she is unconsciously being reminded of 
that thieving nature of language. The Freudian slips mark the surfacing of the 
repressed. 
 
What, then, of the role of the writer, of an ethical method of writing? The trauma of 
violence and loss of life, and the existential crisis in response, does not have to lead 
to a classical or Christian resignation to destiny, or nihilism. Fredric Jameson writes: 
"What the innumerable holocausts of this period deconceal (to use an existential 
neologism) is not so much death and human finitude as rather the multiplicity of 
other people" (Jameson, 2003: 709). Socio-historically, the atrocities were followed 
by decolonization (and, I would also add, the mass displacement of population on a 
global scale), which "suddenly released an explosion of otherness unparalleled in 
human history" (Jameson, 2003: 709). The horror of the Other is the decentering of 
power, the dissensus that democracy brings.  
 
So: if the relation between horror, theatre and ethics entails a refusal of the pleasure 
of identification and a suspicion of the screen (see p.32), then the link between 
horror, writing and ethics similarly entails a suspicion of the originary unity, the 
metaphysical and/or social-political Oneness that promises knowledge and certainty. 
The habit of truth must be mistrusted – even when that truth comes disguised as 
modern theories such as psychoanalysis.  
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Unfortunately, in the face of horror, simplistic assertions about the value of life and 
the condemnation of the immoral are often recycled by artists and writers, much like 
the liveness of theatre is often uncritically upheld as an article of faith. In the wake of 
trauma, artists and researchers may insist on the need for theatre to justify its 
existence by serving, variously, as a chronicler of history; as therapy for healing 
social wounds; as the champion of the masses through entertainment; as platforms 
for political debate; or as the paragon and preserver of beauty and human values. 
These discursive positions may be upheld as the self-evident truth of theatre, 
according to the desires of artists, arts funders, politicians and administrators. They 
become legitimating narratives for making, commissioning and funding art. But, 
regarding the trauma to which they respond, these discourses sound like defence 
mechanisms that ultimately fail to engage with real horror.  
 
In contrast, if loss is the drive behind Krog's writing and its slippages, it is interesting 
to note her insistence that her words fall off her "refusal to be moral" (see p.36). For 
Krog, "[t]ruth and reconciliation do not enter [her] anarchy [of writing]". Writing is 
the movement of graphite over paper; it is the writing of the "broken line".  
 
What Krog is pursuing in that moment corresponds with what Lyotard calls the 
"figure", which is the excess beyond "discourse". Language for the Cartesian subject 
is discourse, or conceptual representations of objects; words signify (gain meanings) 
by being located in opposition to one another within a textual framework (langue).28 
Lyotard points out that discourse relies on the suppression of the figural, such as the 
trace or line of the word that is not concept in itself (Readings, 1991: 19). The 
construction of this perspectival space (see p.27) is "the identification of being with 
meaning", which is "the definitive feature of logocentrism", where "all objects must 
be enclosed within a field of signification" (Readings, 1991: 19). In other words, the 
world must be known (or knowable) and meaningful to the subject through the 
mastery of language. If the subjectivity of an artist or writer is thus constituted, 
ethical action cannot proceed unless the truth is known and stated.  
 
                                                 
28See Chapter 2 for a more elaborate explanation of the concept. 
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The figure is what resists such signification. Figure is not the opposite of discourse; 
"the figural opens discourse to a radical heterogeneity ... which cannot be 
rationalized or subsumed within the rule of representation"; and "the figural marks 
this resistance, the sense that we cannot 'say' everything about an object, that an 
object always in some sense remains 'other' to any discourse we may maintain about 
it" (Readings, 1991: 4). A claim to accurate representation, or a full understanding of 
what is represented (conceptually) is premised on the repression of figurality 
(Readings, 1991: 5).  
 
Lyotard's idea of figurality thus opens up a corporeality of writing in a way that does 
not long for the purity of wholeness and origin (see p.38). The line, the corporeal is 
not inherently figural, "the pure negative of representation" (Readings, 1991: 20). 
The figural – the body, the phenomenological – is not “another kind of 
representation” in opposition to discourse: 
 
the figural is other to representation ... The figural is that which, in 
representation, makes us aware that there is something which cannot be 
represented, an other to representation. (Readings, 1991: 20&22) 
 
So, in Krog's account of her writing, the need to report the discourses of truth and 
reconciliation through the mass media is constantly in tension with her act of writing; 
the concepts falls through the crack of writing (graphite and paper). Her writing thus 
resists recycling already named notions of truth and ethics, but is constantly aware of 
the problematics in taking language as a transparent given.  
 
To give attention to the figural in writing is a political act; for Lyotard, the figural 
space allows an imagined displacing of political space, "opening onto a space of 
social desires and possibilities that are as yet unimaginable within political 
representation"; the figural of writing "becomes a quasi-symptom of a 'political 
unconscious'" (Readings, 1991: 7).  
 
It should be apparent that my usage of the words "ethical" and "political" is not 
clearly distinct. I cite Bill Readings in thinking through these terms. His book on 
Lyotard is subtitled "Art and Politics", but Lyotard's politics "may appear more like 
an ethics" (Readings, 1991: 37). In conventional uses of these words, "politics" 
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entails "a realm of knowledge, of strategy and goals" – a plan of action that proposes 
a social outcome based on knowledge; and "ethics" implies "a focus on individual 
conscience", again dependent on a knowledge of right and wrong (Readings, 1991: 
37). In both cases, the subject acts according to determinate knowledge. However, 
Lyotard's ethics (or politics) is one which confronts "the question of judging how to 
act once one can no longer know in advance how to act" (Readings, 1991: 37). It is 
an ethics/politics that eschews the programmatic. Indeterminacy is the keyword to 
this ethics.  
 
The determinate treatment of the figural in terms of body and subjectivity in much 
recent theatre studies, cultural studies, and theory, is partly what caused my 
discontent. Much of this literature only investigates bodies as discursive entities, as 
sites for social, political and cultural inscriptions, either because the non-discursive is 
seen as essentialist or is considered unknowable and therefore unable to be written 
about.29 What seems problematic is that such analyses seem to insist on a conscious, 
intentional representation of the repressed. For example, postcolonial and feminist 
writers often seem to treat bodies in theatre performances as inscriptions of unequal 
power relations, so that contestations of image and representation dominate writings 
on/of the body. Politics/ethics becomes a determinate project to reinscribe a 
discourse (representations of race or gender relations) on the body that is more just. 
Lyotard's critique is that "repression does not simply take place in historical 
representation but that oppression begins in the modernist thought of history as 
representation" (Readings, 1991: 61). To write the body in terms of a more just 
representation of the repressed risks repressing the figural, the loss that always 
haunts.  
 
In contrast, another part of my anxiety in writing is that the notion of "truth" hangs so 
dominantly over my head and body. This "truth" is the temptation to be the exact 
reverse of discourse: to believe in the truth of the psychoanalytic theory of the 
unconscious without recognizing its phallocentricity; to believe that Artaud's 
mythical hieroglyphics is possible; to believe that pure desire, pure unconscious, pure 
                                                 
29This is related to Lacan's own assertion that the feminine jouissance is ultimately unknowable, with 
implications for what the analytical relationship could and could not be. Some feminists disagree 
with this patriarchal relationship; the conclusion of the thesis explores some alternatives. 
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corporeality is the truth. To recall my interview at the award competition (see p.13): I 
tried to propose a dismantling of discourse in dance theatre by suggesting that no one 
single message can be offered to my audience; that the work can be an encounter of 
pure unconscious (what I called "memories"). My language, the words that I used to 
talk about my dance, assumed that my choreography allowed the bodies to escape 
discourse, and to perform a truth that originates in bodies.  
 
But, if figurality haunts discourse, Lyotard reminds me, discourse also haunts 
figurality. "The unconscious risks ... becoming a counter-orthodoxy" (Readings, 
1991: 45). Just as it is dangerous to characterize all consensus as oppressive (see 
p.33), the yearning for corporeal wholeness is futile and yields an ethics that is as 
determinate as an ethics based on programmatic knowledge. To champion the body 
and its pure materiality risks treating the body as an authentic totality; it is to posit 
the body as a determinate origin, where existential anxieties can be cured by being 
pure Other.  
 
 
 
Towards an ethical writing 
 
How can the writing of my thesis pay attention to dissensus, to the heterogeneity of 
writing? In response to the anxiety of writing and making art in the wake of trauma 
(both social/historical and metaphysical), my writing methodology takes its cue from 
Lyotard's ethics of indeterminacy. The point of examining the theatre controversies 
in chapters 2 and 3 is not to reveal the hidden truth based on which a judgment can 
be pronounced as to who is right or wrong. This thesis does not aim to offer 
convincing interpretations of theatre works to substantiate my positing of the "truth" 
of body performance. I try not to treat theorists as authoritative confessors of truth, 
refusing to use psychoanalysis or deconstruction as "criteriological tool" by which 
other discourses are evaluated (Grosz, 1990: 157). In citing source material on the 
artists, I try not to "just 'read what's there' ... [but] to do something" to the text 
(Readings, 1991: 51). I use the notions of "story" (see p.12) and "re-telling" (see 
p.34) to indicate my attempt to put the texts to work, so as to explore the cultural 
order that regulate the individual artist/critic's writing. I do not treat this thesis as an 
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attempt to render my words as transparent a representation of the truth as my skill 
allows, just as I do not treat my choreography as a way of communicating my 
authoritative intention to the audience through the clarity of the dancers' technique. 
The ethical can be explored only when considered in context of how exchange 
relations are regulated by the cultural order, and significantly, what slippages of 
heterogeneity can be found in these societies. 
 
I hope that the first step towards ethical writing is already made, by writing this 
thesis text upon my anxiety, daring the reader not to treat loss and discontent as 
pathologies confined to the individual. Also, the linear structure of logic gives way to 
fractal pathways; questions raised in one section of text may be picked up a few 
paragraphs later, a few pages later, or in a later chapter. Thoughts occur and reoccur 
in this text as if motifs in a choreographic work, snatches of movement memories 
which are held in non-climactic tension, best read as a palimpsest – a text that lends 
itself to be read, re-read, re-told, re-thought.30 I have mentioned "wandering" (see 
p.1), as a pun on "wondering", connoting the curiosity of the thinking process that 
often resists regulation. A similar method is found in Lyotard, describing a strategy 
of thinking and writing that he calls "drifting". Despairing of how to counter the utter 
certainty about knowledge and history displayed by Marxist orthodoxy, Lyotard uses 
the analogy of a swimmer drifting with the ocean current, so as not to set up a 
"parity" with the Marxist metanarrative, but to think heterogeneously to it (Lyotard, 
1988: 54). And so I have tried not to set up a determinate landscape (geographical 
and/or discursive) on which to draw my view of the body; I try to allow my writing 
to drift along with the series of narratives that I relate, like a travelogue, with only 
my sense of anxiety and loss showing me the next little distance ahead.  
 
The reader may find that this text challenges his/her patience; even a change of 
reading habits may be needed. But the sense of loss haunts my writing, and I am 
constantly aware that my words may easily silence and violate the heterogeneity that 
trauma presents to me. Through this wandering text, I hope that I have not enforced a 
consensus on the theories and practitioners that I cite. My writing must try to narrate 
                                                 
30Lacan said of his seminar: "What's nice about what I tell you ... is that it's always the same thing. 
Not that I repeat myself, that's not the point. It's that what I said before takes on meaning 
afterward" (Lacan, 1998: 36). It makes sense of the "re-telling" strategy I outline above. 
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after their stories, not about them; simply to link my words onto theirs, rather than 
attempt to impose my metanarrative over their stories: 
 
This is what Lyotard refers to in The Postmodern Condition as the 'horizon of 
dissensus', in which consensus is never reached but always displaced by a new 
paralogical narrative, which does not aim at installing a new consensus but 
evoking a further paralogical move – its own displacement. (Readings, 1991: 
68-9) 
 
It may be a scandalous thing to do, to treat academic writing as stories, even personal 
stories, and not apologize for its "contamination" by anecdotes, bias of the 
storytellers, and affects. But it is ethical, not in the sense of compliance with an 
objective set of guidelines, constituting a genre of writing that determines 
truthfulness. It is ethical, for Lyotard, in a sense comparable to the way aesthetic 
judgment is made – indeterminate, without recourse to a metanarrative. I hope that 
by the end of the thesis, the reader will sense that this is not as scandalous as it may 
appear, and in fact quite fitting for an artistic discipline, that there is a different 
process of legitimation at work. It is a process that the academy needs to be aware of, 
in order not to silence the specificity of the discipline, and its heterogeneity to other 
academic disciplines.31  
 
Furthermore, it seems the only ethics possible for a speaking being torn between his 
unknown jouissance and his subjectivity as a speaking being. Suffering from 
performance anxieties,32 it is tempting to renounce uncertainty and acquiesce to the 
desires that structure the speaking being; somewhat like a dancer who resorts to 
his/her dazzling technique in longing for the calls of "encore" from the audience. My 
thesis could be but a (phallic) signifier in exchange for academic position and 
recognition. The awarding of a degree, after all, can be a metonym for the desires of 
wealth, power and status. What about the examiner's desire for rigorous language, to 
be convinced that I "know my stuff"? My desire to be accepted in the academy, not 
to waste the scholarship invested in the writing, and my desire for a better paying 
job? The University's desire for good research outputs, increased funding and 
reputation? The desires of policy-makers to produce knowledge about Africa, for 
                                                 
31The writers of Corporealities assert that the contamination of academic writing by introducing the 
body – "corpo-realiz[ing] writing" – would "challenge [and] profoundly ... alter the discipline – the 
human sciences – such as they are not disposed to incorporate it" (Susan Leigh Foster, 1996: xv).   
32The pun is intentional, relating Lacan's work on sexual relations to my explorations on theatrical 
relations. 
46 
nation-building, for the African Renaissance? 
 
It would probably be far easier to write out of these desires, but the objet a of desire 
is not a graspable object. The writing will "keep bumping into an empty space, the 
area excluded by language" (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 184) – a sense of loss that 
haunts all my effort to write, speak, perform, and so inducing anxiety, spurring me to 
rise again and again – encore. But my performance anxiety could also be an 
invitation to exploit the gap in the way subjectivity is constituted. I wonder if it is 
possible to wander towards a time and place where my theatre performances elicit 
calls of "encore" from an audience who are nevertheless not unaware of the lack that 
constitutes their enjoyment.  
 
Travelling towards such a horizon is not like the hero's quest. There is no 
renunciation, no blessing to be expected. Each artist travels through the mire of 
anxiety in order to establish the possibility for making work. It is not an 
accomplishment, only a precondition. Krog's story is, for example, strictly her own 
travelling towards finding a position from which she can write, which is a new 
consensus in a reconciled South Africa: "I want this hand of mine to write it. For us 
all; all voices, all victims" (Krog, 1999: 422). At the end, her writing is the imploring 
of a confessor (see p.17): "forgive me / forgive me / forgive me" (Krog, 1999: 423). 
Hers is not my journey, I cannot identify with it and thus lighten my anxiety through 
catharsis; her exit from anxiety is not the answer for my discontent, is not my cure. 
Similarly, the reader cannot expect to take something determinate away from this 
thesis, like a perspectival drawing that captures my knowledge, my view of the world 
which can then be compared to other (self-)portraits. I am not writing this thesis to 
fulfil the desire for a "model" of knowledge which can then serve as a determinate 
hallmark for truth or falsity. If I wrote as a confessor of faith (in art, in humanity), 
the reader would not know what is not already known, and I would be doing a 
disservice to the reader. However, the re-telling of Krog's story does allow me to 
embark on my own; and so my hope is that the reader, being next in the chain of re-
tellings, can set off on his/her own wandering.  
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Chapter 2 
 
(Refusing to) Look at Trauma: Visibility and the noisy politics of 
representation 
 
Bill T. Jones's Still/Here and the "victim art" controversy 
 
 
"Sometimes when I step onstage, ... I carry in front of me an invisible phallus. ... 
It is my virility, my right to be, and the assurance that I will always be." 
- Bill T. Jones, cited in Morris (2001: 259) 
 
 
This chapter examines the politics that strives to make suffering visible, to let victims have a 
voice, and to represent the silenced. Discursive binaries of public/private, dead/living, and 
invisible/visible underlie the politics of AIDS and sexuality. These discourses impact on the 
reception of Jones's choreography, despite his use of modernist artistic processes in search 
of a bodily presence that aims to collapse the binary of representation (text) and its subject 
(being). The theory of the gaze shows this politics to be a phallocentric discourse; and 
narrative analysis traces the metanarrative that results in the commodification of oppositional 
identities, so that spectators participate in the politics as consumers. An ethical artistic 
response thus needs to shift its focus to the subjectivity of the spectator.  
 
 
Coming out: public visibility as liberation 
 
Whatever anxieties there may be about representing trauma, images and narratives of 
suffering are daily disseminated in public. From war journalism to television talk 
shows, private experiences of trauma are represented publicly as a matter of routine, 
ranging from the most horrifying to the trivial. The blurring between public and 
private is a distinctive feature of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC): 
Taylor notes how "stories of personal grief, loss, triumph and violation now stand as 
an account of South Africa's recent past", marking a shift from the eclipse of 
personal suffering under the "larger project of mass liberation" (Taylor, 1998: ii).  
 
The role of disseminating private images and stories of trauma is not only played by 
the mass media; art has also been widely used to this end. Because this chapter 
touches on the intersection between sexuality/AIDS and art, I cite the AIDS 
Memorial Quilt as an example. Described as "the largest ongoing community arts 
project in the world" (www.aidsquilt.org), the Quilt makes its intervention by making 
visible the names of individuals who have died of the AIDS pandemic. AIDS, more 
than the wars and genocides of the twentieth century as a social trauma on a massive 
scale, is perhaps the one that straddles most precariously between the private and the 
public. Because sex is in the majority of cases the immediate cause, AIDS makes 
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what is usually hidden from view available for public discourse, along with 
expressions of opinions (often prejudicial) about sexuality, race and class: what is 
commonly called the "stigma" attached to AIDS. The AIDS Memorial Quilt attempts 
to steer this intersection of public/private discourses to counteract stigmas, by 
making visible private desires, loves, and griefs of individuals affected by AIDS, 
both the deceased and the bereaved.  
 
The Quilt has its beginning in gay rights activism in San Francisco, USA. Since the 
1978 assassinations of prominent gay public figures, Cleve Jones had been 
organizing annual commemoration candlelight marches. The following is from the 
Quilt's official history: 
 
While planning the 1985 march, [Cleve Jones] learned that over 1,000 San 
Franciscans had been lost to AIDS. He asked each of his fellow marchers to 
write on placards the names of friends and loved ones who had died of AIDS. 
At the end of the march, Jones and others stood on ladders taping these 
placards to the walls of the San Francisco Federal Building. The wall of names 
looked like a patchwork quilt. (www.aidsquilt.org) 
 
This inspired the idea of quilt panels, and starting from 1987 the Quilt began touring 
across the US for display; there are now many affiliated AIDS Quilt organizations 
across the globe, and since 1996 the Quilt in its entirety has grown too large for a 
single display. Each quilt panel is of set dimensions, created by people (usually 
friends/family) who wish to commemorate an individual who passed away from 
AIDS; panels are then sent to the organizers to be sewn together. Private objects such 
as photographs and clothing may be sewn onto the quilt. Besides the set dimensions, 
there is basically no limit to what can be included within a quilt panel. So the Quilt is 
unlike other public memorials, such as war memorials or museums, which are 
usually commissioned by a public institution and created by selected individuals 
through a once-off construction process. The Quilt is an ever-expanding 
representation of individual expressions of a wish to remember individuals who 
are/have been part of this extensive social trauma. It has also become customary at 
each display of the Quilt for the commemorated names to be read over public 
announcement by celebrities, politicians, families, lovers and friends 
(www.aidsquilt.org). 
 
The Quilt thus came into being explicitly within the context of remembering. A 
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slogan on www.aidsquilt.org reads: "Remember. Understand. Share the lessons. 
Act". Memory serves as the basis for knowledge ("understanding"); once this 
knowledge becomes public ("share the lessons"), action can be taken to intervene in 
the course of the pandemic. In other words, while the Quilt offers a space for 
emotional responses to suffering (such as sympathy, grief, and so on), such personal 
memories and emotions are represented publicly, for the explicit purpose of 
intervening in social life. (It is worth recalling that the original impulse for the Quilt 
was located in a public march.) It is a politics whose efficacy is based on the 
representation of the private in the public. 
 
Another word that describes this (epistemological) basis for political action is 
"outing", also with origins in gay culture. To "come out (of the closet)" means 
declaring one's (homo)sexual orientation; what is privately known is now declared in 
public. To "out" someone is the involuntary version of the same thing. The 
implication is that there exists a truth of the self: repressed desires that are first 
acknowledged privately and then publicly. Making this knowledge public affects 
one's social relations: although it can be dangerous (gay bashing, ostracization, 
economic/job discrimination), usually it promises liberation (the idea that coming out 
enables you to be authentically yourself). This trajectory of coming out seems to 
have become a model for contemporary cultural discourses and struggles for 
empowerment. In AIDS activism as in gay activism, "closets" are regarded as 
detrimental to personal well being. In the late 1980s, activist group ACT-UP in New 
York issued a poster with the slogan, "Silence=Death" on a pink triangle (symbol of 
the gay community). The political action encouraged is clear: bring both "shameful" 
secrets (being gay and/or being HIV+) out into the open, to be seen, heard, talked 
about; get yourself onto the public agenda so you are not ignored. Similar strategies 
of visible representation are found in South Africa: public figures are encouraged to 
wear the red ribbon symbolizing the AIDS pandemic; there have been calls for 
members of parliament to have public HIV tests; publicity campaigns encourage 
open discourse about sexuality and AIDS.  
 
The need for a politics of representation and visibility is understandable. AIDS was 
first linked with homosexuality in the US (it was first called GRIDS: Gay-Related 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome), and the American government's reaction in the early 
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1980s was a virtual non-response, a concrete manifestation of the "silencing" of 
marginal groups. The need for representation was thus urgent, on which was hinged 
the lives of HIV+ people: at stake were funding and support structures for medical 
and social intervention to slow down and to cope with the tide of death. In the face of 
this official silence and discursively cordoning off of AIDS as a problem of the gay 
ghetto, making personal trauma visible seemed a sensible politics: AIDS victims are 
humans too; gay people also love, grieve, and mourn. At least part of the appeal of 
projects such as the AIDS Memorial Quilt is the recognition of the private domain as 
a universal, the provocation for policy-makers and society in general to see that "we 
are all humans, after all". A quilt, a domestic object associated with personal 
intimacy, is a concrete manifestation of this universal appeal; the act of crying and 
the need to commemorate also attempts to cement a collectivity of humans as 
emotional beings.  
 
Understanding and questioning the politics of representation and visibility is a 
preparation for re-examining Bill T. Jones's theatre performances in this chapter, 
particularly the choreographic work Still/Here (1994) and the "victim art" debate that 
surrounded it. One of the basic questions that can be asked of this politics is this: 
why the need to traverse across the public/private boundary? And: how did this 
boundary come about? 
 
We seem to have a notion that the separation of public and private spheres is self-
evident. Sex belongs in the private realm, demarcated discursively, geographically 
and temporally (Don't tell everyone about your sex life. Get a room to have sex. Sex 
happens at night/mornings/on weekends). So embedded in the social order is this 
separation that to upset it, as the controversial artists to be examined have done, is to 
invite vehement attack. Queer theorists Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, in a 
provocatively titled paper "Sex in Public", account for the vehemence of contestation 
by tracing the construction of the public/private boundary. The ostensible privacy of 
the sex act is in fact enmeshed in a "constellation of practices" that influence social 
organization; the boundary of sexual practice impacts on such seemingly non-sexual 
practices as  
 
paying taxes, being disgusted, philandering, bequeathing, celebrating a holiday, 
investing for the future, teaching, disposing of a corpse, carrying wallet photos, 
51 
buying economy size, being nepotistic, running for president, divorcing, or 
owning anything "His" and "Hers". (Berlant & Warner, 1999: 359-360) 
 
There are everywhere unspoken habits or expectations in (public and private) living 
that are regulated according to sexual norm. More than explicit prejudice against 
alternative sexualities, it is the nexus of social institutions, structures of knowledge 
and social practice that produces "a sense of rightness" about heterosexual culture. 
Often unconscious, this sense of rightness feels as if it is "hard-wired into 
personhood", as if it is the foundation of subjectivity (Berlant & Warner, 1999: 359).  
 
Such "heteronormativity" discursively and institutionally produces the separation 
between the private sphere for the sexual person, and the public sphere for the 
political/economic person. Sex is constructed as intimacy within the context of 
home-based familial reproduction, a realm which can serve as "a vision of the good 
life", a fantasy promising a "simple personhood" that is separated from the chaos of 
political discourse and economic inequalities (Berlant & Warner, 1999: 358-9). The 
public sphere is thus organized around a heterosexual privilege, bracketed off as 
private and sexual: hence "[t]here is nothing more public than privacy" (Berlant & 
Warner, 1999: 355).  
 
To bring the private, particularly the sexual, into public discourse is thus to challenge 
heteronormative privileges: this is the potential efficacy of the politics of 
representation and visibility. Even in seemingly trivial exercises in visibility such as 
television talk shows, "people testify to their failure to sustain or be sustained by 
institutions of privacy" (Berlant & Warner, 1999: 360). The promise of the normal, 
good life falls apart; images and narratives of non-normative social relations can be 
publicized and disseminated.  
 
However, these sites of visibility are also where the non-normative can be brought to 
trial: "punitive responses ... tend to emerge when people seem not to suffer enough 
for their transgressions and failures"; "[e]very day,  even the talk-show hosts are 
newly astonished to find that people who are committed to hetero intimacy are 
nevertheless unhappy" (Berlant & Warner, 1999: 360). Public visibility does not 
equate social change; falling short of the normality usually gets blamed on the 
individual's pathology ("what a slag, she can't even keep faithful to her husband") or 
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the stereotype of a class ("these trailer trash are all slags"). "On these shows no one 
ever blames the ideology and institutions of heterosexuality" (Berlant & Warner, 
1999: 360). In other words, the Freudian hero's quest in the myth of heteronormative 
intimacy continues; the Lacanian screen remains intact, taming the trauma of the 
gaze – the trauma of confronting the idea that it is impossible to maintain a 
heteronormative subjectivity.1  
 
Berlant and Warner enact a Foucauldian analysis of heteronormativity, aiming to 
intervene by radically re-constructing social relations.2 My focus is far narrower: to 
examine the act of representation in theatre, and the exchange relations thus 
engendered (pun intended). How efficacious is the politics of visibility? 
 
 
 
The importance of being (re)present(ed) 
 
The public for art does not stay constant. As cultural conditions shift, the conditions 
under which the exchange relations take place, and the kinds of responses expected 
or possible to a piece of art, also shift.  
 
Dance writer Roger Copeland cites what Jean-Paul Sartre refers to as  
 
the crisis of the imaginary, the ways in which fact has put fiction on the 
defensive in a century of unprecedented horror (and of unprecedented means of 
documenting those horrors). (Copeland, 1995: 16) 
 
Copeland draws attention to art's conditions of reception: the prevalence of horror 
changes how the audience receives a piece of art (a literary fiction, an image, a 
performance). The idea of "art" also shifts: its relation to fact and fiction is 
conditioned by the perception of pervasive horror. To respond to an image of horror 
in a past century would have been different to the way one would respond in the late 
twentieth century and today. Could the response be pity, disdain, indifference? Of 
                                                 
1For explication of the "hero's quest" and the "screen", see chapter 1. 
2The authors propose "a world-making project", to create "queer counter-publics" that resist 
heteronormativity (Berlant & Warner, 1999: 361). Such a project, echoing Habermas's theory of 
publics, may entail intervening in urban zoning, legislations, club cultures, sexual practices, as 
well as literary and artistic practices. The merit or otherwise of such a project is beyond the scope 
of my study. 
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images that depict war and its victims, Susan Sontag writes:  
 
It used to be thought, when candid images were not common, that showing 
something that needed to be seen, bringing a painful reality closer, was bound 
to goad viewers to feel more. (Sontag, 2003: 79) 
 
Goya's famous series of etchings, Los Desastres de la Guerra (The Disasters of 
War), made between 1810 and 1820, were premised on such sensitivity of the 
viewer. The "ghoulish cruelty" depicted "are meant to awaken, shock, wound the 
viewer" (Sontag, 2003: 44). The etchings are accompanied by captions, such as "One 
can't look", "Barbarians", "What madness!", "This is too much!", and "Why?" Sontag 
characterizes these captions as the artist's voice which "badgers the viewer: can you 
bear to look at this?" (Sontag, 2003: 45). The responsiveness – the respons(e-)ability 
– of the viewer is taken for granted, utilized, and encouraged. The ethical basis of 
imaging horror is for the viewer to see and respond with feeling.  
 
One is tempted to seek recourse in an essentialist, humanist framework in which to 
understand, and to prescribe, a reaction of pity and sorrow in response to horror: it is 
human to respond in this way; if you don't feel, you're inhumane. However, Sontag 
traces the politics of this seemingly universally "human" way of responding. She 
notes that published journalistic photographs usually show "grievously injured 
bodies" in wars "from Asia or Africa" (Sontag, 2003: 72). She traces the precedents 
of the journalistic custom in "ethnological exhibitions" which displays the "exotic – 
that is, colonized – human beings" (Sontag, 2003: 72). Such seeing imposes the 
discursive othering of the exotic on the viewer; "the other ... is regarded only as 
someone to be seen, not someone (like us) who also sees" (Sontag, 2003: 72).  
 
The imaginary proximity to the suffering inflicted on others that is granted by 
images suggests a link between the far-away sufferers – seen close-up on the 
television screen – and the privileged viewer that is simply untrue, that is yet 
one more mystification of our real relations to power. So far as we feel 
sympathy, we feel we are not accomplices to what caused the suffering. Our 
sympathy proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence. (Sontag, 2003: 
102, emphasis added) 
 
The unequal power relations of seeing that Sontag describes here are not necessarily 
a callousness, or even perverse satisfaction, towards the suffering of others. The 
viewer's sincerity, or even a passionate caring, is perhaps not so much questioned as 
rendered irrelevant by the inability of the image to implicate "our" responsibility, our 
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participation, in the same world as those who are suffering. To invoke Lacanian 
theory: "we" see the image of horror via the mediation of the screen, which leaves us 
in an external viewing position. The object of horror is captured within our 
subjective (perspectival) look; it avails to us a "meta" level where we can see and 
know the world, and thus control it. Our subject position is not threatened; the horror 
is never really our direct concern, however much sympathy we may feel. 
 
This discursive divide between the viewer and the object of viewing (horror) is not 
confined to the politics of colonialism and its legacy; in the case of the AIDS 
pandemic, where "one of us" crosses the divide between life and death, the memorial 
image becomes a representation of the loss, which is also a loss of "me" (the lover, 
family member or friend takes away a part of my emotional bond by dying). 
Commemoration enables me to see the image of the deceased, represented as lost; 
but in the seeing I am confirmed to be alive. The presence of the dead through 
representation is a way to restore the equilibrium of the subject, to affirm the 
boundary between life and death.  
 
Memory is, achingly, the only relation we can have with the dead. So the belief 
that remembering is an ethical act is deep in our natures as humans ... 
Heartlessness and amnesia seem to go together. (Sontag, 2003: 115) 
 
Forgetting – the failure to represent the loss – seems an inhumane thing to do, 
because what is forgotten is the division between life and death, the discursive 
division which makes life possible. Memory makes passing away understandable. It 
becomes a way to keep the living "us" as external viewers of death, rather than 
participants in it, which would be an unbearable horror. 
 
This complex exchange between the seeing subject, the mediating screen and the 
horror of the gaze, however, is seldom the basis for the politics of representation and 
its analysis. Particularly in the Anglophone academy, the kind of analysis that has 
gained prominence and that is identified as having a political relevance or 
commitment, is one that aims to "give voice to the oppressed" (Readings, 1991: 61). 
Political intervention is mainly located in contesting the production and 
dissemination of images of marginalized groups. This “’images of’ analysis” 
intervenes in how social groupings such as women, black people, ethnic minorities, 
lesbians and gay men, the disabled and the aged are represented (Dyer, 2002: 1). Its 
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political efficacy is derived from the idea that, to create and disseminate "positive" or 
"negative" images of a certain grouping affects their social standing, and hence 
quality of life.  
 
There are several ways in which representation is assumed to affect the lives of 
people. Firstly, how a group is represented indicates how or if they are "spoken for 
and on behalf of" (Dyer, 2002: 1). Representation is linked to their subjecthood, their 
status as speaking beings within a social order. An obvious political example is the 
ability (or prohibition) to present a member of parliament to voice the concerns of 
that particular group. Secondly, representation affects "how they see themselves and 
others like themselves, how they see their place in society, their right to the rights a 
society claims to ensure its citizens" (Dyer, 2002: 1). It concerns how and if a group 
has the (discursive and institutional) power to produce images with which they can 
identify and which will satisfy their sense of rightful subjecthood within the social 
order.  
 
Note that these two notions of representation deal with subjectivity in terms of 
speaking and seeing. This echoes the dual method of analysis that I explore in 
chapter 1, relating the theory of the gaze and the theory of the role of language in the 
unconscious. The anxiety and discontent over both image and language are related to 
the dilemma of presence. 
 
Thirdly,  
 
Equal re-presentation, representativeness, representing have to do also with 
how others see members of a group and their place and rights, others who have 
the power to affect that place and those rights. (Dyer, 2002: 1) 
 
In other words, other subjectivities, particularly those who hold discursive and 
institutional power, are compelled to acknowledge and change the narrative frames 
and institutional structures and practices – in short, the cultural order – to allow these 
marginalized voices to be heard/images to be seen. For example, Ann Cooper 
Albright describes this process in theatrical dance: audience responses are the focus 
of political challenge and change in  
 
dances that foreground issues of social, political, and sexual difference in ways 
that make the spectator aware of the performer's cultural identity as well as his 
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or her own cultural positioning. (Albright, 1997: xxii) 
 
The assumption here is that viewing subjects will change by being asked to identify 
with images of difference presented on stage.  
 
This politics has gained currency in dance studies and other arts disciplines. The 
academy is moving away from the traditional art-historical approach emphasizing 
aesthetic coherence, towards locating dance within the discursive field that is culture 
(or, within culture that is seen as a discursive field). As dance scholars discover that 
this theory proves productive in linking dancing to other cultural practices, and as 
they vie for acceptance in the university,3 the turn towards discursivity in dance 
becomes prominent: the textual and the visual merge. Janet Adshead-Lansdale 
embraces a textual model of dance for its ability to destabilize the meaning-making 
processes of dance, allowing multiple interpretations (Adshead-Lansdale, 1999: xiii-
iv). Albright further locates her project within a political urgency:  
 
This book grew out of a conviction that contemporary dance could shed light 
on the current debates about how cultural identities are negotiated and 
embodied. The project has acquired an urgency over the past few years as I see 
more and more dancing bodies becoming invisible and arts funding 
increasingly becoming a political minefield. My hope is that ... [this book] will 
also expose both scholars and dancers to some of the ways in which dance can 
be a central, indeed, a crucial discourse. (Albright, 1997: xiii, emphases added) 
 
The artistic and the political thus become bound together within representation.  
 
It should be apparent that the premise for this politics is the perspectival gaze: the 
position of looking equals accession to power, the affirmation of the 
looking/speaking (and hence knowing) subject. The link between the textual and the 
visual as theoretical basis also defines the gaze: Lyotard describes the perspectival 
gaze as the "'textualization' of the visual" (Readings, 1991: 25). The audience's 
looking is thus the very possibility of the politics of representation. On this gaze 
depends the political efficacy of empowering the silenced, marginalized, forgotten. 
This is the main point about the politics of representation and visibility that prepares 
                                                 
3Dance is ephemeral to a greater extent than other theatrical performance, such as drama, which 
usually has a script as a textual foundation. This had been seen as a weakness in the discipline, 
which explained "both the lack of serious scholarship, and the lack of funding for its practice" 
(Adshead-Lansdale, 1999: xii). This link between the politics of representation, which emphasizes 
giving voice to the silent, and the under-representation of dance in the academy, is perhaps a 
circumstantial explanation for the theory's currency in dance studies.  
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my re-examining of the "victim art" debate. 
 
 
 
Still/Here: dance as politics 
 
Visibility is a way to recoup the horror of trauma, to turn a negative into a positive. 
Frank Rich alludes to this politics regarding artistic practices: 
 
To the extent that AIDS is responsible for yanking death out of the American 
closet, history may show that the epidemic has changed our culture in much the 
way that the cataclysmic carnage of World War I transformed English 
literature. (Rich, 1995; in Dance Connection) 
 
The dance of Bill T. Jones is usually credited with making marginalized identities 
visible, to "yank" them "out of the closet", so to speak. The "truth" of his personal 
realities is always part of his dances:  
 
in a 1994 cover story Time magazine identified [Jones] as a gay, black, HIV-
positive choreographer. Newsweek, the New York Times Magazine, and the 
New Yorker described Jones similarly, and it is probably fair to say that every 
feature article written about him today speaks of him in these terms. (Morris, 
2001: 243) 
 
Jones himself encourages this discourse: identity is "a pivotal idea in everything I 
do" (Jones, cited in Morris, 2001: 243). His work exhibits "a soul-searching, 
missionary zeal ... with a multifarious political agenda" (Bremser, 1999: 123). The 
dances that brought him initial fame were solos that included autobiographical 
material, and duets with his long-time lover Arnie Zane. Jones does not dance in 
Still/Here (1994), which was choreographed on his company, but the same logic of 
"coming out" is at work: it is a work about living through terminal illnesses, 
including AIDS.  
 
So why did it draw such ferocious debate? Frank Rich's comment, cited above, was 
written for the New York Times, in defence of Jones and to explain his 
choreographic practice. The defence was occasioned by an article in the New Yorker, 
written by a leading dance critic Arlene Croce, who refused to see Still/Here and yet 
wrote a piece attacking Jones and his work. Croce's "Discussing the Undiscussable" 
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(1994)4 instigated a public furore. Commentators wrote to the press both supporting 
and attacking her article, and subsequently the debate was furthered in academic 
writings.  
 
In the following section I will first attempt a description of the work Still/Here, and 
then outline Croce's attack on Jones. At first sight the debate can be judged quite 
simply: Croce obviously felt threatened by images of the sick and dying, and wanted 
to maintain the stronghold of white and able-bodied representations and silence 
black, gay and HIV-positive subjectivities. The ethical judgment can then be easily 
made: Croce is obviously in the wrong. But can the debate be reduced to Croce's 
conservative politics versus the liberation movements? The debate indicates that the 
political efficacy of visibility is open to questions that need exploring. 
 
Still/Here is a modern theatrical dance work that developed out of the Survival 
Project in eleven American cities, consisting of workshops held by Jones with people 
coping with life-threatening illnesses (Bremser, 1999: 125). The words and 
movements of the participants became sources for choreography, and video 
interviews of participants were edited and projected on stage, mainly as "talking 
heads" (Siegel, 1996: 61). The work, performed by his dance company, consists of 
two acts, Still and Here. Still is more meditative, reflecting on the process of coming 
to terms with the knowledge of having a terminal illness, and is performed to a 
chanting vocal score by gospel/folk singer Odetta. The tone tends towards being 
"ordered, contained" (Parry, 1995: 22). Here is more dynamic, focusing on taking 
action to live, to defy death; the survivors are thus said to be "still here". The musical 
score by Vernon Reid is of "aggressively strummed guitar", with recorded voices of 
workshop participants sampled on tape and edited to the musical rhythm. Compared 
to the more posed and elegant, almost sculptural group work in the first act, here the 
dancers "leap and twirl, plunging in headlong dives" (Parry, 1995: 22). Critic Marcia 
Siegel describes the overall tone of the work as "far from ... gloomy or unspeakable,  
evok[ing] a sort of '70s positivism, an almost poignant faith that supportive friends 
and self-awareness can help even those who are imperilled to live bravely" (Siegel, 
1996: 61).  
 
                                                 
4Henceforth all citations of Croce shall refer to this article.  
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The worth of this work is thus hard to miss: it is an act of memorial for those who 
died and an affirmation of those still "here". A web site dedicated to Still/Here 
reflects on the work's significance:  
 
The difficult truth is that the majority of Survivor Workshop Participants, both 
young and old, have died. These images of will, tenacity, beauty and Grace 
[sic] are most precious because they are Still/Here. (PBS.org) 
 
The work thus gives presence to those who have crossed the divide between life and 
death; it makes visible and celebrates the struggle to live.  
 
It seems strange that such a work would cause a ferocious debate which saw 
accusations of conservatism and silencing of minorities from the one side, and 
political coercion and "intellectual swindle" from the other (Kramer, 1995, in Dance 
Connection). No doubt these are sincere responses to the work (except for Croce, 
who did not see it); but in this context they become "[t]he oddest of affective 
tendencies" (Massumi, cited in Žižek, 2004: 294). (I will return to this sense of 
strangeness later by locating it in context of liberal-democratic capitalism. For now I 
will stay with expounding on the political and artistic significance of the politics of 
representation.)  
 
The discomfort shown in Croce's attack and the subsequent counter-attacks can 
perhaps be traced back to the degree to which AIDS was still a contentious, even 
taboo topic, in American culture. The stigma attached to the subject was perhaps 
reflected in the intensity of affect in the debate. But AIDS is only one of several 
terminal illnesses mentioned in Still/Here; it is more foregrounded because Jones's 
works have been vocal and visible representations of his identities as a gay, black, 
HIV-positive male. (He is "vocal and visible" in a literal sense, since in his early 
solos he talked and sang as he danced.) By re-tracing the development of Jones's 
dance/politics, perhaps the source of this discomfort and the ferocity of responses can 
be found. 
 
Jones reached college in 1970, a year after the Stonewall rebellion which officially 
heralded the gay rights movement, and merely two years after the assassination of 
Martin Luther King Jnr. The '70s also saw the rise of work based on the maxim, "the 
personal is the political", with conscientization groups bringing the work of feminism 
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into private domains. Jones's early work therefore took place in context of a time 
when political changes, particularly change in the nature of political discourse as 
belonging to the public sphere, were prevalent. His dances told stories that were 
"deeply personal, dealing primarily with his family history and with dreams" 
(Morris, 2001: 248).  
 
But most remarkably his early work dealt with how these private stories were to be 
accessed by the audience. Siegel offers her recollection of the early Jones:  
 
he'd brazenly display his gorgeous body, do some outrageous turn from a 
minstrel show with a seductive smile on his face, then, while we were still 
enjoying it, snarl some retaliatory joke or whisper a humiliating experience he 
remembered. He could sing with a velvet voice, he could dance, he could do 
acrobatics that looked like love scenes with his white lover-partner Arnie Zane, 
he could pull one-liners out of the day's news or quote from a book. You didn't 
know if he was making it up or spilling his guts. (Siegel, 1996: 68) 
 
To explain this unsettling switching between seduction and aggression, Morris 
locates Jones's tactics within his marginalized identity and his attempts to disrupt and 
wrest control over how he is represented (Morris, 2001: 244). Jones's audiences in 
those years were "overwhelmingly white", and belonged to the "downtown 
postmodern avant-garde" scene, rather than the dance-makers who worked with 
African or Afro-Caribbean dance forms without postmodern devices (Morris, 2001: 
249-250).5 Morris traces how, traditionally, black gay males who appear on stage in 
a dominant white society undergo a triple "symbolic emasculation": as a black man 
he is defined by his body, marked by his colour as labourer/slave, and uninhibitedly 
sexual and hence uncivilized. As a male dancer his public display of emotions 
violates the definition of masculinity which upholds the homosocial power of men 
(by remaining hidden from sight, the "unmarked" masculine identity upholds the 
heteronormative order). As a gay man, he does not only disrupt heteronormative 
gender identities, but also disrupts his relations to other black men, because 
(hetero)sexual potency is one of the few powers left for a black man (Morris, 2001: 
244-7). Jones thus found himself playing in between these stringent conditions of 
visibility. By seducing his audiences (he undresses, he gestures and tell stories that 
are suggestive, he displays his physical prowess with demanding dance technique) he 
                                                 
5The use of "postmodern" in American dance should be carefully distinguished from wider 
understanding of "postmodernism", and is more appropriately considered modernist. The 
relevance of this will be explored within this section. 
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played to the stereotype of the desirable, sexualized male dancer that Alvin Ailey 
popularized in the 1960s and 70s (Morris, 2001: 247); and then by switching to 
aggression (he walks towards and addresses the audience directly, mouthing or 
saying swear words), Jones upset those stereotypes of emasculation. "Jones actually 
frightened spectators" (Morris, 2001: 251). He refused to be the obedient and passive 
object for the audience's pleasurable looking, and dared the audience to identify his 
defiant self as the truth. He "transform[ed] his identity from passive 'feminized' 
object to active 'masculinized' subject" (Morris, 2001: 250).  
 
A part of what Croce seizes on in her attack on Jones is this wresting of control from 
the viewer to the performer.  
 
With Jones, you were actually intimidated. ... At first, I saw the intimidation as 
part of the game that postmodernists played. Choreographers as different as 
Kenneth King and David Gordon and, later, William Forsythe had fun heckling 
the critics – anticipating or satirizing the reviews. Jones also did this. When I 
blasted an early work of his with the phrase "fever swamps," he retaliated by 
using the phrase as the title of a piece. (Croce, 1994) 
 
She locates this "intimidation" within the "defiant anti-conventionalism" of the 
1960s, which she acknowledged as something positive: 
 
I'll say one thing for the sixties: the dance profession flourished in a climate of 
aesthetic freedom it hasn't enjoyed since. Jones's main connection to the sixties 
experimenters was to the power they'd claimed to control the terms on which 
they could be artists and be written about as artists. (Croce, 1994) 
 
However, she criticizes what the artists did with the power they had wrested from 
what she considers to be serious artistic criticism: 
 
The kind of "innovation" that seeks to relieve critics of their primary task of 
evaluation is always suspect. In the sixties, if you didn't like the rules you made 
your own; you fought the critics because they impinged on your freedom. In 
the eighties, you fought the critics because they hampered your chances of 
getting grants. (Croce, 1994) 
 
In collusion with funding agencies (such as the National Endowment for the Arts – 
NEA), artists used art for social and political aims; funders justified their existence 
on supporting "utilitarian art", abandoning "disinterested art" which could be 
evaluated on aesthetic terms (by critics like Croce). Croce thus bemoans the use of 
art for political crusades, which she traces back to the 1960s: "against Vietnam, for 
62 
civil rights"; and further back to the "proletarian thirties" (Croce, 1994).  
 
This is one strand of Croce's argument for her attack on Jones: Still/Here is not made 
on (disinterested) aesthetic grounds but for a political end, and thus pre-determines 
audience response, which cannot be but a voyeuristic sympathy for the victims of 
disease. It is hence "undiscussable", as Croce indicates in the title of her piece.  
 
There seems to be an important gap emerging in Croce's argument. By attacking 
"utilitarian art", Croce seems to be discursively designating the relation between art 
and politics as between form and content (dance-makers use the form of dance to 
convey political messages, rather than strive for perfection of form). She evokes 
images of agit-prop theatre, or political plays and sketches with characters acting out 
scenarios, typically using unrefined acting technique. Indeed she calls Jones's 
company "a barely domesticated form of street theatre" (Croce, 1994). But these do 
not seem to apply to Jones's art. The conventional emphasis on content and the clear 
separation between performer and role do not apply; instead of using art to be 
political, it seems more accurate to say that Jones's art is political. Once again it has 
to do with the issue of presence. Croce blames the ideology of the 1960s; so it is to 
the 1960s I return, to trace the shifts in the notion of a dancer's presence at the 
emergence of the American "postmodern dance".  
 
 
 
Modernism: text = being = truth  
 
The phrase "postmodern dance" emerged in the 1960s to distinguish itself from 
modern dance. Sally Banes describes it as a primarily chronological usage of the 
word: it came after modern dance. Modern dance as pioneered by the likes of Isadora 
Duncan and Martha Graham were never really modernist (Banes, 1987: xiii-xiv). 
New techniques were established which challenged the dominance of ballet, but 
essentially its attitude to the medium itself is not addressed. The work of the 
postmodern choreographers, starting with the Judson Church choreographers such as 
Yvonne Rainier and Steve Paxton, were much closer to how "modernism" is 
generally understood as an artistic concept:  
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the acknowledgment of the medium's materials, the revealing of dance's 
essential qualities as an art form, the separation of formal elements, the 
abstraction of forms, and the elimination of eternal references as subjects. 
(Banes, 1987: xv) 
 
Merce Cunningham may be considered as a forerunner of the postmoderns, in that he 
encouraged dance to be performed and watched on its own terms: as dance 
movements, rather than as illustrations of content (such as the many psychological or 
mythical narratives that Graham created). His separation of the formal elements – 
sometimes bringing the dancing, the music and the stage design together for the first 
time on opening night – is a typically modernist trait (Banes, 1987: xvi). The 
postmoderns extended these experimentations and "found new ways to foreground 
the medium of dance rather than its meaning" (Banes, 1987: xvi). The question "what 
is dance" became the most urgent: ordinary and undramatic movements, movements 
of the mouth in eating, the mental action of speaking, movements of a film projector 
were presented as dance pieces (Banes, 1987: xix). "The body itself became the 
subject of the dance, rather than serving as an instrument for expressive metaphors" 
(Banes, 1987: xviii). The act of performing is thus the meaning, or, to echo 
developments of cultural theory in that era, "the medium is the message" (Marshall 
McLuhan, 1967).  
 
Because of this, the debate is still open as to whether the work of the postmodern 
choreographers should more properly be described as late modernist.6 Bill Readings 
characterizes late modernist art's innovation as seeking "a new truth to the experience 
of telling" (Readings, 1991: 74). Readings, in reading Jean-François Lyotard's The 
Postmodern Condition, is looking at the relation between narrativity (the act of 
telling) and its claim to knowledge (truth). The traditional representational strategy, 
in which performers assume roles (characters) within a narrative, seems to belong in 
what Readings terms "the early modern or classical" model of artwork, which 
"sought to represent ... the world as a fixed meaning, a tableau" (Readings, 1991: 
74). The innovation of Graham relied on finding a new way of telling this "truth" of 
the world (via a new dance technique), but essentially the picture or meaning stays 
                                                 
6Banes notes that the American avant-garde dance scene of the 1980s was closer allied to 
postmodernist devices such as pastiche. But she chooses to retain the term "postmodern" to 
emphasize the continuity from the 1960s to the 1980s (Banes, 1987: xv). The break with historical 
modern dance, in her view, is more significant; and some of the principles and devices explored in 
the 1960s still informed the choreographic practices of the 1980s, as indeed I shall argue regarding 
Jones. 
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fixed. For the late modernists, the subject's experience of telling becomes legitimated 
as knowledge (Readings, 1991: 67). The performer's very act of moving is thus the 
locus of meaning.7 
 
The shift away from narrative meaning to the medium of dance is, ironically, 
probably what gave birth to a "golden age of the art" that Croce nostalgically recalls 
(Croce, 1994). The postmodern choreographers brought a radical dismantling of 
habitual ways of seeing dance in strict terms of genre or tradition, such as "ballet", 
"modern", allowing "dance" to come into focus. Croce reminisces: "All the way up 
and down the line, the most wonderful dancing, the most brilliant choreography were 
all about dance" (Croce, 1994). From this ethos emerged choreographers such as 
Twyla Tharp, who began her career in 1968 within the postmodern ethos and became 
one of the most prominent choreographers in America. Even though she later 
abandoned the radical dismantling of dance techniques and the focus on pedestrian or 
organic ways of moving, opting to work with the most technically brilliant dancers 
such as Mikhail Baryshnikov, the underlying logic of her choreography was still an 
investigation of the medium. Deuce Coupe with the Joffrey Balley (1973), for 
instance, was a juxtaposition of two dance forms on one stage: breakdancing and 
ballet.8  
 
It is evident that Jones is a legacy of this emphasis on formal concerns. The 
switching between seduction and aggression was not the only aspect of his early 
solos; also featured was a "detached approach and formal complexity of much of his 
material", and "an unemotional performance style" (Morris, 2001: 253-4). Some of 
his works "offered task-oriented abstract movement" (Morris, 2001: 254), 
reminiscent of the postmoderns of the 1960s who used games and task structures as 
choreographic devices. He also juxtaposed cool, abstract movement "while 
reminding viewers through his verbal narratives of the pain of black experience" 
(Morris, 2001: 254), clearly a legacy of the Cunningham approach against the 
                                                 
7The logic that runs through these works originated from the modernist era of Clement Greenberg and 
the abstract expressionism of Jackson Pollock. Greenberg's call for paintings that did not illustrate 
figures, but which exists solely on the canvas, echoes the choreographers' insistent focus on 
"dance" that comprised solely of moving bodies, free from the yoke of (literary narrative) 
meanings. Perhaps it can also be traced within ballet, to some of George Balanchine's works, 
which stripped ballet of its romanticist narratives.  
8It is interesting to note that in Deuce Coupe, Tharp approached the ballet vocabulary as words – the 
ballet sequences were constructed from going through the list of standard ballet lexicon 
alphabetically: "arabesque" and so on. The dance language – its textuality – is its meaning.  
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synthesis of meanings.  
 
Croce's complaint of "utilitarian art" thus fails to capture the shift in meaning-making 
brought about by the postmodern choreographers. The seeds of Jones's politics were 
sown in locating meaning within movement itself. This politics also applied to other 
choreographers contemporary to Jones: "even when their dances remain specifically 
private, that very act of confessional revelation seems to take on political meaning" 
(Banes, 1987: xxx).  
 
Even as Jones moved away from the antagonistic dynamic with the audience, this 
method of communicating meaning remained. His video solo, Untitled (1989), was 
among the first works created after the death of Zane. While the narration evoked 
painful memories and longings for people from the past, the dance movements were 
constructed according to a "continuous revision of the established formal structure" 
(Gere, 2002: 56) – a rigorous formal manipulation of set vocabularies. The source of 
vocabulary also betrayed a formal concern: there were sections of "near-literal 
repetition" of a phrase from an earlier work, Continuous Replay (1982), which itself 
sourced movement from Zane's Hand Dance (1977) (Gere, 2002: 55). The 
remembrance and longing for Zane was thus not so much embodied in the 
movements themselves; rather, through its being identified (named) as having 
originated from Zane, the movement text became repeatable quotations, signifying 
the loss of Zane. Its basis was still the emphasis on the medium (the dance text); its 
performance is its meaning.  
 
Jones's dance is Jones's politics: his performing is the representation of the silent, 
repressed voices, in society and in personal lives. The truth that drives his politics is 
in performing: being present, being seen. It can be said that Jones's dancing 
embodies democracy: as a political system, democracy works on the principle of 
representation, in which the social groups are represented in the distribution of 
governing power and hence material resources. Being visible ensures participation in 
the system; for Jones to perform is to represent the interests of gay, black and HIV-
positive communities, and their rights to participate. The same self-referential logic 
is evident in the title for Jones's choreographic work, We Set Out Early ... Visibility 
Was Poor (1997). Jones explains the "we" who started the journey "early" to be 
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himself and Arnie Zane; but, "[o]n another level, it might be my whole generation of 
art makers" (Jones, cited in Al-Solaylee, 1999). "Visibility", being "poor", has been 
the issue against which his dancing struggled: 
 
[Jones] has commented that his early work was an attempt to overcome his 
invisibility and marginalization as a black gay man. But the picture is different 
now. "I feel I've been able to show my work, which is the greatest victory for 
me these days. Therefore I feel less invisible, I feel empowered, I feel 
validated." (Al-Solaylee 1999) 
 
The identification between autobiography, performance text, meaning and politics is 
clearly shown; power comes from the visibility of the self, where truth resides. 
 
 
 
The screen of visibility 
 
A significant part of what Croce attacks is not Still/Here itself, but the lack of 
separation between Jones the person and his work as I have discussed above. This 
identification between personal struggles and the act of dancing is seen, from Croce's 
more classical paradigm, as the representation of narratives of victimhood, hence her 
label of Jones's work as "victim art". This is the second strand in Croce's argument: 
the relation between art (beauty) and morbidity (trauma).  
 
Based on the publicity material she had seen (which was abundant, according to her 
account), Still/Here was unequivocally about illness and dying. For her this was not a 
problem in itself, as she cites nineteenth-century art as laudable examples of how art 
can use suffering as subject matter, how Romantic artists were in fact "preoccupied 
with death" (Croce, 1994). But Croce sees these artists as having transcended or 
"sublimated" their diseases, grief, or morbid preoccupations. Jones, however, as 
epitome of today's culture for Croce, has made suffering a spectacle. Her anxiety lies 
in that "[t]he cast members of Still/Here – the sick people whom Jones has signed up 
– have no choice other than to be sick" (Croce, 1994). Because the performers do not 
transcend morbidity, and do not sublimate suffering into art, the only response she 
feels capable of making is one of sympathy, not artistic judgment: "I can't review 
someone I feel sorry for or hopeless about" (Croce, 1994). Her attack on Jones and 
the political left is that such responses become coercive criteria with which to judge 
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the worthiness of art.  
 
For Croce, any performer should try to strive towards the ideal of beauty; she 
specifically cites the "beauty of line" as criterion. In her paradigm, what matters is a 
good dancer, and cites an example: "Jackie Gleason was fat and was a good dancer" 
(Croce, 1994). Her problem with overweight, old, scoliotic dancers was that they 
could not fulfil the criterion of beauty (of line). What underlies Croce's ideal of 
beauty is clearly the classical model of the separation between performer and role. (A 
fictitious, but likely, thought process in Croce could be: "Even the less fortunate can 
strive for art but, let's face facts, a scoliotic dancer cannot attain the beauty of line.")  
 
What is at stake here is the conception of "art" – how one knows something to be art. 
Referring again to Readings, Croce's paradigm can be termed "classical" because she 
holds "beauty" as an objective truth. "Classical positivism claims speaker and auditor 
[or viewer] as mere contingencies upon the truth to be narrated" (Readings, 1991: 
66); thus it is incidental whether the performer and the viewer are healthy or ill, 
privileged or oppressed: a "descriptive anonymity" characterizes this paradigm. Both 
parties should honour the objective truth of art. Contrasted with the modernist truth 
of subjective presence, Croce and Jones are viewing art from different paradigms. 
Jones's paradigm, in which his act of performance is his politics, thus becomes to 
Croce "unintelligible as theatre" (Croce, 1994).  
 
At this point, I could easily make what seems to be an ethical judgment between the 
classical and the modernist models of artistic truth, based on the idea of doing justice 
to (or not betraying) the bodies in trauma, i.e. the Survival Workshops participants, 
the choreographic source for Still/Here. Croce's clinging to beauty as an objective 
criterion clearly effects an exclusion of bodies in trauma. To recall Copeland's 
reference to Sartre, the classical model is suffering from a "crisis of the imaginary"; 
the fiction of striving for transcendence simply does not hold in "a century of 
unprecedented horror" (Copeland, 1995: 16). The neurosis Croce displays in her 
article also seems to attest to the efficacy of the politics of representation: like a 
Freudian return of the repressed, Croce is haunted by the previously silenced bodies 
clamoring to be seen and heard. Her anxiety at these repressed voices can almost be 
said to testify to her guilty conscience. So, why would I want to re-open this debate?  
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Interestingly, I also feel anxious about the lack of separation between Jones's dancing 
and his subjective truth. I do not object to it on the same basis as Croce; rather my 
anxiety concerns the politics and representation. What exactly is made visible to the 
audience? What comes in between the bodies in trauma and the dancing bodies, what 
is the effect of conflating the two? 
 
Seeing Jones's dance works on video recordings and photographs, reading critical 
writings on his work, and, particularly, examining his creative process, leaves me 
with a sense of incredulity as to the efficacy of political representation. Later I will 
also refer to a similar sense of anxiety which Jones himself feels. What follows is an 
analysis of the creative processes of Still/Here, with which I wish to tease out this 
sense of anxiety.  
 
The Survival Workshops, the process that generated source material, seemed less 
therapy than conscious contributions to an art-making process. Jones pointed out that 
the participants' words and movements, related to their experiences of coping with 
life-threatening diseases, were used in the piece with their permission. Jones 
described the workshops and rehearsal process: 
 
With every workshop we developed a gesture phrase, something that 
everybody could do, and we recorded what that gesture meant to the 
participants. All the dancers have had to learn 78 of these gestures and what 
each one meant. Now we are making phrases out of them. We speed them up 
and slow them down, we make transitions, we juxtapose and invert them. We 
do these things as a way of making movement. Also I will make a phrase 
which for me is solving technical problems. I want to see the dancers use their 
feet more, or I want to make a phrase that has constantly changing directions ... 
(Farrow, 1994: 81) 
 
Jones's description suggests that he constructed Still/Here from a modernist, if not 
formalist, process. The material was crafted according to its formal qualities: "speed 
them up and slow them down"; "juxtapose and invert"; "constantly changing 
directions". The words of participants, for example by one who was living with 
cancer: "Slash, poison or burn, these are your choices", became lyrics which were 
then turned into songs for folk singer Odetta, accompanying the Still section of the 
piece. Copeland notes that "the 'genuine' suffering – which we witness or hear about 
only intermittently on video – is soon distilled into artistic form" (Copeland, 1995: 
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16).9  
 
Reviewer Jann Parry notes the clear coding of meanings in the formalized 
movements: 
 
At the start of Still/Here, dancer Arthur Aviles runs through the sequence of 
gestures, explaining the coded meanings they carry. “Engulfing the universe” is 
a sweeping embrace, offered by a woman [workshop participant] with a spine 
tumour; “maintaining my sexuality” is the provocative pose of a woman with 
breast cancer ... Gestures and movements are formalised into dance phrases, 
but they can still be read, like semaphore ... (Parry, 1995: 22) 
 
It would seem that the layers of abstraction in Jones's choreographic process had 
purified movements to resemble words. What Jones offered was a highly crafted 
dance language which mediated trauma in a highly artistic (artificial) manner. From 
the written records available, it seems that many spectators noticed primarily the 
artistic craft of this work. According to Martha Duffy of Time magazine, Jones 
 
feels that people know they're watching dance and not documentary. "When I 
go to talk sessions after my performances," he says, "people want to know 
about specifics. They want to know about the history of modern dance." 
(Duffy, 1995: 62) 
 
And the history of modern dance, as Jones explains in Farrow's interview, is about 
"find[ing] a new vocabulary"; source material such as the "very naive movements 
and gestures" from the workshop participants were "incorporate[d] and exploit[ed] 
for their movement potential." Jones goes on to say: "The reason I'm doing this is 
that I'm trying to find a new vocabulary." (cited in Farrow, 1994: 79.) His explicit 
aim was to make art; his dance was about dancing. 
 
This seems strange, given that Jones seemed anxious to distinguish himself from the 
"Northern European aloofness" of formalism, asking critics to respond to his work 
"at the same level of passion" that he had (Parry, 1995: 21). But Jones's work 
diverges from his explicit intention; his politics does not operate through 
embodiment of meaning, but through making movement text available as meaning 
itself. The politics emerge in the act of dancing: "It's about how people partner each 
other, how people dance in tandem.” (Farrow, 1994: 75) The degree to which Jones 
had been a faithful disciple of the western modernist dance tradition can be seen in 
                                                 
9Regarding the phrase "genuine" suffering, Copeland is quoting from Croce.  
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his echoing Gertrude Stein's famous modernist proclamation: “What is the meaning 
of a flower? A flower doesn't have a meaning. It is. What is the meaning of a turn? A 
turn doesn't have a meaning. It is.” (Farrow, 1994: 77)  
 
An important distinction needs to be made between a dancing body that 
communicates suffering and trauma through the self-reflexive, formal action of 
dancing, and bodies that experience trauma. The bodies in trauma had taken a 
journey of artistic crafting, from the ("naïve") gestural work and speaking about their 
experiences at Survival Workshops, through a rehearsal process, to being seen on 
stage via video projection and crafted dance vocabulary. The abstraction processes, 
the beautiful crafting, transformed trauma into text, into image. This change can be 
highlighted by comparing the bodies of dis-ease to the bodies that danced on stage:  
 
... when [folk singer] Odetta chants an invocation for cancer sufferers, “Slash, 
poison or burn, these are your choices”, a long, lithe woman with a shaven 
head, Odile Reine-Adelaide, leaps galvanically, one hand clutching a breast, 
the other her groin ... The words reflect an experience; the dancer embodies it. 
(Parry, 1995: 22) 
 
The visual codes of the dancer – shaven head, hand gestures referring to breast 
(cancer) and groin (sexuality) – clearly referred to the cancer sufferer; while the 
technical dance movement, along with the “long, lithe” body of the dancer, reminded 
the audience that they are watching a work of art. Parry describes the dance 
effectively, but the word “embodies” seems inaccurate; rather, the dancer seemed to 
be offering another layer – “words”, “semaphore” – by dancing. Meaning was 
conveyed through a highly trained dancing body. The dancer did not purport to 
embody the suffering of the woman with cancer. The abstraction processes drained 
the jouissance from the body in trauma; bodies conveyed clear meanings by being 
technically accomplished, achieving clarity in performance.10  
 
The gap between these two vastly different bodies was sensed by Johannes Birringer 
                                                 
10Interestingly, even though the modernist model applies to both 1960s postmodern choreographers 
and to Still/Here in 1994, the bodies that perform differed quite dramatically. In the 1960s the 
emphasis was on a refusal to "differentiate the dancer's body from an ordinary body" (Banes, 
1987: xxvii), in reaction to the training of ballet and modern dance, and in tune with the 60s spirit 
of "do your own thing". Bane argues that as sport and fitness became more widespread in the 
1980s, "physical dexterity, complicated timing and partnering, and acrobatic embellishment" 
became the norm; "[i]n the virtuosic works of the eighties, the significance of the dance is the 
refinement of bodily skills" (Banes, 1987: xxviii).  
71 
as the crucial aspect that made Still/Here "aesthetically pleasing" for him. He argues 
that it was not the technical execution of the dance language that pleased him,  
 
but rather the dancers' awareness that technical control here may function 
ironically as a conscious, futile yet necessary elaboration of personal and 
psychologically charged experience. The very sense of control is always 
precariously shadowed and ghosted by the recurring video projections of the 
witnesses' testimony of their struggle to maintain a sense of dignity in the face 
of death. (Birringer, 1998: 13) 
 
But it is possible to understand Birringer's insight from the opposite angle: the gap 
becomes an ironic, anxiety-inducing testimony of how the presence of athletic and 
articulate bodies is unable to dance the truth of subjectivity in trauma. The more 
common response to the work is more likely to be as follows: 
 
The thing I disliked about Still/Here was its mainstream aura. There was 
something inappropriate about its flashy visual investiture, its snappy timing, 
its ruthless editing of the tapes, its slick, accomplished dancing. It left the 
audience screaming with delight instead of pausing for reflection. (Siegel, 
1996: 69) 
 
And, along similar lines: 
 
The sad fact of the matter is that the evening retains little of the raw 
documentary impact of the interviews with the unwell. But at the same time, 
the abstracted version of the interviews aren't very satisfying formally, as 
dance. And the abstracting process hasn't resulted in especially powerful 
images that embody some deeper essence of suffering or survival. (Copeland, 
1995: 16) 
 
The artistic processes of formalism and abstraction continually purge the bodies in 
trauma. What the audience sees is a screen that has been erected in front of trauma. 
Although it claims to tell the story of bodies living through terminal illnesses, 
Still/Here hides these bodies behind art. Not intentionally: I do not imply that the 
work is a pre-meditated betrayal of the participants of the Survival Workshops. But 
within the politics of representation, the dancing bodies, and the video images of the 
diseased bodies, can only be the image presented to the subject's perspectival gaze: 
the political efficacy of visibility is premised on it. But, to recall Berlant and Warner 
(cited towards the beginning of this chapter), public visibility does not equate social 
change. Like memorial images of the dead, the primary effect of the image is to 
prevent the reality of loss (death) from overwhelming the viewing subject, who 
desires to identify with the living. The image tames the gaze and reassures the 
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viewer: "I am alive". Croce is wrong in worrying that the dying "have no choice 
other than to be sick" (Croce, 1994); it is the converse: the living have no choice but 
to be well. The audience's complicity in the anxiety of representation is left hidden, 
the normative social order left unchanged.11  
 
To recall Sontag: 
 
So far as we feel sympathy, we feel we are not accomplices to what caused the 
suffering. Our sympathy proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence. 
(Sontag, 2003: 102) 
 
The sympathy comes from seeing the image (of horror) within conditions that leave 
intact the divide between us and them, with "us" in a safe, external (ahistoricized) 
viewing position. The horror is mediated through discourse such as "the human 
condition" (classical, essentialist), or perhaps "unequal power relations" (modernist 
ideological). These words enable us to understand suffering, purporting to reveal the 
truth about horror. But so quick are we to speak these words as truth that they 
conceal the lack of reality, the loss, within the very words we speak; hence our 
"impotence" (our castration). And, they leave us exonerated from our complicity, 
hence our "innocence".  
 
 
 
Refusing to see: the indifference of representation 
 
Even though the conflict between Croce and Jones can be traced to the problem of 
two different models of relating subjectivity to truth and representation, underlying 
both sides of the debate is the same premise that needs deconstructing. Each attempts 
to capture theatrical performance within its perspectival seeing/discourse, seeking 
recourse to conceptual metanarratives to legitimate its representation as truth – that 
the meaning of dance can be understood in this or that way. Once this truth is 
established, it serves as the determinate basis for politics. This common premise is 
                                                 
11This may come across as a cynical interpretation; and I wish to clarify that the focus of this analysis 
has been on the one particular work, Still/Here. Albright records a performance of another work, 
D-Man in the Waters (1989), involving the dancer Demian Acquavella, who was ill with AIDS 
that he could barely stand. Nevertheless Jones supported him on stage so that he could perform the 
arm gestures of his solo (Albright, 1997: 75). Clearly, the gap between the technically proficient 
and pleasing bodies, and the bodies in trauma, was brought into the meaning-making operation of 
that particular performance of the piece. 
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the target of Lyotard's poststructuralist criticism, of "politics as representation" (cited 
in Auslander, 1992: 43).  
 
Lyotard analyzes a narrative in its three instances: narrator, narrated and narratee. In 
the classical model, the narrated (what is told of, the referent) is privileged as 
objective truth, which places it outside of narrative and governs it, as a 
metanarrative. The metanarrative abstracts itself as the concept that legitimates all 
other narratives, revealing their ultimate meaning (Readings, 1991: 66). Hence, for 
Croce, the truth of art is in the aesthetics of beauty, to which the pragmatics of 
narrator and narratee (performer and viewer) are incidental. The "descriptive 
anonymity" in the classical model (Readings, 1991: 66) renders the performer and 
viewer's idiosyncratic differences irrelevant for art.  
 
In modernism's case, the subject (narrator) is privileged to the status of a 
metanarrative. Narration is reduced to "an effect of consensus between narrator and 
an anonymous narratee" (Readings, 1991: 67). Hence, truth is the performers' 
experiences of moving. In both models, it is the metanarrative (conceptual 
abstractions) which legitimates knowledge. Like the screen that regulates the 
conditions within which an image can be understood, the metanarrative constructs a 
position outside of the actual event of narration (performance). From this position 
representations can be viewed, and certainty of knowledge can be derived. 
 
What guarantees presence (in the Derridean sense: the transparency and certainty of 
meaning for the conscious subject; and in the theatrical sense, the "actorly 
representation" (Auslander, 1992: 37) as the artistic truth that is guaranteed to the 
audience) is thus representation by concept, which Lyotard calls "discourse".  
 
Discourse, that is, organizes the objects of knowledge as a system of concepts 
(units of meaning). Meanings are defined in terms of their position in the 
discursive framework, by virtue of their opposition to all the other concepts or 
elements in the system. Discourse thus imposes a spatial arrangement upon 
objects which Lyotard calls "textual", a virtual grid of oppositions. (Readings, 
1991: 3) 
 
Therefore, the discursive space of presence produces meanings through operations of 
opposition. A textual object signifies in opposition to another textual object in the 
system of discourse. This analysis of signification in discourse is based on 
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Saussurean structural linguistics, where textual units acquire meanings through being 
in opposition to other units. Thus, "cat" signifies something different to "mat" by 
virtue of the opposition between the phonemes [k] and [m], within the system or 
"grid" of English phonology. The word "cat" is not inherently meaningful; the 
relationship between signifier and meaning is thus arbitrary, an effect of opposition. 
 
I have already outlined this discursive operation in terms of artistic and political 
representation, by referring to Sontag on the viewing of images of horror. The 
images, as representations of trauma, signify the death of "them" in opposition to the 
living "us". "Remembering" becomes signified as an ethical action, in opposition to 
"forgetting". In the politics of democracy (particularly for the US Left), to "speak" 
becomes a positive value in opposition to "being silent", the "closet" which is valued 
negatively.  
 
In 2001, in the wake of the September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre in New 
York, Jones spoke in broadcast and press interviews about envisioning art-making 
after the horror. David Gere records how Jones contextualized 9/11 in terms of the 
AIDS pandemic: 
 
Jones reaches back "to another numbing, paralyzing crisis that confronted and 
continues to confront the dance community – AIDS," before attempting some 
insight into what we might expect from artists now. Among other things, Jones 
tells us to expect that "works with a public voice will sound even louder in 
certain quarters recently vacated by the cool aloof gestures of modernism." He 
continues, "More literary or theatrical in nature, some will 'name names,' decry 
and demand to know what is really happening and who is responsible."  (Gere, 
2002: 62) 
 
Jones privileges the public voice in opposition to private silence; in the face of 
horror, his solution is to "sound even louder". In the (literal) void that is the site of 
horror, he proposes "going to the site of ground zero, where the New York towers 
collapsed, and dancing" (Gere, 2002: 62) – to use dancing to fill in the gap. This 
logic of representation inevitably leads towards an aggressive, interrogative stance: 
"decry and demand to know ..." (emphasis added).   
 
In this noisy proliferation of loud sounding and filling in of voids, Lyotard "refute[s] 
the claim that everything is indifferently a matter of representation" (Readings, 1991: 
5, emphasis added). The arbitrariness of opposition as a meaning-making operation 
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gives rise to an indifference: opposites essentially have the same value by virtue of 
deriving their meanings from the same representational system. The clamour of the 
victim art debate is a very good example: both opposing sides of the debate – the 
political right and the left – use the argument that their right to voice dissent has been 
silenced. The left criticizes Croce for conservatism and refusal to let minorities have 
a voice; cultural activist bell hooks writes to the New Yorker,  
 
The publication of this piece alarms and threatens because it exposes the extent 
to which right-wing values, particularly censorship – the will to suppress 
dissenting voices, to limit artistic freedom and critical vision – are gaining 
cultural momentum. (hooks, 1995; in Dance Connection)  
 
The political right defends Croce for her defiance in the face of political correctness, 
the new political orthodoxy that threatens to overrule artistic standards and impose 
political standards. Hilton Kramer writes to the New Yorker,  
 
the ritualistic charges of racism, sexism, homophobia and the like do not issue 
from any serious attempt to illuminate the problems of art and culture in our 
tragically divided society, but are designed to silence dissent from a prevailing 
political orthodoxy. (Kramer, 1995; in Dance Connection) 
 
"Silencing dissent" becomes a charge against political oppositions that are 
exchangeable. The concept has currency for opposing ideologies, indifferent to the 
possibility of a referent in the "real world". 
 
Herein lies the malaise of the politics of representation, especially democratic 
representation in capitalist societies. Opposing political parties discursively signify 
differences: apparently one side champions welfare and social justice, and the other 
side upholds free-market competition and conservative social policy. But in reality 
the left has dismantled the welfare state and does the privatizing for the right (Žižek, 
2004: 314); the discursive differences are, at the end of the day, meaningless. The 
reason is because the signifying operation of opposition is, despite the structuralists' 
claim, not arbitrary. There is still the presence of the metanarrative, the master-
signifier, that governs signification.  
 
Earlier, I propose that Jones's dance is an embodiment of democracy (see p.65). Of 
democracy, Slavoj Žižek writes, 
 
There is no democracy without a hidden, presupposed elitism. Democracy is, 
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by definition, not global; it has to be based on values or truths that one cannot 
select democratically. In democracy, one can fight for truth, but not decide 
what truth is. ... As Hegel already knew, “absolute democracy” could only 
actualize itself in the guise of its “oppositional determination,” as terror. 
(Žižek, 2004: 306) 
 
The "elitism" in democracy is in the power to decide what will be legitimated as the 
truth – the metanarrative – that is the "transcendental guarantee" (Žižek, 2004: 320) 
of the value of representation; but what it can offer is no more than opposing 
signifiers that cannot escape the totality of the system. Jones's strategies of seduction 
and aggression, his politics of visibility, is to wrest from the audience the power to 
decide his representation. What then does Jones embody?  
 
Sometimes when I step on stage ... I carry in front of me an invisible phallus. ... 
It is my virility, my right to be, and the assurance that I will always be. I am in 
search of the dance in which the phallus is forgiven12 for being a thing that 
must penetrate, deflower. This dance will be selfish and self-interested, and 
yet, fulfilled by filling. (Jones, cited in Morris, 2001: 259)  
 
The truth of the phallic master-signifier under which Jones performs is already 
decided; the politics of visibility has already decided that it will only operate within 
the perspectival, discursive gaze. Irigaray lists visibility as one of the values 
inscribed within a phallic discourse of truth (Irigaray, 1985: 86); what visibility 
offers is the  accession to a subject position as a speaking, seeing being, regulated by 
the master-signifier of the phallus. What this truth/master-signifier/metanarrative 
does not legitimate, is not seen. Psychically, it is a blindness towards the 
impossibility for the fulfilment of desire that was precluded by castration and 
language; politically, it is a blindness towards the impossibility of the good life 
promised but precluded by the (hetero)normative order (see p.51). Deviance is 
punished; Jones has to survive by adopting "a conventionally masculine persona" 
(Morris, 2001: 260),13 the phallic signifier, in order to overcome his symbolic 
emasculation; while "no one ever blames the ideology and institutions of 
                                                 
12In asking to be forgiven, Jones becomes the self-portratist as a blind confessor of a transcendental 
Truth. See chapter 1. 
13Morris notes that in the early works, Jones's movement tended to be "blunter, less embellished, more 
squared, and directly forceful"; the verbal narration often involved "tales of heterosexual liaisons" 
(Morris, 2001: 260). Only in 1984 did Jones and Zane explicitly refer to their relationship in public 
interviews, even though it has been implicitly read into their duets before this (Morris, 2001: 258). 
It is important to note again that the focus is not on Jones's choice as to how he represents himself 
(a return to the Cartesian subjectivity, hence implying notions of truth and deceit); but the focus is 
on the positions that were open for Jones to assume within the normative order. Morris argues that, 
in co-opting heterosexual power to overcome emasculation, Jones arrived at a position where he 
could use this power to declare his identity (Morris, 2001: 260-1).  
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heterosexuality" (Berlant & Warner, 1999: 360).  
 
What power Jones gains is only meaningful in the indifference of representation, the 
"terror" of “oppositional determination” (Žižek). The positions available to him must 
either be "visible" (phallic, in control) or "silenced" (oppressed, passive, feminine), 
and both of these positions are accorded to him by the audience's perspectival gaze, 
operating under the master-signifier/metanarrative. If someone such as Croce does 
not want to acknowledge his power, all she has to do is to refuse to look. The truth of 
Jones's visibility suddenly becomes meaningless – unsignifiable.  
 
Croce's (in)action should have been the obvious downfall in her argument: she was 
not present at the show, she did not see something she reviewed, she has broken her 
professional standard of behaviour. It should have been enough to discredit her 
argument completely. Yet the debate continued and grew; and despite some 
criticisms of her arrogance or foolishness in not seeing the work,14 her arguments 
gathered voices of agreement.15 Her refusal to see – however much she revealed 
herself to be a bigot by doing so – points to a crucial weakness in the politics that 
have been pursued by the left in the last few decades, such as the "images of" 
analysis pursued by visual culture theorists (see p.54 above). Albright understands 
Croce's attack as an unease towards the "disruptive force represented by even the 
mere thought of seeing disabled, ailing, or dying bodies on a dance stage" (Albright, 
1997: 74). But she is perhaps using the truth (the metanarrative that guarantees 
visibility) within which she works, to decry an imagined Croce which is her 
opposition, and not her real point of view.16 "Perhaps the best indicator of the liberal 
fake is the sincere horror expressed by liberals apropos overt racist excesses" (Žižek, 
2004: 313). The sincerity of critique is no guarantee of its truth.  
 
                                                 
14Robert Brustein, for instance, writes that Croce should have gone to see the work and then criticize 
it, to lend more weight to her argument (Brustein, 1995; in Dance Connection). But essentially he 
supports her view.  
15Notable public figures who wrote in total or partial support of her view included: Robert Brustein of 
American Repertory Theatre, writers Camille Paglia and Susan Sontag, and to a small extent, 
Village Voice dance critic Deborah Jowitt. 
16Allow me to emphasize that I am not in turn denouncing Albright's stance; if I do so, besides 
pursuing the same recourse to a metanarrative of theory by which to judge her statement, I would 
also be reducing the complexity of her work in the audiences' gaze and different bodies performing 
on stage. By questioning her particular statement on Croce I hope I am not trying to discredit the 
work, nor to propose that Croce is perhaps not bigoted.  
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The truth that is pursued by the politics of representation becomes a fetish for the 
subject. The objet a fuels but does not satisfy the subject's desire (see chapter 1) – in 
this case, for political control, empowerment. The screen protects the subject from 
confronting the impossibility of the total fulfilment of this desire; the gaze of the 
objet a is tamed by holding onto the image on the screen that provides an illusion of 
a subject in control, looking, speaking. Hence the fetish of the image, the importance 
accorded to contesting representation. Žižek calls it "the fetishizing power of logos" 
(Žižek, 2004: 310). Marxists call it "the fetishism of commodities" (Bewes, 2002: 4), 
the image as a reification of the struggle for subjecthood. The exchangeability of 
opposing political signifiers (images) can be understood as fundamentally an 
economic exchange. Democracy (operating through representing the interests of 
various opposing voices) does not escape, and furthermore colludes in, the 
overdetermining of "all noneconomic strata of social life" through capital (Žižek, 
2004: 294). The pluralistic openness of democratic representation is overdetermined 
by "capitalism’s power to produce variety – because markets get saturated. Produce 
variety and you produce a niche market" (Massumi, cited in Žižek, 2004: 294). If the 
(phallic) body of Jones embodies democracy, the images that his dances can produce 
can only signify as commodities (fetishes) within the (political) market – the same 
market within which opposing political camps operate. The politics of resistance 
converges with the dynamics of capitalist power (Massumi, cited in Žižek, 2004: 
294); the politics of representation increasingly becomes the production of niche 
markets. If you don't like what you see, just don't buy it: that (consumer's) choice 
stays no matter how much one contests representations, and fights for the visibility of 
the marginalized. Simply by refusing to see, Croce opts out of buying into Jones's 
niche market, and in one stroke disarms the politics of the left.  
 
Croce's refusal is thus, ironically, the key to unlocking the crisis of "impotence" 
(Sontag; see p.53 above) in body performance in the wake of mass social trauma. 
Instead of giving him control, the phallic signifier that Jones carries with his dancing 
body may be suffering from performance anxiety (see chapter 1). Jones describes the 
experience of performing:  
 
There is something about the spectator saying, in effect, 'Perform for us. Show 
us your body.' So it made me extremely aggressive, and maybe that was my 
desire to impose masculine control ... (Jones, cited in Burt, 1995: 51) 
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And, 
 
I found myself easily seduced by a set of eyes, learned what it is to engage the 
expectations and needs of spectators. It made me want to please. Or spit. 
(Jones, cited in Morris, 2001: 252) 
 
His aggression can be understood as an illusion of control that defends himself 
against performing against his will. This anxious position can be further detected in 
the following incident, described by Jann Parry, dance critic of a British newspaper: 
 
"What do you want from us?" I asked Bill T Jones at a round-table meeting for 
the press in Amsterdam, where his company had performed Still/Here. He had 
been berating critics in general (and me in particular) for "inappropriate" 
responses to his work in the past. "I'm asking you to respond at the same level 
of passion that I have," he said. "I don't want to play Northern European 
aloofness. I refuse to speak to you on your terms – why should I?" (Parry, 
1995: 21) 
 
Sensing the lack of connection between his work and the critics, Jones asks the 
audience (of which critics are a part) to recognize his truth, namely his sincerity and 
passion. He refuses to be seduced by the audience's eyes, and so by setting up an 
antagonistic relation, he demands a reversal of looking; he will "please" them, or 
"spit" at them. Parry remains unconvinced: at the end of her review, she writes: 
"surely a paean of praise [for Jones's "passion"] and a flood of tears [in sympathy for 
the workshop survivors] are not the only valid responses?" (Parry, 1995: 22) His 
demands and aggression, his phallic penetration, his masculine control may have 
won over his power to look instead of being looked at; but his perspectival gaze can 
only produce an audience in the image of his antagonistic discourse – people who are 
antagonized, refusing to speak on his terms. The exchanges between opposing 
signifiers continue.  
 
Croce's refusal to look is thus key to the dilemma, because it points to the difficulty, 
if not futility, in contesting representation. A more relevant question is: how can the 
viewing subject be unsettled – that illusory subject who purports to see, know and 
speak the truth? How can the viewer's "innocence" and "impotence" (Sontag) be 
changed?  
 
To unsettle the viewer – literally, to leave the viewer feeling disturbed. Goya did 
this; but as Sontag points out (see p.53 above), the equally explicit photography of 
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war atrocities may simply leave us unimplicated, offering sympathy from an 
"impotent" external position. The image can only signify as a fetish for commodity: 
at the simplest level of analysis, disturbing war images can be neutralized by 
switching to a "different" television channel.  
 
Discourse always suppresses an "other" by reducing difference to oppositions; 
the indifference of discourse represses jouissance, an unspeakable other that is 
always at work within and against the text, disrupting the rule of representation 
(Readings, 1991: xxxi, 5-6).  
 
The screen and the image conspire to tame (or repress) the horrors of large scale 
trauma before it reaches the viewer. It used to be supposed that the disclosure of 
private suffering can move the viewing public to demand more justice. But in the 
marketplace of images, the separation between public (politics) and private 
(suffering) is only a discursive construct; "private" signifies in opposition to "public" 
so that a normative order can be maintained – it may be a heteronormative order, or 
the order of the global market economy. Jones insists on the public voice: to make 
the terminal ill visible, to dance on ground zero of the World Trade Centre attack; 
but this call for the "public" assumes a truth of the "private" that now rings hollow, a 
fetishizing belief in democracy (Žižek, 2004: 312-3): democratic bodies only count if 
they are seen, represented, remembered.  
 
But: a jouissance, an object-gaze, a figurality (see chapter 1), "is always at work 
within and against the text, disrupting the rule of representation". Before finding out 
how to access this, Sontag proposes why this should be necessary:  
 
Perhaps too much value is assigned to memory, not enough to thinking. ... 
history gives contradictory signals about the value of remembering in the much 
longer span of a collective history. There is simply too much injustice in the 
world. And too much remembering (of ancient grievances: Serbs, Irish) 
embitters. To make peace is to forget. To reconcile, it is necessary that memory 
be faulty and limited. (Sontag, 2003: 115) 
 
The scale of loss has become that, not only is it impossible to be fully represented, it 
is dangerous to cling to representation. The fetish of remembering – which is "the 
fetishizing power of logos" (Žižek, 2004: 310) – demands the presence of meaning. 
But in the twentieth century, to be present and human, such as being a Jew during the 
Holocaust or being black under Apartheid, is to have already transgressed and to be 
killed; they have committed the crime of being (Steiner, cited in Kobialka, 2000: 42). 
81 
The identification of being with meaning and truth that is characteristic of 
representation becomes unthinkable, unbearable, and ethically non-viable.17  
 
Lyotard's politics is based on the "unspeakable other", the "figure" that haunts 
discourse and representation. For Lyotard, "[t]o make the Holocaust a concept rather 
than a name, to claim that the death camps could be the object of a cognition, a 
representation by concepts, is to drown out the screams of its victims" (Readings, 
1991: 22). And, to give voice to the silence of the dead would be to betray that 
silence (Readings, 1991: 62). This is precisely because the horror entails such 
complete erasure of being. It would do an injustice to ask a survivor of Hitler's Final 
Solution: "Have you ever, with your own eyes seen a gas chamber?" Any such 
witness is dead and the demand for such a witness makes the gas chamber less of a 
horror than it had been. For the survivor to exist and speak of her knowledge of the 
horror is to cast doubt on "her authority to bear witness" to that which was invented 
to terminate her existence (Praeg, 2000: 229). The damage is thus accompanied by 
"the loss of the means to prove the damage" (Lyotard, cited in Praeg, 2000: 229).  
 
Because representation can do this injustice, it becomes "an ethical necessity that the 
Holocaust haunts us, that it cannot be remembered but cannot be forgotten either", to 
exist as an "immemorial" (Readings, 1991: 22). The "immemorial" is "that which 
cannot be either remembered (represented) or forgotten (obliterated)" (Readings, 
1991: 62). "It is that which returns, uncannily" (Readings, 1991: xxxii). The 
discursive divide between the living and the unliving, subject and object, is unsettled, 
disturbed. The ethical response demands that  
 
[w]e must not give voice to the millions of murdered Jews, gypsies, 
homosexuals and communists, but find a way of writing history that will testify 
to the horror of their having been silenced. This amounts to the deconstruction 
of the binary opposition between voice and silence, history and the 
unhistorical, remembering and forgetting. It's a history directed towards the 
immemorial. (Readings, 1991: 62). 
 
For Lyotard, "Adorno's greatness is to have recognized that, after Auschwitz, art can 
only be historically responsible as [figural] event, rather than representation" 
                                                 
17Jones's exaltation for people to dance on ground zero of World Trade Centre thus appears to me not 
only a futile gesture of "impotence" in the face of horror and death, but also a dangerous defiance 
that seems to indicate a lack of understanding as to America's own complicity in their conflict with 
the Arab world; it seems to betray a false "innocence".  
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(Readings, 1991: 23).  
 
What, then, for the artist? Michal Kobialka asks: 
 
Is there a way ... [to] surpass the visible which is epistemologically organized 
by the Self, optically totalized by the eye realizing the vision of transparency of 
humanity to itself ...? (Kobialka, 2000: 43) 
 
What can the artist do to stop the screen of visibility from maintaining the viewer's 
"innocence" and "impotence"? Can the artist access the jouissance of the figural, and 
if so, how? 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Screen and the Viewer's Blindness: Ritual's (empty) promise of 
atonement  
 
Brett Bailey and ritual theatre 
 
 
"Once you realize that the road to confession is not the road to salvation, it 
may be the case that our narratives of suffering are very mixed with 
outcomes that we can't really predict." 
 – Jay Winter, speaking on traumatic memory and war 
 
 
By appealing to a transcendent reality, and by constituting spectators as a participative 
community, ritual theatre claims to enact change (not only making it visible). The “truth” of 
ritual rests not on rational knowledge, but on the performer’s competence to produce a 
shamanic presence, which Bailey embraces in his early work. Ritual presence operates by 
identification and belonging to a father/god as the source of meaning; but it represses the 
loss of this originary wholeness. Spectators of ritual theatre are drawn into an enactment of 
communion/community, the centre of which is, however, loss/emptiness. The constitution of 
the audience as one body participating within a transforming ritual becomes problematic for 
its absence of truth. Bailey attempts to perform a hybrid, postcolonial aesthetics; but the 
problem rests in the larger context of performing the notion of “South Africa”, a communal 
identity hardened around the metanarrative of suffering, abjecting those that do not belong to 
the land of the father/god – foreigners that unsettle the meaning of South African identity. 
 
 
Ritual and efficacy: transcending visibility 
 
The published collection of South African director/writer Brett Bailey's early plays is 
entitled The Plays of Miracle and Wonder (2003). He explicitly warns against 
treating the book as "pieces of literature separate from the rich and multi-layered 
non-verbal elements which make up the language of living drama" (Bailey, 2003: 
10). Bailey emphasizes the immediacy and energy of theatre through music, visual 
spectacle, "ritualistic rhythm", and "atmosphere" (Bailey, 2003: 10).  
 
His approach is similar to the western avant-garde in his rejection of the primacy of 
the word, the exploration of subconscious and dream states, "the quasi-religious 
focus on myth and magic, which in the theatre leads to experiments with ritual and 
the ritualistic patterning of performance" (Innes, 1993: 3). Ritual has an even deeper 
influence for Bailey: working with practising sangomas (diviners, traditional healers) 
in his theatre, he is dealing with the Xhosa cultural context where spiritual practices 
do hold significance, in comparison to the "de-spiritualis[ed]" west (Bailey, 2003: 9).  
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The sangomas have been his "main source of inspiration" (Bailey, 2003: 19). A 
sangoma "serves as a channel for ancestral communication between her society and 
what Jungians would call the collective unconscious"; in an iintlombe (ceremony), 
the sangomas transport the clapping, chanting community by "coaxing the Spirit of 
the people into a tangible throbbing force" (Bailey, 2003: 19). Bailey describes this 
state of consciousness and the "performance techniques" used by a sangoma: 
 
In a ceremony her increasingly strident dancing, chanting and "confessing" 
(rapid stream-of-consciousness out-pourings and prayers), the clapping, 
drumming and singing of her supporters, the pungent smoke of smouldering 
herbs all aid her journey into the trance in which the ancestors "possess" or 
animate her voice, her movements, her being ... (Bailey, 1998: 193) 
 
Being in the presence of this energy, Bailey claims, "has a healing and rejuvenating 
impact" (Bailey, 1998: 193).  
 
With the sangoma as the ideal figure of a theatrical performer, Bailey aims "to fuse 
ritual and theatre in some way, to make drama which would transport performers and 
spectators" (Bailey, 2003: 15). In iMumbo Jumbo,1 the character of Nicholas Gcaleka 
directly instructs the audience on how to watch (or participate) in the show:  
 
Gcaleka: Now you white people,2 you like to watch, don't like to get involved, 
don't like to sing and clap. Hey, tonight you have that opportunity, tonight we 
are all together in one Spirit ... If you don't want the Spirit you must close here 
and here and here [indicating his eyes, ears and finally his arsehole] – put 
something like a cork so that the Spirit cannot, cannot find you, understand? 
(Bailey, 2003: 111) 
 
It is thus "the Spirit of the work which is all-important" (Bailey, 1998: 201).  
 
At the end of chapter 2, I ask if the artist can rupture the "screen of visibility" and 
access the "jouissance of the figural". In this statement there are echoes of 
                                                 
1The original production premiered in 1997. I watched the revival of the play in 2003 at the National 
Arts Festival in Grahamstown. 
2The character explicitly identifies the audience as white. An interesting correlation is set up with the 
audiences that Bill T. Jones performed to in his early works (see chapter 2). In reality, it is perhaps 
common knowledge that South African theatre audiences are mainly white due to socio-economic 
realities; however, at the performance that I attended, the groups that were seated in front and 
across the aisle from me were not white. I will note here that I, also not being white, felt an 
alienation to the play at hearing this comment from the actor. This incident became an example of 
my discontent of the theatre experience that I try to understand in this chapter. 
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spirituality: for example, Jesus's crucifixion is recorded in the Christian Bible to 
cause the veil of the Temple to be torn in two (Matthew 27: 51; Mark 15: 38; Luke 
23: 45), thus providing access to the Holy of Holies, the inner sanctum which was 
shielded from sight. Peter Brook describes "the Holy Theatre" as the "Theatre of the 
Invisible-Made-Visible" (Brook, 1972: 47). There is a sense that a higher reality or 
spiritual truth can be reached in special moments, compared to which daily living is 
but an illusion. Ritual theatre is highly relevant in my investigation into the 
performer/audience relationship: it purports to provide a spiritual or psychic 
communion that transcends the barrier of conceptual representation. 
 
There are four threads of connection between ritual and my investigation, which I 
would like to explore further: 
 
Firstly, the claim that ritual transcends language and rationality (Bailey refers to the 
Jungian "collective unconscious") differentiates it from other approaches of 
intervening into the dilemma of representation. An obvious example of theatre that 
disturbs the screen of visibility is Augusto Boal's "Invisible Theatre", a pedagogic 
strategy derived from Paulo Freire that is essentially the invasion of theatrical reality 
into real life.3 However, it differs from ritual theatre in two ways: the change that 
Invisible Theatre potentially brings about (namely, its pedagogic efficacy) is mainly 
achieved through provoking debate, leading to a change in conscious perception and 
behaviour (as opposed to the unconscious). Its pedagogy also depends on the 
spectators' not knowing that a theatre performance is occurring. Boal calls the 
spectators "spect-actors", since they are actively involved in the action; but their 
participation depends upon their being in a different "cognitive world" to the 
performers, in other words, without suspecting that the action is in any way rehearsed 
(Watson, 1997: 168). Therefore the frame of theatre itself is the screen that Invisible 
                                                 
3Watson (1997) cites an example of Invisible Theatre provided by Boal: in a performance in 1978 in 
Belgium, a group of actors rehearsed actions and scenarios around the unemployment problem that 
was rife. At the "performance", the actors enter a supermarket as if they are ordinary shoppers: 
they do not set up the fictional framework of theatre by setting themselves apart as actors. One 
actor takes some basic food items to the checkout counter, but informs the cashier that since he is 
unemployed, he cannot pay in cash, but can work for the supermarket for however many hours are 
needed to pay for the food items. Negotiations and disputes ensue, involving the cashier, the store 
manager and other customers, with the other actors (invisibly en-roled as customers) provoking 
discussions about economic problems, different nationalities in Belgium, prices .... When the 
police arrives after being called by the manager, customers are collecting money to help pay for 
the food items. 
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Theatre attempts to bypass: theatre must not be recognized as theatre.  
 
Ritual theatre is closer to what Richard Schechner calls "believed-in theatre".4 Even 
though the audience knows they are watching actors, there is also a real process 
occurring, such as real-life events that are narrated in the performance, or real HIV-
positive blood that is spilt in a performance art event (Schechner, 1997). Christopher 
Innes describes the merging of illusion and reality in avant-garde theatre (Innes, 
1993: 179); the transformation effected by ritual theatre (such as the healing that 
Bailey claims) is not a discarding but a penetration of theatrical illusion as the screen. 
 
Secondly, avant-garde theatre has traditionally used ritual as inspiration to disrupt 
theatrical representation, so that theatre does not only tell the audience about 
something, but does something to the audience. "[T]he ambition to make theatre into 
ritual is nothing other than a wish to make performance efficacious, to use 
[theatrical] events to change people" (Schechner, cited in Innes, 1981: 11). Artaud 
called for a theatre as a plague that unmasks "the world's lies, aimlessness, meanness, 
and even two-facedness" so as to transform humanity (Artaud, 1970: 22). His writing 
had inspired Grotowski's rigorous confrontation of the self in his Poor Theatre, 
Brook's experimentations in the 1960s leading to ritual theatre, the Living Theatre's 
mythological visions of transformation, and the nudity and Dionysian events of 
Schechner's Performance Group, leading to environmental theatre. To greater or 
lesser extents, all these theatres try to perform a shamanic function, exorcizing the 
"disease" of the community through the performers' actions (Innes, 1993: 180). The 
audience are presumed not as spectators sitting on the other side of the divide (such 
as the "fourth wall"), able to maintain aesthetic and/or critical distance. Even though 
audience involvement at the Performance Group or the Living Theatre was often 
crudely conceived,5  they were nevertheless attempts at countering the "de-
spiritualisation of the West" (Bailey, 2003: 9), to reach towards the sacred which 
                                                 
4Although Schechner includes Boal's work as an example of believed-in theatre, he specifically cites 
Forum Theatre and Legislative Theatre, in which spect-actors are aware that they are engaged in 
the make-believe of theatre as well as the possibility of social change (Schechner, 1997: 86). The 
performer/spect-actor relationship is thus different to that of Invisible Theatre. 
5Innes cites the example of the Performance Group's Dionysus in 69 (1968), in which spectators were 
encouraged to strip off clothing and to join in climbing through a canal shaped by actors' naked 
bodies, symbolizing rebirth. To be naked was considered liberating, and so "the meaning of 
Dionysus ... lay not so much in what was performed, as in simply getting spectators to strip" 
(Innes, 1993: 174). 
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"transcends the limits of cognitive signs and concepts" (Uzukwu, cited in April 2002: 
51). The politics of the Living Theatre, for example, was not only found in their 
street protests and slogans, but also in trying to induce in the audience "something of 
a vision of self-understanding, going past the conscious to the unconscious" (Innes, 
1993: 181).  
 
Thirdly, ritual keeps a community's history through the presence of the performers in 
the action of narrating, rather than conceptual representation. It differs to the 
insistence on memory that serves to signify the separation between the living and the 
dead (see chapter 2, p.54). For example, Gary van Heerden (2002) examines Xhosa 
grieving rituals as means of keeping the deceased in contact with the community. 
While the failure to "let go" is pathological in the western view (Van Heerden, 2002: 
9), the Xhosa rituals deal with loss by invoking the presence of the dead. Lyotard 
(cited in Praeg, 2000: 235-6) explains ritual as an "immemorial" narration: instead of 
remembering the past as representational content, ritual as a narrative form gives rise 
to a pragmatics of knowledge, where the emphasis is on the act of reciting (or, as I 
refer to in chapter 1, storytelling). Focusing on the regularity of metre ("the beating 
of time in regular periods") rather than the individuality of accent ("the modification 
of the length of a certain episode"), performances such as ritualized chanting 
organize narrative and time not for the recalling of the community's memories 
(accents), but as  "an immemorial beating" (Lyotard, cited in Praeg, 2000: 236).  
 
The immemorial thus locates the participants and references of the past within the 
present act of narrating, or performing a ritual. Lyotard writes, 
 
... a collectivity that takes narrative as its key form of competence has no need 
to remember its past. It finds the raw material for its social bond not only in the 
meaning of the narratives it recounts, but also in the act of reciting them. The 
narratives' reference may seem to belong to the past, but in reality it is always 
contemporaneous with the act of recitation. (cited in Praeg, 2000: 236) 
 
Gideon Khabela clearly illustrates this by differentiating the Christian missionaries' 
emphasis on strict, formal catechisms, and the Xhosa's reliance on orality, regulating 
social behaviour through "myth handed down in the oral tradition without any 
demand for exactitude and finality. The mythological past was always recoverable in 
ritual" (Khabela, 1996: 26).  
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Ritual eschews the distancing of conceptual representation that is characteristic of 
discourse; the immemorial ritual performance becomes a figure to the discourse of 
memory, and can perhaps provide clues regarding the anxiety of representation of 
trauma and loss.  
 
Fourthly, and most importantly, ritual interrogates my epistemology. If, for example, 
Xhosa rituals of mourning are immemorial narrations, do my anxieties of 
representation apply to these performances? Are my anxieties rooted in western 
metaphysics, and hence do not apply to, for instance, African theatrical events?  
 
Praeg argues that anxiety about representing suffering is a "reluctance to accept, 
respond [to] and embrace an African ethical imperative to tell stories" (Praeg, 2000: 
232). Was it not ethical and necessary that stories of atrocities and trauma be told at 
the TRC? It was not a perfect solution, but there was a "moral superiority of 
maintaining the social bond" (Praeg, 2000: 232). The peace and stability of a nation 
was more important than fidelity to individual "truths" of suffering, since it promises 
the prevention of further suffering. Similarly, despite Krog's anxieties around the 
word "truth" (see Chapter 1, p.36), she insists on reporting the stories of the TRC. 
She acknowledges the artist's anxiety of defiling the "holy character" of the victims' 
experiences; but she sees the danger of paralysis and resists it:  
 
German artists could not find a form in which to deal with Auschwitz. They 
refused to take possession of their own history. So the inevitable happened. 
Hollywood took it away from them. (Krog, 1999: 360-1) 
 
Does an African aesthetics render irrelevant my anxieties around representation? Are 
my anxieties a legacy of the Enlightenment separation between art and life? Miki 
Flockemann, citing several writers, notes that African art is premised on the 
continuity between art and life; African art is functional (in other words, not purely 
aesthetic) in that art mediates between material and spiritual experiences (Reyes, 
cited in Flockemann, 2001: 31). This sense of continuity allows art to assume a 
social position that can readily effect transformation in society; the efficacy of 
performance is part and parcel of its aesthetics.  
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To my ears, this trajectory of thought seems to imply the following: if I were open to 
being transformed, to embrace being in Africa, I would see that the discursive 
categories and divisions about such notions as art and truth, and hence my anxieties, 
in fact do not exist. My pathology is diagnosed: clinging to un-African thinking.6  
 
But how is the relationship between art and reality constituted in the wake of trauma; 
what does continuity of art and life mean in a traumatic reality? Does this aesthetics 
apply to postcolonial hybridities, such as Bailey's ritual theatre? To further my 
wondering/wandering, I invite a few postcolonial literary figures into my narration. 
 
If Bill T. Jones (in his early solos) could be compared to a Caliban who seduces and 
curses with the (dance) language he was taught,7 then one could perhaps find a 
different way out of the dilemma in the novel Foe, J.M. Coetzee's re-working of 
Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe. Friday, the slave who is unable to speak – to use 
the colonizers' discourse – points to a different language that resists representation. 
Friday was Cruso's slave, brought to England when Cruso and Susan Barton were 
rescued from being marooned on the island. He has no speech, but as Barton 
describes, "utters himself only in music and dancing" (Coetzee, 1987: 142). To 
construct the truth of Friday out of his wordlessness becomes Barton's main focus, 
who hires a writer Foe (alluding to Daniel Defoe) to write the story. As if describing 
the psychoanalytic experience, Foe says, "In every story there is a silence, some sight 
concealed, some word unspoken, I believe. Till we have spoken the unspoken we 
have not come to the heart of the story" (Coetzee, 1987: 141).8 Friday's dances are 
indecipherable to the colonizers; perhaps this is an example of what post-colonialist 
                                                 
6I am aware that, if read with irony, this sentence contains an ominous and potentially offensive claim, 
making (perhaps unwarranted) allusions to less wholesome episodes in history. Like sections of 
chapter 1, it is a confession, an unsubstantiated narrative of my experience of making theatre in the 
new South Africa: labouring under guilt, constantly aware of potential accusations: I am not 
"proudly South African". My narrative here is meant to echo ideas of consensus and dissensus in 
chapter 1. I also stated in chapter 1 (see p.12n10) that I do not necessarily reject the possibility that 
I am, after all, writing about my personal pathology, my refusal to operate within the (new) social 
order. But there are discontents that remain unsatisfied. So I will continue asking questions, and 
tentatively propose an answer at the end of this chapter. 
7The comparison relies on a postcolonial reading of The Tempest that does not necessarily confer 
judgment on Caliban according to his representation by other characters in the narrative, for 
example Miranda's charges of rape. The comparison focuses on the issue of discourse: who speaks, 
who has access to the symbolic order, and how is the language used to negotiate power relations. 
8This trajectory of thought strays towards a romantic primitivism that projects western desires and 
anxieties on to Africa, constructed as a blank space, where fantasies of pure origin are projected. I 
will return to this critique later in this chapter, in relation to the search for Spirit. 
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theorist Iain Chambers calls "the untranslatability of the native's experience" 
(Chambers, 1996: 47).  
 
Coetzee resists writing Friday as a truth that he knows, which he can represent. At 
the end of the novel he writes himself within the text, re-enacting the capsizing of 
Susan Barton's boat. He sinks into the ocean,9 diving beneath Defoe's discourse, and 
discovers the shipwreck where he finds the corpse of Friday. He tries to ask Friday: 
"what is this ship?" 
 
But this is not a place of words. Each syllable, as it comes out, is caught and 
filled with water and diffused. This is a place where bodies are their own signs. 
It is the home of Friday. (Coetzee, 1987: 157) 
 
He tries to dig into Friday's mouth. As it opens,  
 
a slow stream, without breath, without interruption, flows up through his body 
and out upon me; it passes through the cabin, through the wreck; washing the 
cliffs and shores of the island, it runs northward and southward to the ends of 
the earth. Soft and cold, dark and unending, it beats against my eyelids, against 
the skin of my face. (Coetzee, 1987: 157) 
 
What truth Friday can yield is not uttered in words, but in a corporeal and sensual 
"stream"; it is felt corporeally ("against the skin"), and the wave reaches far – 
perhaps it washes across the divides set up by discourse.  
 
Friday's corporeality is a resistance against what Gayatri Spivak calls the "epistemic 
violence" with which the (European) Cartesian subject views the world (Chambers, 
1996: 47).10 The critique of the perspectival gaze of the subject thus intersects with 
the critique of western modernity, and the point of intersection is the body. Rey 
                                                 
9The immersion (of Barton and Coetzee the author) into the sea echoes Hélène Cixous's essay, "Aller 
à la mer". Writing about her theatre work as resistance against the theatre as a patriarchal structure, 
she advocates a "body-presence" and a lessening of "dependency on the visual" (Cixous, in Drain, 
1995: 134). This writing of the body and of the feminine is described as a scene/stage where 
women will be "listening and [be] heard, happy as when they go to the sea, the womb of the 
mother" (Cixous, in Drain, 1995: 135). The French essay title offers a pun between "mother" and 
"sea". Coetzee's choice of narrating through Barton, a woman, is thus significant. 
10The European conqueror objectified the world, constituting itself as the "Subject of History": 
The self-assured tone, critical distance and academic or 'scientific' neutrality of the narrative 
that purports to describe and explain the world flowed without interruption towards meaning. 
The threat of an interruption, of the violence that constitutes the chronology of events and the 
semantic disposition of power, is effectively obliterated. In the aseptic and sterilised accounts 
of history, sociology, anthropology, the 'pain of violence' is written out of the narrative and 
forgotten. (Chambers, 1996: 47-8) 
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Chow proposes that the colonizer's subjectivity was in the first instance not 
constituted as actively gazing; instead, they feel gazed at by the native:  
 
This gaze ... makes the coloniser "conscious" of himself, leading to his need to 
turn this gaze around and look at himself, henceforth "reflected" in the native-
object. It is the self-reflection of the coloniser that produces the coloniser as 
subject (potent gaze, source of meaning and action) and the native as his 
image, with all the pejorative meanings of "lack" attached to the word "image". 
(Chow, cited in Chambers, 1996: 58) 
 
What was it about the native's body that so "gazed" at the colonizer; what 
performances of body made the colonizer feel the need to cover this body (literally, 
and through banning indigenous rituals), so as to produce the native-object as image? 
If this gaze can be recovered, would it tear the screen that protects the colonizer's 
subjectivity and his perspectival gaze? 
 
So, to return to the question: does African aesthetics render my anxieties irrelevant? 
Within a postcolonial context, perhaps the more relevant question is: does insisting 
on African aesthetics escape the colonizer's looking? Does ritual theatre reproduce 
the image of the native-object, or is it "a place where bodies are their own signs" 
(Coetzee)? Bailey's theatre manifests the critique of western epistemology: in 
iMumbo Jumbo, as will be explored in detail in this chapter, the critique of Cartesian 
rationality is simultaneously a critique of colonialism and its representation of 
Africa. But what does Bailey propose in its place? Is the Spirit, a radically irrational 
force, an adequate response?  
 
Is it possible to uphold an African aesthetics in the wake of trauma and dissensus? I 
can only answer this later in this chapter, when the contradictions of postcoloniality 
and its anxieties are explored further. Before this, an examination of the truth claims 
of ritual theatre is needed.  
 
 
 
Competence: shamanic presence and the truth of theatre 
 
Bailey records in his workbook regarding the play iMumbo Jumbo:  
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More than just a stand against materialistic rationality, this iMUMBO JUMBO 
must be a celebration of dream, ritual, Spirit, the unconscious and the irrational 
... The Spirit cannot be quelled, though scientists and kings may thwart it for a 
while, though people may side with Big Science. The victory is the Spirit. The 
ritual of Life. The play must always remember this. (Bailey, 2003: 108) 
 
Bailey's insistence on the Spirit can be seen as fidelity to the subject of his research, 
Nicholas Gcaleka, the "chief" who travelled to Scotland in 1996 on a mission to 
retrieve the skull of King Hintsa kaPhalo of the amaXhosa nation. Gcaleka received 
his mandate in a dream, which traditionally enables a prophet (isangoma / ighira) to 
be in contact with ancestors. According to oral history, Hintsa's body was mutilated 
by Scottish soldiers and his skull taken to Scotland. Hintsa's Hell Spirit was thus 
ravaging the country, bringing crime, instability and moral degeneration. The return 
and re-burial of Hintsa's skull would reconcile the ancestral realm with the living, 
"traditional collective values will be reaffirmed, and the national pride, morality and 
social harmony of the pre-colonial Golden Age will be restored" (Bailey, 2003: 100). 
But, on Gcaleka's return from Scotland, the Xhosa royal house organized scientists to 
examine the skull. Forensic tests concluded that the skull in fact belonged to a young 
Caucasian woman. The skull was not returned to Gcaleka for burial. Scientists 
therefore "thwart[ed]" the Spirit. 
 
Some came to suspect the motives behind enlisting the scientists, since the Xhosa 
royal house were initially supportive of Gcaleka’s mission. Bailey came to the 
conclusion, after gathering information for the production – a part of which entailed 
recording long speeches and diatribes by Gcaleka on his mission and on the state of 
the nation – that the Xhosa royal house enlisted the scientists out of the fear that the 
monarchy was being upstaged. Also, Gcaleka's supporters cited jealousy as the 
motive (Bailey, 2003: 98). Bailey came to this conclusion:  
 
The point is this: exactly whose neck the skull once sat upon is really irrelevant 
... no scientific test can ascertain the symbolic value of an item, the importance 
it has for the people who revere it. (Bailey, 2003: 99) 
 
The rejection of scientific truth is motivated by something akin to the "moral 
superiority of maintaining the social bond" (Praeg, 2000: 232). What appears to be 
"mumbo jumbo" – superstition and magic – to modern scientific eyes may hold more 
truth. For the purported skull of Hintsa is one example of the many sacred bones, 
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royal artefacts and similar items of magic that were looted away by European 
colonizers, and on these purloined items rest the power and legitimacy of nations 
(Bailey, 2003: 100). In the play, political leaders are denigrated for relying on 
rational discourse rather than the Spirit:   
 
Gcaleka: Why you people not dreaming, only depending on writing?11 ... And 
you chiefs, you bloody bastards, you are nothing to the Spirit, nothing, nothing, 
nothing! ... First you agree that the head must be buried, then you change your 
mind, you want the written proof, you want the books! You are powerless, you 
got no visions, you are puppets. (Bailey, 2003: 142-3) 
 
Writing (rationality) is "powerless" when compared to dreams, to spiritual reality. 
Bailey remains faithful to Gcaleka by abandoning the epistemology of (Western) 
scientific discourse.12 He does this in the play by giving the Gcaleka character long 
speeches to voice his beliefs, based on the recordings of the real Gcaleka. But Bailey 
also kept faith with the Spirit in theatrical process and form.  
 
iMumbo Jumbo is conceived as a "play within a ritual", which "climaxed with the 
sangomas calling their ancestors into the theatre to ask them to bless all present and 
to bring peace and light to the city" (Bailey, 1998: 193). It is an "ntlombe to tell the 
people of the world about [Gcaleka's] beliefs, philosophies and predictions, and to 
strengthen the Spirit in the audience by incorporating them in this ritual" (Bailey, 
2003: 106).13  
 
It is thus not a representation of Gcaleka's story first and foremost, but a performance 
that is meant to be efficacious, performative of certain transformations perceived to 
                                                 
11Citations of Bailey’s play texts in this chapter may include non-standard English grammar; they are 
quoted as in the play text.  
12Even within western science, the "representational paradigm" has been challenged. Koen Tachelet 
describes the basic assumption of the dominant paradigm as "the successful transfer of 'objective' 
information from the world outside to an internal representation of it by means of cognitive 
operations within the brain"; but it is becoming evident that the act of perception constructs reality 
(Tachelet, 2000: 84). Tachelet concentrates on sciences of biology and cognition; by studying 
visual perception in animals and humans, the western paradigm of "the ontological distinction 
between a perceiving subject and a perceived object" (which gives rise to representation) is 
challenged. For example, the frog does not see a fly as an objective entity; it can only see a fly 
when in motion. The human eye has a blind spot on the retina where the optic nerve leads to the 
brain; something that is projected directly into that point cannot be seen (Tachelet, 2000: 84-85). 
13This echoes the circumstance under which Bailey met Gcaleka: in his account of his research, Bailey 
met the prophet in Nyanga East (a Cape Town township) on the day when there was to be a ritual 
sacrifice "to make the Spirit strong" (Bailey, 2003: 93). This first encounter may have informed 
the eventual dramatic structure of the play. 
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be needed: the performers, some of whom are actual sangomas, "use dancing, 
chanting and clapping to take them into the state of trance in which they may bring 
the restorative powers of the ancestors to all present" (Bailey, 2003: 106). The re-
enactment of the journey to Scotland is a drama component within a larger ritual 
performance. Reviewer Suzanne Joubert records, 
 
"You think you are watching a drama show," says one of IMumbo [sic] 
Jumbo's 21-strong cast. "We are doing much bigger work here." (Joubert, 
2003) 
 
Bailey writes in his workbook for iMumbo Jumbo: "My performers ... need to believe 
that their actions, their presence, their energy during the performance have an effect 
on the world" (Bailey, 2003: 20).  
 
The training and rehearsal process reinforce the irrational:  
 
In training my group members I spend much time encouraging them to yield 
themselves to various spirits or emotions, to sacrifice themselves to their 
imaginations. ... The spirit then moves onto their tongues and flow out through 
their voices, then into their gestures until their very being becomes a vivid 
articulation of that spirit. (Bailey, 2003: 21) 
 
Echoes of Artaud are evident: the Theatre of Cruelty searched for an "objective 
theatre language" that "turns words into incantation", "expands the voice" and 
"liberates a new lyricism of gestures"; a theatre that "aims to exalt, to benumb, to 
bewitch, to arrest our sensibility" (Artaud, 1970: 69-70). Compare Gcaleka's question 
in iMumbo Jumbo: "Why you people not dreaming, only depending on writing?" to 
Artaud's First Manifesto: "We do not intend to do away with dialogue, but to give 
words something of the significance they have in dreams" (Artaud, 1970: 72). 
Compare also the statement: "I want human fire on my stage" (Bailey, 2003: 22) to 
the call for performers who are "like victims burnt at the stake, signaling through the 
flames" (Artaud, cited in Derrida, 1978: 179).  
 
Bailey describes some of his training exercises that push the performers away from 
rational states of mind: he uses trance "accompanied by wailing, fits and gnashing of 
teeth"; he uses "roaring and cursing" to drive the performers; he gives a particularly 
vivid example: "I have blindfolded [the actors] in a forest for hours while they 
explored their animal selves, and then chased them screaming and stumbling blind 
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down a steep river course" (Bailey, 2003: 21). He is aware that some people find his 
methods "manipulative", or that he comes across "as a madman", but he believes his 
methods are able to "access deep, collective areas of self"; the work "clean[s] the 
channel of their self for the free flow and conscious control of these currents", and 
"when these channels are open they will truly be able to perform, touching people at 
deeply symbolic levels" (Bailey, 2003: 21-23).  
 
Bailey's actors thus emulate the shaman as their ideal (with the sangoma being the 
shamanic figure within the specific cultural context). The shaman  
 
develops the power to transmit his creative trance to [his audience] so as to 
transport them out of the ordinary, everyday reality into other cosmic regions ... 
the shaman is the stimulator of the collective imagination ... This is also the 
contemporary role of the artist today. (Karafistan, 2003: 152) 
 
Karafistan lists symbolism, Artaud, Grotowski, and Eugenio Barba among others as 
theatres that draw on aspects of shamanism. Even as South African critics hail 
Bailey's work as "a new and thoroughly appropriate form of theatre for this country" 
(Accone, in Third World Bunfight web site) and "a new South African theatre that is 
highly innovative in its use of indigenous performance modes" (Mda, in Third World 
Bunfight web site), Bailey's ritual theatre is clearly located within the lineage of the 
western avant-garde, which he lists as one of his sources (Bailey, 2003: 9).  
 
Drawing the avant-garde connection allows a perspective on Bailey's ideas and 
methods for the actor's training and mode of performance. Some of his methods 
remind one of the licentiousness which groups such as the Living Theatre embraced 
as liberation (see description of their Paradise Now in chapter 1, p.37n25). Indeed 
some avant-garde theatres understood ritual and the unconscious as resisting the 
fixity of forms and preferring spontaneous actions (Innes, 1993: 173); Grotowski 
calls them "chaotic, aborted works, full of a so-called cruelty which would not scare 
a child, ... which only reveal a lack of professional skill, a sense of groping, and a 
love of easy solutions" (Grotowski, 1969: 86). The most influential avant-gardes, 
however, emphasized the technique of the shamanic actor: "Cruelty is rigour" 
(Artaud, cited in Grotowski, 1969: 93). The '60s counterculture in America "folded 
up" because "there wasn't enough competence, enough precision, enough 
consciousness" (Grotowski, 1987: 31). Bailey also acknowledges the need for 
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"techniques, stringent discipline and commitment, and strong belief and aptitude" for 
the actor to emulate sangomas (Bailey, 1998: 196).  
 
Thus an apparent contradiction is at the core of ritual theatre: despite Gcaleka's call 
to obey dreams and disregard writing, shamanic performance requires not the 
abandonment of form and language but its fulfilment. The philosophical aspect of 
this contradiction is explored in chapter 1, in my citing Derrida's reading of Artaud. 
The practical implication in the making of theatre is that the truth of the shamanic 
presence is reliant on the apparent falsity and ordinariness of illusion and technique; 
transcendence relies on lengthy and repetitive preparation. For example, Etzel 
Cardeña and Jane Beard cite research into the link between facial muscles, bodily 
postures and emotions; "changing facial expressions without any association to 
emotional labels and thoughts was more effective than thinking about personal 
memories associated with these emotions" (Cardeña & Beard, 1996: 35). Bailey 
notes a similar process in his work: making a sound can rouse emotions (Bailey 
1998: 196-7). Cardeña & Beard (1996) call it "truthful trickery". Grotowski notes 
that the tension between the performer's conscious control and animal instincts 
"creates a contradictory and mysterious fullness" (Grotowski, 1987: 36-37) – the 
charismatic presence of the actor. 
 
This appears contradictory because of an idea that emerged with western modernity: 
the idea that truth is internal and spontaneous, while bodily technique is associated 
with falsehood. Jane Taylor (2004) traces the shift in notions of truth brought on by 
the Reformation. A main target of Martin Luther's attack on the Catholic Church was 
confession. Taylor notes that confession was a public naming of sins that precipitated 
forgiveness; it was only in response to the Reformation that the more contemporary 
practice of "furtive whisperings undertaken in a secluded confessional box" was 
instituted (Taylor, 2004: 8). In other words, "confession" belongs to a regime of 
truth-telling that has similarities to the proclamation of the Angel's blessing (Derrida, 
1993: 29; see chapter 1), the sangoma's verbal outpourings and prayers (Bailey, 
1998: 193), and testimonies at the TRC. With the Reformation, however, "the truth 
of the self [became] associated with conscience, the terrain within, that which is 
unseen" (Taylor, 2004: 11); truth came to be located in the private as opposed to the 
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public.14  
 
Taylor cites the example of Hamlet: in the "Mousetrap" scene, "the suspected 
murderer [Claudius] is observed throughout the performance [the re-enactment of the 
murder], and his responses are read for traces of a guilty heart" (Taylor, 2004: 14). 
The assumption is that the internal burden of guilt must show externally – if 
unrehearsed. The spectator, not knowing what to expect, must react with truthfulness. 
The actors, however, were derided by Hamlet for summoning up grief and tears 
without an authentic source (Taylor, 2004: 14). Rehearsed action is pretence, which 
is abhorrent. Acting as a profession came to be seen with suspicion.  
 
The body was thus read for signs that point to internal truth. Taylor then traces how 
truth-telling in western modernity developed with scientific methods: the truth of 
personhood could be read off the body through objective observations such as 
fingerprinting technology. Within this regime of truth-telling, then, the iMumbo 
Jumbo story appears dubious, partly because scientific tests proved that the skull did 
not belong to Hintsa, but also partly because Gcaleka's performance did not come 
across as sincere, authentic. At their first meeting, Bailey found his "naïveté ... 
pathetic", and his two main actors shook their heads at the chief's ranting (Bailey, 
2003: 94). His performance failed to convince his observers. Later Bailey became 
aware of Gcaleka's previous charges of forgery: "I know he's a bit of a conman and a 
power-monger and an opportunistic businessman with the gift of the gab"; and the 
amaXhosa leaders claimed that Gcaleka had no right to that name (Bailey, 2003: 96). 
In short, Gcaleka is something of a "fake".  
 
Yet Bailey focuses on a different framework for determining the truth: Gcaleka's 
authority – his competence – rests on his shamanic presence, his performing the 
required action with precision and to great effect. Bailey describes his "affecting 
physicality" in "the way he talks, the way he flings his arms about, the way he 
touches people" (Bailey, 2003: 97). He performs the ritual of sacrifice, and the cries 
of his sacrificial ox "will signify ancestral approval" (Bailey, 2003: 101). Against the 
charges of Gcaleka being a charlatan, Bailey counters: "if the Spirit of the Xhosa 
                                                 
14See chapter 2 for the discussion on constructions of the private/public separation. 
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Nation chose a rather gregarious and offbeat messenger, who are we to question?" 
(Bailey, 2003: 96) 
 
The etymology of "shaman" is the Manchu-Tungus word saman, deriving from the 
verb sa – to know (Karafistan, 2003: 151). Shamanic knowledge is revealed "in an 
ecstatic manner" (Grimm, cited in Karafistan, 2003: 151); its truthfulness cannot be 
tested through rational means: it is beyond criticism. Yet it can be traced and named: 
Gcaleka's dream is an instruction that came from the ancestors. Similarly, the truth 
that an actor can access is, for Grotowski, also of ancestral origin.  
 
Grotowski proposes that the actor's competence allows him15 to access the originary 
moment of creation. By working with precision and discipline on technique and 
artistry, an organic realm opens up to the actor where he can explore not only 
himself, but also the person(s) through whom the art has passed. For example, an 
actor sings a song; but if he learnt the song from his grandmother, then "who is the 
person singing the song? Is it you?" (Grotowski, 1987: 39) The actor's impulses 
explore not only himself, but also the grandmother/singer. The tradition can be traced 
back further: 
 
You have the song, you must ask yourself where it began. Perhaps at the 
moment when a fire was tended in the mountains, where someone was looking 
after animals, he began repeating the opening words, to keep warm. It wasn't 
the song yet, rather ... a primitive incantation that someone repeated. You look 
at the song and ask yourself: Where is this primary incantation? In what 
words? Perhaps these words have already disappeared, or perhaps ... someone 
else has developed what the first person sang. But if you possess the ability to 
go toward the beginning of the song, then it's no longer your grandmother 
singing but someone from your ancestry, your country, your village ... 
(Grotowski, 1987: 39).  
 
The actor's presence, beyond mimetic fidelity, is the result of tapping into an organic 
tradition; in an old French saying, you are someone's son; and "if you are the son of 
the person who sang the song for the first time, ... that's the real image of the 
character" (Grotowski, 1987: 40).  
 
The truth of the shaman/actor is at odds with the rationality that has come to 
                                                 
15The choice of gender does not only reflect Grotowski's writing, but it is also chosen in light of my 
interpretation of Grotowski's theory below. 
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dominate modernity. Liz Mills (2004) locates the epistemology of theatre within a 
tradition of orality, rather than a literary tradition; its "creative essence" is "original 
being". The immemorial (Lyotard) nature of shamanic/theatrical knowledge makes it 
possible to recover the past – the original song – in the present.  
 
 
 
Performing for the Father: the blind spot of truth 
 
One is left with an impasse between scientific truth and shamanic truth. The stake 
involved is similar to that of Gcaleka's quest: what is the truth about the skull that he 
retrieved? (A rhetorical question: if Hintsa's spirit is appeased by the return of the 
skull, what about the spirit of the Scottish woman to whom it may belong?)  
 
Is the truth recoverable from the corpse of Friday, the African whom Defoe silenced, 
and whom Coetzee tries to restore? Is it only recoverable in an African epistemology 
and an African aesthetics; is it only recoverable as a truth of the Spirit? If that is the 
case, why does Gcaleka perform as a Caliban, who (like Jones) curses and attacks? 
Towards the end of iMumbo Jumbo, after a caricature of the scientists' announcement 
about the skull, Gcaleka interrupts the scene with a long, ranting speech: 
 
Gcaleka: ... What is your clan? You cannot dream about Hintsa, he's not your 
clan. ...Who sent me to overseas to fetch the head? Is it the scientists or the 
Spirit? ... Why you want to keep my grandfather's head? That body's got no 
head for one hundred and sixty-one years, can I take your head? Won't take me 
five minutes. You're playing with his head, where is your respect? My Spirit 
doesn't play! Why you think everything not come right in this country, how 
many people must die? ... I can challenge any man, any Spirit! I can turn whole 
of South Africa upside down in five minutes if my Spirit getting cross. ... 
There's gonna be a big calamity in this country, gonna be your [the amaXhosa 
chiefs’] fault. The Spirits of our forefathers are fighting. This is war! You are 
the enemies. (Bailey, 2003: 142-3) 
 
Like Jones, shamanic presence operates under the master-signifier of the phallus: 
however sincere the intention, Gcaleka's performance displays aggression and also 
impotence (see chapter 2). It demands, but does not realize the impossibility of 
satisfaction. The phallic signifier is clearly in operation in Grotowski's text. 
Grotowski stresses the competence that must precede the organic process of 
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accessing the originary truth, the impulse that guarantees theatrical presence. But 
what is this competence?  
 
The overriding concern for an actor, Grotowski proposes, is to arrive at a place 
where "you are someone's son"; to realize that you "aren't a tramp, you come from 
somewhere, from some country ..."; and if you are not someone's son, "you are cut 
off, sterile, unproductive" (Grotowski, 1987: 40). One cannot dream of Hintsa's skull 
unless one is in the Hintsa clan. The question of technical competence leads 
ultimately to the question of "your competence": "Are you a man?" (Grotowski, 
1987: 40)  
 
To be a man, writes Grotowski, is to be "connected with the vertical axis", to stand; 
which means to be vigilant (Grotowski cites this word as a Biblical reference), to 
have conscious control (Grotowski, 1987: 36). To stand means not to fall over – 
losing your balance (because of incompetence, lack of technique), losing your 
uprightness, your moral and spiritual steadfastness. We are told that language 
distinguishes us from animals; language enables man to take greater control of his 
environment. Theorists propose the erect posture as a key event in human evolution, 
and one of the results is the increased emphasis on sight as the primary sense 
perception. Falling becomes an indication of losing the competence of man as a 
spiritual being – the Fall of Man necessitated redemption, the Angel's blessing; and 
"the blind are beings of the fall, the manifestation always of that which threatens 
erection or the upright position (Derrida, 1993: 21). 
 
Shamanic presence can thus be translated in psychoanalytic terms as: How stable is 
your sense of “I”? Freud states, "the beginnings of religion, ethics, society, and art 
meet in the Oedipus complex" (Freud, 1919: 260). As I explore in chapter 1, the 
Oedipus complex is the crucial event in the formation of subjectivity. In more recent 
psychoanalytic theory, the same question may be re-stated as: How cleansed of the 
abject is your subjectivity? (see chapter 1, p.26) The horror of abject, which shows 
me "what I permanently thrust aside in order to live", is felt in confronting the horror 
of (for instance) a corpse – the abject which brings me to "the border of my condition 
as a living being", the abject which is death and not just signified death or the idea of 
death (Kristeva, 1982: 3). The cadaver's root word is cadere, to fall; the bodily 
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wastes that I drop enables me to live, "until, from loss to loss, nothing remains in me 
and my entire body falls beyond the limit – cadere, cadaver" (Kristeva, 1982: 3). If 
ritual "must aim to resolve some tension and substitute a situation of equilibrium" 
(Layiwola, 2000: 128) – in other words, if the purpose of ritual is to resolve some 
fundamental contradiction in humanity, it is ultimately the definition of "man" – and 
the fragility with which this standing definition is constructed – that ritual (and ritual 
theatre) must negotiate. Kristeva writes of religion and art:  
 
The various means of purifying the abject—the various catharses—make up the 
history of religions, and end up with that catharsis par excellence called art, 
both on the far and near side of religion. (Kristeva, 1982: 17) 
 
If body brings me inexorably towards the horror of the abject, what religion (and art) 
tries to purge through catharsis is my body. Lyotard, in The Inhuman (1991), traces 
the blind spot in western thinking and development of technology: the distinction of 
life and death (on which the sense of "I" depends) may be a defence against thinking 
the breakdown of this distinction. Lyotard writes of the possibility that one day, for 
instance when the sun (four and a half-billion years old) expands and causes the 
death of earth itself, not only life will be brought to and end, but the event will be the 
end of death as well, since after such an event, there will be "no more thinking able 
to reflect upon that moment as being the death of the sun" (Tachelet, 2000: 88). 
Artificial intelligence – a technology that tries to think without the body – may 
therefore be a defence against the possibility of the end. Jettisoning the body 
ostensibly allows a thinking that can carry on without the abject.  
 
Is it possible that religion is also a technology that tries to cheat the inevitability of 
ending, repressing the fear of absolute loss, to think without the body? In an 
interesting parallel, Sandra Kemp describes graceful dancing as an attempt to render 
the body immaterial, for the dancer to "just think about the music" and forget the 
body (Kemp, 1996: 158-9).  
 
Freud interprets this repression not in the future, but in the immemorial past. The 
sacrificial feast of totem animal16 – the slaying and eating of the animal that holds 
                                                 
16Ethnologists have noted that "primitive men" refer to their totem also as "ancestor and primal father" 
(Freud, 1919: 218-9). Freud thus draws a parallel between the sacrifice of the totem animal and 
parricide – as explained in this paragraph. 
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spiritual power of the community – is, for Freud, a substitute and commemoration of 
an original murder of the ultimate figure of power. Freud cites Charles Darwin's 
concept of a primal horde, "a violent, jealous father who keeps all the females for 
himself and drives away the growing sons" (Freud, 1919: 235). But this social 
structure is not observed in any human society; thus Freud induces, from the 
sacrificial feast, an event of murder in which the expelled brothers, both envious and 
fearful of the father, "joined forces, slew and ate the father, and thus put an end to the 
father horde" (Freud, 1919: 235). The brothers ate the father out of a desire to 
identify with his power (Freud, 1919: 236).  
 
The totem feast ... would be the repetition and commemoration of this 
memorable, criminal act with which so many things began, social organization, 
moral restrictions and religion. (Freud, 1919: 236) 
 
The feast – of the totem animal, and similarly the Eucharist feast of Christ's body – 
thus establishes the social organization of identificatory kinship: 
 
If one shared a meal with one's god the conviction was thus expressed that one 
was of the same substance as he; no meal was therefore partaken with any one 
recognized as a stranger. (Freud, 1919: 224-5) 
 
It is thus significant that Gcaleka derides the scientists for not being able to dream, 
because they do not belong to the clan. His shamanic truth (the calling of dreams, his 
performance, his execution of sacrifice) is thus an extension of how his identity, and 
the identity of the community, was constituted. His competence as a performer is 
linked to his competence as a “man” (Grotowski, see p. 100). Grotowski’s definition 
of a “man” – of personhood – involves locating oneself within a fatherland (if you 
are a “tramp”, you are “not someone’s son”, you do not belong to “some country”, 
you are “sterile” – see p.100). Freud’s analysis of the origin of social organization 
perhaps traces the flipside of this personhood: the rejection of the “stranger” (who is 
not a son of this land) allows for kinship – or identity. 
 
Why is the father/god killed, but then commemorated? What allows the act of 
                                                                                                                                          
 It is also necessary to comment on the problematic nature of Freud’s Totem and Taboo. Although 
the patronizing Enlightenment model of cultural development, from the primitive (supposedly 
found in contemporary aboriginal populations) to the modern (supposedly found in the superior 
European societies), did not originate from Freud, his writing on the psychic life of “savages” 
nevertheless operates within this model. In citing Freud’s text, I do not aim to draw on its 
anthropological knowledge, but the psychological insights it may give. 
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parricide to become the cement of social organization and personal identity? Even 
though the brothers transgressed patriarchal authority, the parricide was performed 
out of both fear and envy for this authority. Remorseful of their act, they instituted 
prohibitions in the form of taboos (in the narrative of the primal horde, it is the 
father's women whom the brothers denied themselves) (Freud, 1919: 238). The 
taboo, which cannot be touched, points towards the unclean and yet also the sacred 
(Freud, 1919: 32) – the murdered father both hated and revered. Repression (a 
psychic echo of taboo) thus upholds the law of the patriarch; the Oedipal complex 
and the repression necessary for the formation of personhood allows the entrance 
into the patriarchal symbolic order. And this happens through language. This link 
between language and the psychic narrative of the parricide is traced by Derrida in 
his reading of Artaud. It becomes possible to read Artaud’s theatre, and his quest for 
an originary language, as a confrontation with the father – the author-god, the seat of 
originary truth: 
 
the idea of a theater without representation ... permit us to conceive its origin, 
eve and limit, and the horizon of its death. ... Presence, in order to be presence 
and self-presence, has always already begun to represent itself ... Which means 
that the murder of the father17 which opens the history of representation and the 
space of tragedy, the murder of the father that Artaud, in sum, wants to repeat 
at the greatest proximity to its origin but only a single time – this murder is 
endless and is repeated indefinitely. ... [In its self-presence] it erases itself and 
confirms the transgressed law. (Derrida, 1978: 249) 
 
Even though the performance re-enacts a transgression – a death of originary 
wholeness that gave rise to representation – each subsequent re-enactment confirms 
the law. The presence of the actor – who, "like victims burnt at the stake, signal[ing] 
through the flames" (Artaud, cited in Derrida, 1978: 179) – is a repetition of the 
original parricide; the actor's competence allows this re-enactment. The body, 
however, is the casualty: it is burnt (prohibited, repressed, abjected) in 
commemoration of the death – the loss – at the origin of presence.  
 
The competence of a performer, "the exemplary male subject as adequate to the 
paternal function", therefore depends on "a negation at the heart of subjectivity – the 
lack that is fundamental to the constitution of identity in the symbolic order ... " 
                                                 
17
"[T]here is always a murder at the origin of cruelty ... a parricide. The origin of theater, such as it 
must be restored, is the hand lifted against the abusive wielder of the logos, against the father..." 
(Derrida, 1978: 239). 
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(Rimmer, 1993: 209-210). The body of a performer on stage  
 
acts as a place where the audience fantasises at the level of represented image 
using it as a type of mirror that allows for transformation of the everyday body. 
The external representation is then the place to which the audience constantly 
refers to sustain their identity. (Rimmer, 1993: 209) 
 
Ritual theatre transcends everyday reality, but its "vision of the invisible" (Derrida, 
1993: 29) is not the rupture of the image-screen, rather a blindness (castration) that is 
the condition of visibility, a deference to "intelligible father who begets being as well 
as the visibility of being", the patriarch(al law) that "remains as invisible as the 
condition of sight" (Derrida, 1993: 16). Shamanic presence is the confession of this 
debt to the father.  
 
 
 
Ritual, atonement and communion 
 
Besides the performer's competence and shamanic presence, ritual theatre also claims 
to effect transformation in the audience. Innes notes that the most common link 
between the avant-gardes and ritual is in the common ideal of "community":  
 
ritual is defined [by the avant-gardes] as an action in which all the members of 
a community actively participate, one which symbolically or even actually 
transforms the status and identity of the group ... (Innes, 1993: 174) 
 
Bailey's primary critique of western theatre is that "it does not bring us together in 
communion" (Bailey, 1998: 191). Such communion is necessary if ritual theatre is to 
effect the transformation that it promises. Not only would the shamanic actor plunge 
into the unconscious, but also lead the audience along the same journey: the actors 
would "set the audience alight, to take them on a journey" (Bailey, 2003: 80). Bailey 
takes Artaud as his model in this regard. Citing from Theatre and the Plague, the 
programme note of Bailey's ipi Zombi? (1998) compares his ritual theatre to Artaud's 
vision, which "unravels conflicts, liberates powers, releases potentials, and if these 
and the powers are dark, this is not the fault of plague or of theatre, but of life" 
(Artaud, cited in Bailey, 2003: 40). Innes notes the same tendency in the avant-
gardes inspired by Grotowski: "Their ideal was to recreate a shamanistic 
performance exorcizing the 'disease' of the community in the form of taboos, 
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hostilities, fears" (Innes, 1993: 180).  
 
Bailey's productions tend to seek out the trauma, wound, or disease of a community. 
iMumbo Jumbo emerges out of the restlessness of an ancestor's spirit, and the dispute 
within the amaXhosa over a sangoma who seems to be an imposter. Ipi Zombi? 
brings to light the events of the Kokstad witch hunt in 1995. The Prophet (1999) 
focuses on Nongqawuse, the prophetess who instigated mass cattle killing that broke 
the strength of Xhosa resistance against British imperialism. Big Dada (2001) 
satirizes the brutal regime of Idi Amin in Uganda. Instead of hiding what some 
would consider shameful to the community, Bailey brings the sores out in the open. 
Artaud sees plague as a means of bringing social and psychic crisis to its breaking 
point: 
 
It seems as though a colossal abcess, ethical as much as social, is drained by 
the plague. And like the plague, theatre is collectively made to drain abcesses. 
(Artaud, 1970: 21-22) 
 
Ritual theatre thus intervenes at moments of crisis and trauma. The role of ritual as a 
mediator of crisis is widely evident: Khabela describes the Nongqawuse cattle killing 
as a manifestation of a belief in the coming of a new state, where  
 
[r]isen Xhosa warriors who had died in colonial wars would drive all white 
settlers into the sea and the new Xhosa culture, devoid of the whiteman's 
interference, will be instituted. (Khabela, 1996: 81) 
 
The prophecy was a call for cleansing, not only of cattle that were infected by 
imported Friesland bulls (Khabela, 1996: 67-68), but also the plague of widespread 
mortality, from warring against the British, from smallpox and tuberculosis, and 
from famine. Belief in resurrection thus strengthened in reaction to the pollution of 
death in "the whole of Xhosa existence" (Khabela, 1996: 81).  
 
Thus the violence of ritual has as its aim the restoration of balance in the community. 
The disease which upsets the harmony of a community is attributed to the 
community's failure to maintain good relations with Qamata (God in isiXhosa) via 
ancestors as mediators. Any "antisocial behaviour, sorcery and irresponsibility [and] 
failing to do the family rituals and to display humaneness towards others (ubuntu)" 
are seen as threats to such harmonious relationships, and are "vehemently opposed 
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by society" (Mtuze 1999: 46).  
 
Qamata is the God of the whole community. It is therefore imperative that the 
whole community and the whole nation behave in ways that would be 
acceptable to him, failing which retribution and public censure would follow 
on the whole community. (Mtuze, 1999: 46) 
 
The TRC, as repeated rituals of confession, aimed to achieve a similar state of 
harmony and communion. From a Christian perspective (officially the majority of 
South Africans are Christians), confessing at a TRC hearing led to a healing of a 
divided Christian brotherhood (Praeg, 2000: 262). The TRC can deliver South 
Africans from their sins and restore a unity in Christ which can also be understood as 
a "previous autonomy" – a reconciled nation, a kind of Edenic original state.18 From 
an African perspective, confession (and its attendant forgiveness) was "a ritual re-
enactment of the social bond" (Praeg, 2000: 275) – a restoration of community.  
 
On the link between personhood (one's competence as a "man") and community, 
Praeg offers a complex argument. He distinguishes between Christian and African 
discourses of confession, forgiveness and community. The Christian brotherhood 
(koinonia) is constructed upon a conditional exchange: forgiveness is granted on the 
condition that a confession is made, and this exchange restores the social bond 
(Praeg, 2000: 274). African ubuntu, or the dictum "I am because we are", demands a 
more circular process in which both confession and forgiveness are imperative for 
the social bond (Praeg, 2000: 275). While the ritual of confession in the former is 
enacted according to a transcendental (the spiritual law of the need for sacrifice to 
exculpate), and is applied individualistically (the refusal of forgiveness does not 
negate the personhood of the confessor), the ritual of confession-forgiveness in the 
latter establishes the condition of African personhood itself. The failure to perform 
this ritual (either by refusing to confess or to forgive) would leave the individual in 
an "existential vacuum" (Praeg, 2000: 270), because in ubuntu, neither the individual 
nor the collective is prior to the other: I am because we are (Praeg, 2000: 275).  
 
However, while Praeg draws out the differences in these two discourses, Khabela 
                                                 
18Praeg analyzes "the politics of return" as a discursive construction which promises a return to 
African values unsullied by colonialism (Praeg, 2000: 90). The prefix "re-" seems to postulate an 
ideal original state. 
107 
and Mtuze seem to place them on a continuum. They point out the similarities 
between Xhosa and Biblical spirituality (Khabela, 1996: 4; Mtuze, 1999: 3), and 
Khabela traces the millenarian tendency in Xhosa prophecy that clearly echoes the 
Christian logic. In response to crises in land, culture and power, the Xhosa sought 
"release through an act of atonement" (Khabela 1996: 3). Mtuze specifically links the 
practice of ritual sacrifice to the New Testament definition of atonement (Mtuze, 
1999: 11).  
 
I will not attempt to resolve the differences; however, the outcome of either 
discourse seems to be the same. In seeking atonement for a wrong – in cleansing 
society of its disease – it is at-one-ment that is sought; the oneness of the community 
establishes the possibility of transformation.  
 
Ritual theatre seeks the same oneness that enables transformation to occur, not only 
by the performer's delving into the spirit realm, but by "healing the disease" in the 
audience as well.19 A performer in ritual theatre therefore does not so much perform 
for an audience, as performing with an audience for the gaze of another. Matthew 
Goulish, of American experimental theatre Goat Island, identifies this other as "the 
phantom audience" (Goulish, 2000: 16). To arrive at this notion, he first re-cites the 
story of a Jewish rabbi performing the ceremony of the kindling of lights in a 
concentration camp during the Nazi Holocaust. The rabbi was confronted by an 
offended fellow Jew, asking how he could say the blessing that God has "kept us 
alive, preserved us, and enabled us to reach this season", when they were surrounded 
by death. The rabbi replied that he did hesitate to say the blessing; but then he saw a 
vision of a large crowd of living Jews gathering behind him, phantoms that re-
affirmed the blessing of life even as death pervaded. From this tale, Goulish draws a 
parallel in the theatre:  
 
You perform for a different audience – for the phantom audience. 
Although they are not present like the others, they pay much closer attention. 
                                                 
19This echoes Freud's analysis of modern psychological drama as an identification between a neurotic 
hero and an audience also with neurosis (see chapter 1, p.22). The performer/audience relationship 
in ritual theatre may apply, to a certain extent, to all theatrical performances, and indeed Karafistan 
(2003) and Cardeña & Beard (1996) try to link shamanism with not only avant-garde theatre, but 
also to acting in general. Simply by taking cognizance of such textual links as this, as well as the 
links between different religions that Khabela and Mtuze attempt to draw, one can see shamanism 
as a discourse premised on a universality (a oneness) that overrides differences.  
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Think of how profoundly influenced you have been by performances which 
 took place before you were born, which you have only heard about, or 
 even imagined. 
Were you not then part of the phantom audience, arriving? 
When you are gone, will you not return in the memory audience, departing? 
(Goulish, 2000: 16) 
 
Goulish's notion of the phantom audience is remarkably close to African notions of 
the ancestors. A living person is not conceived from birth, but arrives in the realm of 
the living from a spiritual realm. After death, he joins the realm of the ancestors, who 
mediate between the living and God and is thus essential to the harmony of the 
community. Bujo describes the centrality of the ancestors in a community: 
 
The ancestor constitutes the unity of the community and represents the pivotal 
point from which all actions of the members of a clan take their dynamism and 
legitimacy. (Bujo, cited in Mtuze, 1999: 47) 
 
The communion of ritual theatre is legitimated by the phantom audience; its claim to 
having an efficacy on the (living) audience depends on this other, a belief – a faith – 
that we the living are seen by them. For even as we are blind (part of the lineage of 
blind men that Derrida identifies – see chapter 1), even as the truth is invisible to us, 
we can be assured that we are watched over, because the atonement, the suffering of 
the sacrifice (of the animal in a ritual, of the performer in ritual theatre), is an image 
of the larger communion to come. It is no co-incidence that both Xhosa and Christian 
spirituality postulate mediators between God and the living: it is the screen on which 
the image of oneness can be projected; they guarantee community.  
 
 
 
The imposition of oneness 
 
Yet the efficacy of ritual theatre is disputed. On the one hand, there are those who 
insist that the theatre is a space for representation, excluding the possibility of theatre 
that does something to an audience. On the other hand, questions are posed to the 
premise of ritual theatre: what effect does shamanic presence have on audiences, and 
is it ethical? (See chapter 1, p.41, regarding “ethics”.) 
 
Gcaleka's failure to fulfil his mission is a case of ritual's ineffectiveness against 
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rationality. Another example is the failure of Bailey's ritual theatre to "set the 
audience alight" (Bailey, 2003: 80) – except in a wordy furore of debate – in the 
controversy caused by the last performance of iMumbo Jumbo at the Baxter Theatre, 
Cape Town, 2003. Towards the end of the evening, a chicken was sacrificed on 
stage, propitiating and thanking the ancestors. Instead of transporting the audience 
into a spiritual reality, several spectators walked out of the theatre, feeling outraged. 
The debate spread to the press, public responses were issued by Bailey and the 
Baxter Theatre, and the Cape Town Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(SPCA) officially laid charges.  
 
The sangoma ceremony that caused such controversy is a planned part of the 
production (in a scene called "Rites" – Bailey, 2003: 138), complete with the smoke 
of mpepho (sacred herb), candles, drumming and chanting; but the chicken is not 
usually slaughtered, only blessed by the sangomas and returned to the crate. In his 
public reply, Bailey explains that "where all other ceremonial details were strictly 
adhered to, this felt phoney" (Bailey, in The Star, 19 Aug 2003). It would seem that 
Bailey wanted to use the last opportunity in Cape Town to "do it right", to ensure the 
efficacy of the ritual.  
 
The dispute clearly reflects a larger dispute regarding the nature of theatre. The 
SPCA protested against the act based on "the moral understanding that the slaughter 
of animals should not be a public spectacle" (Bodington, in Kemp, 2003). A reader 
writes to the press: "It is entirely indefensible to kill any animal ... in the name of 
entertainment. ... African theatre is no different from any other theatre: it is intended 
to reflect life, not replicate it" (Bird, 2003). Another reader writes: "If there is to be 
outrage I think it should be that Mr Bailey has seen fit to reduce the sacred to 
performance art" (Berkman, 2003). The emphasis on theatre being "public 
spectacle", "entertainment" and "performance art" points to an unfamiliarity in the 
general theatre-going public with twentieth-century developments in theatre and 
performance, especially the avant-garde (the misuse of the phrase "performance art" 
is telling). But more importantly, these views point to an insistence on constructions 
of truth in theatre: the stage is a public space of make-believe, hence unable and 
inappropriate to show the private, where truth resides (see chapter 2). Also, there is 
to be clear separation between art and life. What Flockemann (2001) proposes as an 
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African aesthetics – the continuity of life and art – is thus rejected. This is one of the 
arguments used as a rebuttal: if Cape Town is in Africa, then the theatre should 
follow African ways. Guy Willoughby offers this analysis:  
 
One understands, of course, patrons’ shocked reactions: it is because the 
theatre, like the gallery a hallowed, charmed space in Western culture, became 
for a moment something else altogether: that space of ritualised sacrifice from 
which all theatre, in ancient Greece, actually began. (Willoughby, 2003b) 
 
The bias of western rationality against ritual is clearly seen in the SPCA's response: 
"Whether it's an act of cruelty where people are sitting in an audience, or an act of 
cruelty in somebody's backyard, it's something that we take very seriously" 
(Bodington, in The Citizen, 2 Oct 2003). This view admits no possibility of a truth in 
ritual, wherever it is performed. No wonder then, that accusations of cultural 
insensitivity and racism were voiced in the furore.  
 
This perhaps reflects the clearer lines of division between races and wealth/poverty 
in Cape Town. The situation in Johannesburg is different. Choreographer Johan van 
der Westhuizen presented Nomkhubulwana (2001) at a dance festival.20 In this work 
a Zulu ritual for rain, associated with fertility, was performed by sangomas who 
entered into trance. According to David Thatanelo April of Moving into Dance 
Mophatong (MIDM), the sangomas were in deep spirit possession so that Van der 
Westhuizen ran frantically to prevent sangomas falling off the stage (April, 2002: 
50). A substantial portion of the audience felt uncomfortable and angry, and walked 
out of the performance; those who stayed were mostly white South Africans (April, 
2002: 52).21  
 
April summarizes the objections of the mainly black members of the audience who 
walked out, after conversing with some of them: 
 
• The performance of sacred African dance rituals does not belong on stage as 
it undermines the cultural values of certain African societies. 
• The performance of sacred African dance rituals does not belong on stage if 
                                                 
20The FNB Vita Dance Umbrella, at University of Witwatersrand Theatre in Johannesburg, 2001 
(April, 2002). This festival mainly takes place at urban theatre spaces, and emphasizes original and 
innovative choreography; in other words, it takes place in an explicitly theatrical context, as 
opposed to anthropological or religious contexts – if such categorization of contexts can be made.  
21It is interesting to compare this phenomenon to how iMumbo Jumbo addresses explicitly a 
predominantly white audience.  
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they are to be performed with lack of understanding and sensitivity as it will 
result in cultural values of certain African societies being undermined. 
• The sangomas are making a mockery of African culture. 
(cited in April, 2002: 52) 
 
While the performers have unquestioned competence to perform the ritual (they are 
real sangomas), it is interesting that the space of the performance rendered their 
presence a "mockery". The theatre is identified by black audience members as a 
western space where African rituals will inevitably be made profane. 
 
Zakes Mda observes that it is generally white playwrights "who have ventured into 
using African rituals on the theatrical stage. Blacks still hold these rituals in awe" 
(Mda, 2002: 286). The Johannesburg-based MIDM have made theoretical and artistic 
interventions into the problem of ritual and theatre, by raising awareness of the 
dangers of appropriating ritual. This discourse has in some ways set the parameters 
for contemporary dance fusion in South Africa, specifically in Gauteng. Sylvia 
Glasser's (founder of MIDM) paper, "Appropriation and Appreciation",22 encourages 
sensitivity to aesthetic values in different cultures and political contexts, warning 
against trivializing rituals and presenting them in inappropriate contexts. Since fusion 
is inevitable, Glasser's emphasis is on how the appropriation of ritual for stage can be 
done with understanding and a "respectful and sensitive" attitude (Glasser, 1997: 88) 
– in other words, ethically. 
 
What did this mean in practice? In making the dance work Tranceformations (1991), 
Glasser identified the main problem as how images of San rock art should be 
translated visually and in movement. Her solution was to correlate choreographic 
devices with the experience of San ritual: since "[s]uperimposition is a consistent 
part of shamanistic art", Glasser choreographed "layers" of activities on stage 
simultaneously (Glasser, cited in April, 2002: 50). She did not attempt to reproduce 
the ritual on stage. The production designer, Sarah Roberts, similarly created a set 
that did not provide a realistic ritual setting, but rather referred to the trance 
experience of San rock art. She cites as motivation partly modernist aesthetics, and 
partly the need to eschew presenting the dance as "appropriately costumed animated 
museum pieces" (Roberts, 1991: 17). Thus in the first scene, for instance, panels of 
                                                 
22This paper has been presented at various times and places; the version I cite was delivered in 1997.  
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acetate with translucent collages of rock art images were flown from the flybars, to 
suggest the "incandescent, shimmering" images perceived in the first phase of trance 
(Roberts, 1991: 22). To "suggest" is the keyword here: it seems that both 
choreographically and visually, the work did not attempt to effect a ritualistic 
transformation in the audience, but rather referred to a shamanic experience which 
can only be suggested on stage. Unlike ritual theatre, therefore, MIDM's approach 
maintains the difference between the artistic (and fictive) nature of the theatre space, 
and the sacred nature of the ritual space. Ritual is thus brought to a theatre audience 
through the mediation (screen) of art, sidestepping the anxieties surrounding ritual 
theatre. Perhaps Glasser's approach can be compared to that of Bill T. Jones; there is 
little doubt that the primary experience both aim to offer is an artistic experience, in 
other words, for the audience to see their work as art and to know it to be art. 
 
In comparison, ritual theatre is far more provocative, in its attempt to upset the 
representational framework of theatre. So in Cape Town, Bailey's play was seen as 
heralding the presence of "African belief systems [that] have not been diluted by 
colonialism and the evangelic missionaries of the last two centuries" in spaces 
previously dominated by white people – both theatre and suburbs (Mangxamba, 
2003). In Johannesburg, Van der Westhuizen's presentation was seen as threatening 
the sacred nature of the ritual, inappropriately bringing real ritual into the theatre. 
Yet, despite their differences, both these reactions construct a purity of African ritual 
that cannot or should not be sullied, "diluted".  
 
It is against this purity – the oneness that ritual seeks – that critique can be made. 
Because the effect that shamanic presence purports to have on an audience is one of 
communal transportation, it risks imposing a forced community where dissent may 
be quashed, or simply not made possible. In iMumbo Jumbo, Gcaleka states: "Do you 
know what's my vision of Africa? It's that everybody must follow his Spirit" (Bailey, 
2003: 132). Before this seemingly democratic statement is made, Gcaleka tells a 
story about speaking to a British man: 
 
I ask him a question: "Who was the first writer in the world! Who introduced 
everything must be writing down?" He say: "The Chinese." I ask him: "If our 
policy is not to write, our policy is to dream, what do you say?" (Bailey, 2003: 
132) 
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A clear opposition against rationality is once again constructed in this speech. He 
then comes into the audience and addresses a question to a spectator: "What is your 
vision of Africa?" On the day that I attended the production, I happened to be the 
spectator to whom this question was addressed. I whispered my answer (here 
paraphrased): "Africa is a place where if you don't agree, you're not welcomed." My 
feelings of embarrassment and anxiety about replying out loud were not only because 
of the content of the question, which I felt contained too many assumptions (such as 
the notion of "Africa") which needed unpacking; but the act of questioning also 
positioned me as a potential contributor to the show (a “spect-actor” with lines to 
speak), a show which I did not want to ruin by spoiling the "Spirit". It was in effect 
not possible to answer in the contradictory to Spirit – to laugh alone is to be 
embarrassed (see Kemp, cited in chapter 1, p.14). There was a compulsion not to 
stand apart from the community, even if I felt it was ethically warranted, even if I 
wanted to.  
 
Was this just a case of my being over-sensitive? Was it my own pathology? I have 
cited Salverson's experience (see chapter 1, p.31): she was compelled to state 
explicitly, "We are one", even though internally she objected. The performance 
already pre-determines a totalization.23 The 1960s avant-gardes frequently subjected 
audiences to an enforced ecstasy. Innes cites the example of Schechner's Dionysus in 
69:  
 
... Dionysus repeatedly announced, "It's a celebration, a ritual, an ordeal, an 
ecstasy", and the audience were encouraged to join "the community" by 
stripping and dancing with the performers as a positive act, even though by the 
time this level of participation was reached the group had a negative 
significance in terms of the play, mindlessly following a megalomaniac quasi-
fascist leader in acts of violence. (Innes, 1993: 175-6) 
 
The Living Theatre gave rise to similar anxieties. A review of Mysteries in Time 
notes the aggression and latent violence that had come into the group's work; and the 
precision with which they rehearse and perform some of the scenes feels so 
"impersonal ... that it most resembles a company of Green Berets", as opposed to the 
                                                 
23
 Even though Salverson proposes a different solution to what I will propose in this thesis (her 
solution seems to tend toward strategies for contesting representation), there are obvious 
similarities between both reactions against totalization. 
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liberation that the group promises (Tytell, 1997: 239). Robert Brustein finds the 
actors "manipulative, preventing the expression of freedom whenever the point of 
view was different from theirs" (Tytell, 1997: 239); that Paradise Now relies on an 
"emotional swamping of the audience" (Brustein, cited in Tytell, 1997: 241). 
Brustein expresses fear that "people might swerve to fascism" (Tytell, 1997: 241). 
By the end of the 1960s, Schechner also came to see the danger in the avant-garde 
strategy of communal ecstasy. The same ecstasy  
 
can be unleashed in the Red Guards or horrifically channeled toward the 
Nuremburg rallies and Auschwitz. ... The hidden fear I [Schechner] have about 
the new expression is that its forms come perilously close to ecstatic fascism. 
(Schechner, cited in Auslander, 1992: 41) 
 
The danger of this indiscriminate ecstasy is evident in Bailey's ipi Zombi?, a re-
telling of how the death of twelve school boys in a motor accident led to a mass 
witch hunt. Based on a testimony of seeing 50 naked women at the accident scene, 
the blame for the deaths was attributed to witches. There were fears that those boys 
who were killed were captured by witches as zombies to do their bidding, rather than 
passing on to the ancestral realm. Bailey records how the Bhongweni community 
was festering with discontent: unemployment, drug-peddling, exam failure rates and 
a spate of car-crashes indicated to the community that the "witches were definitely 
up to their high-jinks" (Bailey, 2003: 31). "Catastrophe large and small in traditional 
African belief systems is often attributed to these witches: satanic women ... who 
harness evil to breed disorder in their community" (Bailey, 2003: 31). The stage was 
set for mass hysteria. In the play, Senti, the leader of the witch hunt, justifies his 
actions: "We are cleaning this town, my brother, all of these cockroaches must go" 
(Bailey, 2003: 70) – the (millenarian) discourse of cleansing, maintaining the 
oneness of community, and returning to an original purity, is evident. The disquieting 
thing is: as Bailey and his company toured ipi Zombi? in the rural Eastern Cape, 
some audiences believed the actors to be zombies; spectators "threaten violence, 
forcing the performers to break out of character and introduce themselves as 
representatives of a harmless troupe from Grahamstown" (Bailey, 2003: 78). If ritual 
theatre succeeds so well in the continuity of art and life, that it transports the 
audience to an immersion in the reality of another realm, so that they "threaten 
violence" – just as a mob in Bhongweni perpetrated a violent witch hunt based on 
these same fears – then what effect on the audience is ritual theatre really seeking? 
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And is it ethical?   
 
In a scene from the play, Senti riles the mob of boys to hunt down the witches. As 
more and more undesirables are named as witches to be eliminated, the character 
Krotch pleads for sensible action: 
 
Krotch:  We need evidence, where's the evidence? 
Boys:  No need for evidence! 
  No need for evidence! 
Krotch: What about the law! 
  What about the law! 
Boys: We are the law! We are the law! (Bailey, 2003: 67) 
 
The Boys' words are telling, for indeed in their ecstatic reverie (in the narrative, and 
the actors in performance), they do constitute a law – the patriarchal law of shamanic 
presence. The drive towards oneness (atonement) is the phallic pleasure – Eros (see 
chapter 1) – that supports "all the architecture of … words and knowledge" 
(Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 187-8). Under the master-signifier of the phallus, the 
performer embodies the truth and the law (of the father).  
 
The surplus of enjoyment left over by language becomes the unconfessable 
crime which is pursued by the law of the father, who is the upholder of the 
phallus as legislative power. The law looks for the truth, but only to put it 
behind bars, to keep truth on the run, from one signifier to another; the truth 
retreats and re-appears like a mirror-image ... it moves in an out like waves 
lapping on the shore, still it goes on, encore ... disguised, mute, fading away, 
ungraspable. (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 191) 
 
What is confessable is what confirms the law. The murder (the original parricide) is 
confessed in the form of ritual (sacrificial feast/atonement) that upholds the (father's) 
law. The surpluses – the abjected, the outlawed, the foreigner, the wandering tramp – 
can only be represented to the law in images that screen the phallic subject from the 
gaze of their true alterity. The representation of these abjected elements – in a witch 
hunt's case, the naming of witches – protects the mob from being exposed to their 
own hysteria; as more witches are named, their illusion (image) of cleansing the 
community is further re-inforced, and so: encore! 
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No pure Africa: contradictions of postcoloniality 
vs 
A pure South Africa: master-narratives, identity and community  
 
The problem lies in the attempt to construct a consensus in a postcolonial, 
heterogeneous society. Some objections to the chicken sacrifice in iMumbo Jumbo 
were motivated by this contradiction that they sense in the play; for example, a 
reader's letter to the press describes the play as "whimsical and allegorical ... [which] 
relied on rudimentary and fanciful props to convey its message", such as "wooden 
babies and porcelain dogs and cardboard trees". The ritual of chicken killing was 
thus "incongruous" (Bird, 2003).  
 
Bailey's stated artistic intention reflects this contradiction: “The two realms – 
showbiz and ritual – can work together” (Bailey, cited in Willoughby, 2003a). 
Within his commitment to ritual there is also cynicism: does the title iMumbo Jumbo 
ultimately affirm or mock the Spirit? (Matshikiza in Bailey, 2003: 7) Flockemann 
notes  
 
the way Bailey's work incorporates simultaneously Brechtian effects that 
foreground the constructedness of the representation, while at the same time 
having a decidedly un-Brechtian involvement of the audience in processes of 
possibly cathartic emotional experiences. (Flockemann, 2001: 37n4)  
 
The play-within-the-ritual – the dramatic enactment of Gcaleka's quest – uses a 
cartoonesque style that caricatures the characters involved in his story. There is 
delicious irony in representing the English Queen as clearly black, clutching an 
absurdly large cell phone and a porcelain dog, calling herself "This is Queen 
Elizabeth two of England" (Bailey, 2003: 130). Jesus appears on the crucifix with 
outstretched arms, a crown of thorns, and wearing on his chest a large heart shape 
outlined by bright blinking pink lights. He "wiggles his fingers frantically and 
Nicholas bounds up the steps and plucks the nails from Jesus' hands" (Bailey, 2003: 
136). The amaXhosa leaders are portrayed by precise ensemble action, stylized 
delivery of lines, and wearing thick white make-up outlining eyes and lips, as if they 
are clowns. This aspect of the play is often what makes the most impression; one 
review states: "IMumbo [sic] Jumbo makes wonderfully escapist theatre" (Joubert, 
2003) – a far cry from the Spirit of ritual theatre.  
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Bailey is informed by the hybridity that he observes in reality. On the one hand, he 
narrates the mystical encounters which constituted his calling – in 1993 he journeyed 
into Zimbabwe; one evening, alone in a river gorge, he was approached by a spirit 
messenger, "silver-blue and completely covered with what looked like large feathers 
or scales". He was "transported away" with this spirit, and saw visions of barrenness 
and industrial development on the land. He interprets this experience as the "African 
Spirit" showing him the spiritual drought of the land, and calling him to work with 
the Spirit in making drama (Bailey, 2003: 13). On the other hand, when he visited 
Gcaleka in Nyanga East, Bailey found the chief "hold[ing] court" while a "soap 
opera flickers blandly on the TV" (Bailey, 2003: 93). Later, Gcaleka sacrificed a 
goat; the blood "froths onto the electric blue linoleum, and two American soapie stars 
kiss on the screen in the background" (Bailey, 2003: 94-95). He felt "ecstatic" about 
"all this impurity, these minglings, these collisions. This is the Africa of today" 
(Bailey, 2003: 95).  
 
Is this impurity a reason that Bailey's work offends some black intellectuals? 
Matshikiza describes the objections from "Johannesburg's black glitterati", because a 
white man "dared to stray into nervous African territory – a mixture of witchcraft, 
corrupt tradition and dodgy modern politics" (Matshikiza, 2002). Bailey does not 
appropriate ritual with sensitivity and respect – in other words, he does not construct 
African spirituality in terms of a sacred purity. On the other side of the contradiction, 
Bailey also does not please those who desire the absolute truth of spiritual ecstasy. 
Willoughby records a well-known playwright asking this question: "Why a chicken? 
Wouldn’t, in terms of cultural meaning, a goat or cow have been more appropriate?" 
(Willoughby, 2003b)  
 
The desire for a truth that is purely African ironically reaffirms a colonial 
subjectivity: 
 
the desire to re-cover an authentic African epistemology in order to establish 
African philosophy as autonomous subject, ironically re-iterates Western, 
enlightenment notions of the autonomous subject. Here, in the pursuit of an 
autonomous subject the terms of historical oppression are necessarily 
duplicated in the terms of liberation. (Praeg, 2000: abstract) 
 
Even as the formation of subjectivity shifts away from race divisions, the audience is 
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nevertheless constructed on the same terms as the western (colonial) subject; its 
autonomous detachment is secured as it casts its perspectival gaze over the stage. 
The belief in truth (of the Spirit, or of culturally sensitive representation) ensures that 
its subjectivity is meaningful.  
 
Does this mean that Bailey's theatre, by embracing the impurity of postcoloniality, 
enables reflection on the viewing subjectivity? Does it manage to push aside the 
screen, to reveal the void that shapes the audience's desire for identification?  
 
The answer is no: firstly, the hybridity of postcoloniality is not in itself a truth that 
can legitimate a subject position (making it lawful), without the tendency to purge 
impurities in securing its identity. The contradiction of Spirit and cynicism or 
rationality is not a stable co-existence, but a shifting tension. The Plays of Miracle 
and Wonder came to constitute an early phase of Bailey's work which ended with 
The Prophet. Bailey explains how in this production he pushed "too hard" the 
exploration of Xhosa spiritual beliefs, rituals, sangoma ceremonies and trance 
performance, "burning a couple of the performers" (Bailey, 2003: 198). He 
"withdrew in fear", and "began to question [his] right to work with this material at 
all" (Bailey, 2003: 198). Later, in Big Dada, the "cartoon cabaret style" and 
"grotesque buffoonery" became the modus operandi (Willoughby, 2004). "As one 
watches this production it's impossible to go beyond style" (Greig, 2001). The Bailey 
of Big Dada describes himself thus: "I'm probably quite a superficial human. I love 
over-the-top, camp, glittery sensational stuff. For me cheap tricks work" (Bailey, 
cited in Szalwinska, 2001). There was a strong reverse in Bailey's intent and 
approach.  
 
It would seem that Bailey realized the terror that Spirit could bring. Was he perhaps 
also unnerved by the failure of audiences to respond as ritual theatre promises they 
should? This is the second answer to the question whether Bailey's theatre enables a 
revision of the viewing subjectivity. A reviewer notes the significance of the 
audience's reactions in Bailey's first work Zombie, an early version of ipi Zombi?:  
 
But it is this audience integration that fails a thoroughly engrossing chain of 
events. In Nyanga, the expectation of mass appreciation turned out to be short-
lived, as onlookers felt free to join in the actors' dialogue and burst into 
119 
uproarious fits of laughter at moments that hardly seemed to warrant it. 
(Witchcraft? What a crock!) ... (Marshall, 1997) 
 
Bailey also records the reactions of an ipi Zombi? audience consisting of black 
school learners, who  
 
explod[ed] with laughter at what was never anticipated as humorous: the 
violent killing of a woman, the desperate hacking of corpses with axes in an 
attempt to destroy the evil witchcraft. ... Sometimes I find it disturbing when I 
cannot understand, sometimes I let go and laugh along with them. ... [D]rama 
stirs up deep feelings, drama releases emotions: that is enough for me. (Bailey, 
2003: 80) 
 
Bailey's anxiety perhaps indicates that it is not enough to accept that drama – 
specifically ritual theatre – releases unconscious or spiritual energies without 
accepting responsibility for how audiences react to it. He came face to face with the 
problematic statement by Artaud, cited in the programme of ipi Zombi?: "Theatre, 
like the plague, unravels conflicts, liberates powers, release potentials, and if these 
and the powers are dark, this is not the fault of plague or of theatre, but of life" 
(Artaud, cited in Bailey, 2003: 40, emphases added). It seems that offence, disgust 
and fear were elicited, but not the horror of realizing the fragility and impurity of the 
"I". Kristeva writes of a horror that confronts and draws the subject towards a place 
where meaning breaks down; it is a horror in realizing that meaning, and therefore 
identity, cannot be ascertained by a belief in truth. The audiences' reactions, 
however, seem to indicate a reaffirmation and entrenchment of their identities, a 
hardened screen that does not allow disturbances to what the subject holds as truth.  
 
What is this identity that draws an illusion of autonomy around the subject? Again, 
Bailey's records of his touring experiences offer some clues. In Ginsberg, a township 
near King William's Town, the performance venue for ipi Zombi? was double-
booked. Bailey and the troupe took to performing in the streets just outside; the 
"township fathers" ordered them to leave. They protested that they could not be 
prevented from performing in the streets, "this is South Africa". The reply was: "This 
is not South Africa, this is Ginsberg. This is our community. You don't know 
anything, you haven't suffered" (Bailey, 2003: 79). In Umtata, where school learners 
laughed at scenes of violence (see above), a white professor explained to Bailey: 
"They are used to it, they have seen so much violence" (Bailey, 2003: 80).  
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The point is more complex than over-sensitivity or desensitization against violence; 
rather, it concerns how identities were forged in the wake of apartheid. The signifier 
that seems to legitimate their subjectivities is the name "sufferer". And it points 
towards more than the exposure to violence during the liberation struggle, or the 
economic hardships that followed. I would suggest, albeit tentatively, that the TRC 
as a major public intervention into the construction of a new South Africa was 
instrumental in forging structures of subjectivity. Praeg analyzes the TRC as the 
construction of a sense of community through discourses of nationalism, Christian 
brotherhood, and ubuntu (Praeg, 2000: 235). These discourses informed the rituals of 
confession (and forgiveness) out of which reconciliation was sought. Personal 
experiences of trauma were narrated, representing an overall narrative of suffering. 
Even though the TRC marked a shift in that personal experiences of trauma were no 
longer eclipsed by "the larger project of mass liberation" (Taylor, 1998: ii), Praeg 
argues that  
 
It is clear ... that there is no significant difference between eclipsing the 
suffering of the individual for the sake of liberation and doing so for the sake 
of constructing a master-narrative in which the personal comes to stand for the 
memory of the national. These are simply two different ideologies. Both the 
ideologies of liberation and nationalism depend for their legitimation as 
teleological grand-narratives on a Hegelian consolidation of history and 
autobiography – a consolidation that consumes the personal in order to produce 
a public "horror pornography" (Jones et al 1998: xvi). ... [T]his consumption of 
suffering also makes it possible to narrate both the personal as well as the 
national in ... messianic terms ... (Praeg, 2000: 238) 
 
The TRC aimed to establish a South African community or nation by emphasizing 
the general over the particular, forging a "master-narrative of suffering essential for 
providing a united community with the past necessary to conceive of its identity ..." 
(Praeg, 2000: 235, emphases added). Both perpetrators and victims24 could identify 
with the identity of sufferer, since perpetrators suffered under guilt and needed 
atonement (Praeg, 2000: 255); and all were in need of healing and reconciliation. As 
they approached the priestly figure of Archbishop Desmond Tutu to perform rituals 
                                                 
24Stephanie Marlin-Curiel notes that the TRC chose the term "victim" over "survivor" despite 
anxieties about the terminology, as "survivor" has more positive connotations of strength and 
overcoming adversity. The more passive "victim" was chosen because it is the "intention and 
action of the perpetrator that creates the condition of being a victim" (TRC Final Report, cited in 
Marlin-Curiel, 2001: 79). The TRC thus located "truth" in "the moment when the victim was 
powerless and silenced" (Marlin-Curiel, 2001: 79). 
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of confession, they submitted to a conversion – converting from a deceitful 
representation of South Africa to the "Truth" about South Africa (Praeg, 2000: 264). 
The meanings of confessions and testimonies were thus pre-determined within the 
metanarrative.  
 
As a parallel, Schechner notes that "real events" (as opposed to dramatic 
representation) are always already mediatized (Schechner, 1997: 88) – the supposed 
authenticity of the event is already pre-determined by its media of transmission and 
reception. Schechner refers to the impact of TV on live theatre: audiences are used to 
receiving news of "real events" (such as war) in edited broadcasts, usually framed as 
"morality play: good guys/bad guys, lessons to be learned"; and the victims, 
relations, and bystanders who speak (confess) on TV about the event tend to "emote 
on camera, or are edited to bring forth the greatest pathos" (Schechner, 1997: 88). 
The habit and expectations of receiving "events-as-TV-drama" affect how live 
theatre is received (Schechner, 1997: 88). The TRC was also represented to most 
South Africans through the mass media;25 so that in addition to the metanarrative that 
consumes personal narratives to produce a "horror pornography" (Praeg), the primary 
relation between the ritual performance and the audience also constructs the TRC as 
a (TV) spectacle.  
 
A similar overarching discourse may be found in Bailey's ritual theatre: "questions of 
sincerity or irony on the part of the creator are deferred – or rather, overwhelmed – 
by the sheer spectacle on stage" (Willoughby 2003a). The story of the Kokstad witch 
hunt in ipi Zombi? most likely came across to the audience of laughing school 
learners in Umtata as a spectacle of violence, one which paradoxically affirmed their 
subject position within the historical narrative of the new South Africa. The 
explanation that "they have seen so much violence" does not only refer to exposure 
to real-life violence or to Hollywood films, but perhaps also points to the role that 
such narratives plays in the construction of identity. 
 
Moreover, identities are hardened around the name of "sufferer". Against the 
                                                 
25Krog (1999), for instance, writes of her anxieties in reporting the TRC. Besides the issues raised in 
chapter 1, Krog also engages with the more practical problems of mass media, selection of 
material and its effect on representation.  
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metanarrative of suffering, the TRC offered the "Truth" of the new South Africa; 
"the heimlichkeit of the nation is offered in return for confessions or testimonies" 
(Praeg, 2000: 241). Purged of the abject (or, having been atoned by the TRC), a 
homely (heimlich) South Africa becomes the image with which citizens can identify. 
This presupposition of a collective desire for the homely nation demands of the 
collectivity  
 
that they should recognise that what the nation has to offer is essentially better 
or superior to the condition that preceded its narration. This the national 
narrative does by turning everybody into victims because if everybody can be 
persuaded of having been victims, then the seductive homeliness of the nation 
will legitimise itself. As essentially a narcissistic discourse the nation 
postulates itself as desirable by inventing for itself a redemptive function. 
(Praeg, 2000: 254) 
 
The nation becomes a "messianic" (Praeg) image, which, just as ritual theatre 
promises in its millenarianism, delivers its audiences/participants into a higher truth. 
The sufferer thus entrenches his identity within the historical narrative of the new 
nation; to disturb his subjectivity is to disturb the truth about the new South Africa. 
Ironically, the Ginsberg community leader who stopped Bailey's troupe from 
performing drew a smaller, tighter boundary: "This is not South Africa, this is 
Ginsberg. This is our community." Perhaps out of disillusionment with living 
conditions, the nation does not hold the truth for him; but the messianic belief in the 
community of Ginsberg is as strong, as entrenched, and as exclusive. 
 
The psychoanalysis of subjectivity reveals a similar construction of identity under 
metanarratives. It is the premise of the "talking cure". For Lacan, symptoms are 
cured by reordering the signifiers in the unconscious (see chapter 1, p.8); material of 
the unconscious (symptoms) are interpreted (reordered) according to new master 
signifiers. These master signifiers are essentially metanarratives with which a subject 
can identify and which "commits them to certain orderings of all the rest of the 
signifiers", in other words, to certain values and ideals that are intimately bound up 
with identity (Sharp, 2002). In the talking cure, unconscious material is "integrated 
into the subject’s symbolic universe: the way s/he understands the world, in the terms 
of his/her community’s natural language. They have been subjectivised ... an integral 
part of this identity", and thus not considered as alien or foreign (Sharp, 2002). (Note 
again the cleansing away of the foreign, the unhomely – considered as traumatic and 
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sources of symptoms – even if it is a matter of re-naming them as heimlich.) 
Psychoanalytic interpretation thus "realigns the way [the client] sees her past" 
(Sharp, 2002).  
 
The master-signifier that ultimately interprets the client's unconscious is, as feminist 
critiques point out, the phallus that governs the symbolic order (see chapter 1, p.6). 
New narratives can be constructed in the analytic – or theatrical – situation, creating 
positive images for identification; but "these often work to resubstantialise identity, 
resituating the phallus as the referential definition of subjectivity" (Rimmer, 1993: 
214). Entrenchment of positions, rather than transformation, tends to follow as a 
result (an example of which is the victim art debate, discussed in chapter 2; see 
pp.77-78). 
 
Peggy Phelan (1996) traces in the beginnings of psychoanalysis the suppression of a 
cure that engaged with the body in favour of the talking cure, thus launching a 
phallocentric trajectory for the discipline.26 The talking cure aims to represent the 
unheimlich under the master-signifier of the phallus; this echoes the attempt of the 
TRC to offer a desirable homely nation organized under the metanarrative of 
suffering. Both posit a truth and promise a cure; they come together in their collusion 
to construct personal subjectivities that are defined against national metanarratives. 
Thus, as Kristeva notes regarding subjectivities within modern nation states: "one 
can be more or less a man to the extent that one is more or less a citizen ... he who is 
not a citizen is not fully a man" (Kristeva, cited in Ziarek, 1995: 2). And if 
competence to perform depends on the question Grotowski raised: "Are you a man?" 
(Grotowski, 1987: 40) then the criterion for evaluating a South African theatre 
performer is plainly set out: be proudly South African. 
 
My performance anxiety, and the whole question about body performance in the 
wake of mass social trauma, can be summed up in the question: "In what sense is the 
past ... already constructed prior to the act of confronting it?" (Praeg, 2000: 254) Is a 
confession of the traumatic past (in front of an analyst, a TRC commissioner and the 
South African public, or a theatre audience) already narrated, its meaning pre-
                                                 
26This is further explored in the concluding section of the thesis. The related idea that religion may be 
an attempt to think without the body is explored earlier in this chapter (see p.101). 
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determined? What is "live" about theatre; what kind of communal experience does it 
construct, and is it necessarily ethical?27 
 
Duma Khumalo testified at the TRC about his wrongful conviction and death 
sentence during apartheid. He spent nearly four years on death row as one of the 
"Sharpeville Six", convicted for "his alleged participation in the mob killing of a 
town councillor" during a mass protest (He Left Quietly programme note).28 Political 
negotiation eventually released Khumalo from prison, but his conviction was never 
overturned. Testifying at the TRC proved to be an inadequate ritual for Khumalo: he 
subsequently participated in the play The Story I am about to Tell: Indaba 
Engizoyixoxa (1996) as one of three TRC testifiers; later, he performed in He Left 
Quietly (2002), a production solely about his experiences. In both these plays, he sits 
face to face with audiences, recounting his traumatic past. It is doubtful that theatre 
succeeded in offering Khumalo healing and closure where the TRC failed: he 
repeatedly re-visited the site of trauma, telling his story again and again (encore), 
refusing closure.  
 
Against the construction of national identity and citizen's subjectivity, there is a need 
to register the dissent, discontent, and anxieties that are the by-products of the very 
identity and subjectivity that is upheld (erected) as desirable. Jay Winter studies the 
trauma of wars and their memories: while consensus constructs neat narratives of 
"black and white, good and evil, right and wrong, outcome and justification", "wars 
of decolonization are never wars of consensus" (Winter, in Sujan, 2004). In such 
cases,  
 
It is entirely unclear whether the act of speaking out ... heals. It's entirely 
unclear whether the people who do it actually escape from the shadow of the 
events that disfigure their lives. It may happen, it may not. It's not the case that 
the truth shall set you free – it's not the case. It may be the case that there are 
certain injuries that can never ever be healed, and once you realize that the road 
to confession is not the road to salvation, it may the case that our narratives of 
suffering are very mixed with outcomes that we can't really predict. (Winter, in 
Sujan, 2004) 
                                                 
27I draw attention again to chapter 1, exploring notions of ethics and indeterminacy. 
28More precisely, Khumalo was charged with "common purpose" for being in a crowd near the scene 
of the murder of a councillor during a rent boycott in Sharpeville in 1984 (Magardie, 2004). 
Khumalo's "crime" was simply that he was there. Like many non-white people's experience during 
apartheid, he had simply "committed the crime of being" (Kobialka, 2000: 42). See chapter 2, p.80. 
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Does all this mean that the TRC was unethical? No. There was clearly the "moral 
superiority of maintaining the social bond" (Praeg, 2000: 232). The modern world is 
organized around political states, and without the construction of a national identity 
there cannot be peaceful living to any extent. Now that this nation has been 
established, however, a new responsibility to the past arises: to negotiate between the 
desire for oneness, and the foreigners (the outlawed, the wandering tramps – see 
p.115) that such desire abjects. For the theatre, this means a need to review not only 
representational content, but also the performer/audience relation. Also at stake are 
the processes and performance modes of theatre, so that the craft of making theatre is 
not taken for granted, but investigated for its impact on the performer/audience 
relation. It is not only an artistic but also an ethical imperative to investigate the 
desires that drive us to the theatre again and again, compelling a performer to stand 
in front of an audience, allowing a spectator to look from the safety of his 
subjectivity. And, once the dynamics of these desires are more clearly understood, 
the responsibility remains with the artist to find alternative ways of constituting the 
theatre event itself – even if this means losing those calls of "encore" to the 
indeterminacy of this theatre.  
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Conclusion 
 
Bodies of discontent 
 
The South African stage is circumscribed by political and economic discourses; the 
problematization of national identity is also a problematization of image-identification in the 
theatre. In search for a way to unsettle these interrogative discourses, two moments of 
performing foreignness are examined, one fictional, one theatrical. These moments enact a 
parallel to the feminine hysteric, who disturbs the phallocentric truth of the psychoanalyst 
through body performance. These moments of disturbing spectatorship are reflected in the 
works of performance artist Marina Abramović. Her explorations into passive-aggression, 
shamanism and finally theatricality and the morality of spectatorship allow for an overview of 
the issues raised in this thesis regarding body, viewing, and subjecthood. Sensitivity to the 
body and its discontent on the part of the viewer becomes crucial to ethical performance.  
 
Reflecting on contemporary dance in South Africa a decade after the first democratic 
election, and looking ahead, choreographer Jay Pather offers this thought: 
 
Contemporary choreographers should be urged to stop thinking just in terms of 
the three-strong dance company and be supported to create large-scale 
companies that, fired by a contemporary imagination and edgy aesthetics, can 
inspire a nation as well as rightfully be the pride and joy of the government. 
(Pather, 2004)  
 
What Pather is proposing here has a degree of ambiguity: what may at first come 
across as jingoistic rhetoric can be contextualized within the entire article, in which 
Pather argues for artists to consider their responsibility to and dependence on their 
political and economic environment. Nevertheless, the point remains that the 
discourse of/on dance and the discourse of “government” should converge. Pather 
offers the example of performing contemporary dance at a presidential inauguration, 
which would signal a kind of national recognition of the significance of 
contemporary dance. Pather asks, “If we have fought for what is rightfully ours, why 
can’t we leave the peripheries and inhabit centre stage without losing our edge?” 
(Pather, 2004)  
 
Here the stage space is clearly circumscribed by the discourse of the “nation” (as 
represented by the government1). A large-scale company “inspires” by being able to 
offer an image of a collective that South Africans can identify with; the image on 
                                                 
1
 Contrary to political discourse in the west, where oppositional politics signals the health of 
democracy, here the government is considered legitimate and just because democratically elected. 
The discourse of political resistance in theatre and performance studies (e.g. the title of 
Auslander’s book, Presence and Resistance) do not fit well into this scenario. However, see 
chapter 2, pp.75-78 on the economic hegemony that overdetermines the notion of democracy. 
Doubt is thrown on the pride with which the “centre stage” – the space of the government, the 
space of democracy – can be occupied. 
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stage legitimates ways that citizens can be made into a nation.  
 
As explored in chapter 3, the operation of image-identification in theatre primarily 
serves to constitute a unity; what the content of that unity is may vary. Pather here 
advocates "contemporary" and "edgy" (possibly with unspoken bias towards the 
urban), but there are possible substitutes: "multi-racial casting" and "cultural fusion" 
once dominated dance discourse in the 1980s and 1990s, while "relevance" once 
dominated theatre discourse. "Deep roots in tradition" is conceivably the new 
substitute.  
 
One of the problems with erecting such images for national identification is the 
government’s adoption of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) before 
2004, "a macroeconomic policy that genuflects to an international market economy" 
(van Graan, 2004). Within this environment, it has been the high arts such as opera 
and ballet that were favoured, appealing to the new middle class (Pather, 2004). 
Ironically, the "contemporary" and "edgy" aesthetics that Pather proposes are but 
ways that contemporary dance can enter into a similar discourse of spectacle, by 
projecting images of a modern, vibrant, and (urban) cosmopolitan nation well 
adapted to the global market. Dance becomes assimilated into the creation of niche 
markets (see chapter 2, p.78). Even though Pather problematizes the economic 
controls over cultural production, the strategy he proposes is not dissimilar to the 
theatre spectacles that gained support under GEAR: the content may vary, the 
operation is the same.  
 
[T]o invoke the power of presence through a dramatistic model of political 
action and art is to link oneself inextricably with the workings of a repressive 
status quo by "leav[ing] politics as representation uncriticized (Lyotard)" 
(Auslander, 1992: 43).  
 
My discontent gave rise to the (re)search for a theatre that does not work according 
to the audience's projection of desire, "attribut[ing] to others, especially a leader, 
entertainer or artist the secret images within ourselves" (Frenkel, cited in Auslander, 
1992: 43). For Kristeva, the figure of the foreigner embodies these "secret images"; 
and the prevalence of xenophobia in South Africa today may be the cost that is paid 
for patriotic subjectivities, a cost that theatre, complicit in asserting images of the 
nation, must share. But the foreigner that is hated and expelled is only a projection of 
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the foreigner within the construction of our individual and national subjectivities; 
"the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity, the space that 
wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity founder", the abject 
that reminds us of the emptiness within identity (Kristeva, in Oliver, 1997: 264). 
 
Discontent and traumatized foreigners reveal the emptiness of a nation. The character 
of Gregor in a short story by Peter Rule, “A Return” (1988), is the hidden face of 
apartheid national identity; while Duma Khumalo (see chapter 3, p.124) can be seen 
as a parallel foreigner that confounds the TRC's construction of a new nation. Both 
perform an emptiness that destroys the image of the nation, albeit in different 
contexts; furthermore, the performances of emptiness (void, gap, the tear in the 
screen) by both foreigners are located in the body. 
 
Gregor is a young white man returning home from fighting in Angola. The trauma of 
killing and witnessing death left him “bosbefok” (psychologically traumatized). He 
finds himself feeling displaced within what used to be his familiar (heimlich) 
environments, bottled up with memories and feelings for which he can find no 
words. He falls (see chapter 3, p.100) into an unnerving silence. Gregor becomes 
intensely aware of the physical motions and tensions that accompany his attempts to 
speak: “My throat is thick, I cannot reach my words out to her; they are caught 
before the tongue, clotted in mucus and saliva” (Rule, 1988: 102). 
 
Gregor's silence unnerves his family. One Saturday afternoon Gregor and family go 
on a visit to the “northern suburbs”, a middle-class, fairly well-off part of the city. 
Despite Gregor's silence, they try to continue a normal family life. Playing with his 
young godson, Gregor experiences a flashback of the war, remembering the children 
he had encountered on the battlefield. He cannot continue playing with his godson. 
 
I turn on the garden tap fully, kneeling. I think of the wails of small life thrust 
from the mouth of the womb, the laughter and cries, the last clotted expression 
caught in the throat. The water cascades across my scalp, gushes down my 
back, clogs and bursts in my ears, stings in my eyes. The water flushes like 
shock over my body, through my shirt, presses my head like a blessing. 
Terence turns the tap off. 
 "What are you doing, Greg?" 
 His voice is shaky, his face disturbed. 
 I felt clogged up. I needed a wash. I sit on the grass wondering about such an 
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answer. 
 "Damn it, Greg! Answer me!" 
The sun stretches its warmth over me like a cloth. My eyes sting with the 
water. Is it tears? (Rule, 1988: 106) 
 
Is Gregor performing a cleansing, a baptism in this scene? The washing does not 
provide him with the forgiveness that he needs; he is unable to re-assume a speaking 
subject position. Rule describes in detail Gregor's physical struggle, the agitation felt 
particularly on the outer edges of his body: Words are caught at the throat; water 
washes over his scalp and back, stings in his eyes, and drenches his shirt so that it 
clings to his skin. The symbolic action of cleansing, even the ordinary weekend 
afternoon action of playing with water, are ruptured by the sting of the water that 
touches on Gregor's pain; but by touching it and relieving it, the pain of the body also 
becomes an unspeakable jouissance. The forbidden pleasure is in hurting where it is 
not supposed to hurt: the heart of a white South African suburban home.  
 
Khumalo was supposed to feel hurt; he was meant to testify at the TRC, have his 
memories publicly recorded, in exchange for a healed identity. His repeated 
performances of traumatic memory in subsequent theatre productions confound this 
logic. Director and artist William Kentridge, who also grappled with theatre and 
testimony in making Ubu and the Truth Commission (1997), records his experience 
of watching Khumalo in The Story I am About to Tell. He found the "most moving 
moment" to be when Khumalo "had a lapse of memory" on stage, and he notes the 
"paradoxes" between an actor forgetting his place in a script, and a victim forgetting 
his own story of trauma (Kentridge, in Taylor, 1998: xiii-xiv). Stephanie Marlin-
Curiel explains the loss of speech as a physical excess: by talking about their 
traumatic memories on stage, the actors in The Story are bringing out "an embodied 
memory of violence"; the actors were observed to cover face with hand, to wring 
hands, and to rock back and forth on the chair (Marlin-Curiel, 2001: 85). These 
bodily actions "proceed from, but also precede, and exceed beyond speech" (p.80). 
 
I watched Khumalo telling his story in He Left Quietly.2 The audience was ushered 
                                                 
2
 The performance attended was part of the National Arts Festival in Grahamstown, at PJ’s, which was 
a converted school hall. Scaffolding in the hall provides the audience seating throughout the 
festival, facing the raised stage where the performance would ordinarily take place; but for this 
production only the raised stage was used. 
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on to the school hall stage, where a few rows of plastic seats surrounded the playing 
area on three sides. Khumalo sat but a few feet away from my seat, smoking sedately 
as he invited spectators to ask questions about him. He remained on stage throughout 
the play, sitting on a chair, accompanying the enactment with his narration. I cannot 
decide which moment of the play moved (as in unsettled) me more: the flouting of 
the dramatic frame as Khumalo spoke to us face to face; or the dramatic re-
enactment of masturbation in prison: in a climactic moment of crisis and pain, the 
actor playing Khumalo stood, slightly bent at the waist, his hand jerking in his 
trousers. On the one hand, Khumalo's presence on stage clearly marked the moment 
as "unreal", a mere re-enactment. On the other hand, Khumalo stopped narrating at 
this point, remaining silent; the scene stood out as an empty, traumatic moment, a 
taboo that should not be touched: not only because of its content, but also because 
structurally, it did not seem predicted or explained afterwards by the play's narrative 
structure.  
 
Perhaps the scene was moving (or unsettling) because, firstly, this usually private 
bodily action was performed so publicly. The private act is supposed to be the truth, 
and its public (re-)performance supposedly fictive; that Khumalo and the actor 
playing him were both on stage should have underlined this distinction, but it did not. 
Having Khumalo sitting right there, watching (like the audience), not talking, 
somehow blurred the distinction. Secondly, while masturbation is usually understood 
as an action of comfort or release, this masturbating body was a desperate attempt to 
get into contact with the unspeakable horror of facing impending death. Like the 
water stinging Gregor's skin, the jerking hand contacted the jouissance (collected in 
this case in an erotogenic zone of the body) that could not be spoken.  
 
The bodies of Gregor and Khumalo (and his actor) performed in ways that 
introduced a foreignness, a strangeness that ruptured the performance contexts, 
whether it is suburban home life, TRC rituals, or the theatre event. Marlin-Curiel 
holds the actors' bodies in The Story "responsible for the 'loss of control' over 
speech", that the bodies were speaking in ways "unintended by the speaker" (Marlin-
Curiel, 2001: 83-84). Her choice of words seems to be derived from a perspective 
which deems the body an unwelcome element in the healing process. Some 
psychological theories regard psychosomatic responses as symptoms indicating a 
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"failure to work through" loss (Harvey, 1996: 15 & 17). Healing is considered 
successful when embodied memories are purged. Psychoanalysis, inheriting the 
dualist metaphysics of the Cartesian subjectivity (see chapter 1, p.7), displays the 
same bias against the body. If subjectivity is formed in the gaze of the Other 
(mediated by the screen), Kristeva describes the Ego as "a body to be put to death, or 
at least to be deferred, for the love of the Other so that Myself can be" (Kristeva, 
cited in Oliver, 1997: 149). The body becomes an abject so that "I" can be formed 
(see chapter 3, p.100).  
 
Critiques of this metaphysics have been mentioned from various theoretical 
perspectives; what I would like to elaborate here, however, is a feminist critique that 
reclaims the body. Even though Lacan left behind a phallocentric psychoanalytic 
truth that needs deconstruction, his investigation into feminine sexuality nevertheless 
opened a door for something other, "something which says 'no' to phallic enjoyment. 
This can be seen in the pains of the hysteric, whose symptoms often represent a 
denial of the role of the phallus" (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 188-9).  
 
Peggy Phelan (1996) traces the rise of psychoanalysis through Josef Breuer and 
Freud's Studies on Hysteria. Out of the cases of five hysteric women, Freud built 
(erected) the discipline of psychoanalysis, which claimed to be "a therapeutic 
technical procedure which left nothing to be desired in its logical consistency and 
systematic application" (Breuer & Freud, cited in Phelan, 1996: 90). The technique – 
the talking cure – emerged when the somatic symptoms of hysteria in Anna O., such 
as a nervous cough, paralysed leg, and fainting on seeing her image in a mirror, were 
"cured" by narrating her trauma to Breuer. This spoken act of interpretation allowed 
the joining of her body (symptom) to her consciousness; the trauma, the origin of 
symptoms, is framed by narration, given meaning or signified, and integrated into her 
present sense of self. Phelan, reflecting on this technique, calls hysteria "the first 
disease in which psychoanalysis imagines a history of the symptom and where the 
patient discovers that her body's history must be spoken" (Phelan, 1996: 91).  
 
But in re-visiting the case of Anna O., Phelan points out that this original account did 
not show the talking cure as the only possible basis for healing. The touching of body 
parts performing hysterical symptoms or the re-enactment of a traumatic event were 
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crucial parts of Anna O.'s process with Breuer (Phelan, 1996: 97).  
 
Classical psychoanalysis abandoned the physical cure in favor of the clinical 
technique of the talking cure. A technique that depended too heavily upon 
touch was a huge risk for an epistemological revolution whose visionary leader 
[Freud] was determined to be, above all, scientific. Studies, almost unwittingly, 
realizes two different approaches to the cure – and the psychoanalytic 
movement followed the one that left the body untouched. (Phelan,1996: 90-91) 
 
Adopting the dualist, logocentric bias against the body, psychoanalysis gained 
recognition and legitimation as a science. However, body is not simply constructed 
as opposed to language. Phelan draws a link between the talking cure and the act of 
dancing and choreographing: "Psychoanalysis and choreography are two different 
modes of performing the body's movement. Each seeks to give the body a system of 
time" – the former through conscious narration, the latter through organizing 
movements in space and time (Phelan, 1996: 94). Both are techniques that seek to 
discipline the body: the talking cure brings the body into the discipline of linear, 
progressive time; dance disciplines the body by "consciously perform[ing] the body's 
discovery of its temporal and spatial dimensions" (Phelan, 1996: 92). These 
techniques of disciplining the body are explored in detail in chapters 2 and 3.  
 
What, then, is the body that critiques the logocentrism and phallocentrism of 
psychoanalysis? After Breuer terminated treatment, Anna O. had a phantom 
pregnancy. As a reproduction that embodies an emptiness, the hysterical pregnancy 
"signifies the excess, the supplement that cannot be contained or interpreted by the 
talking cure" (Phelan, 1996: 98). The phallocentricism of the talking cure can be seen 
in the interpretation of Anna O.'s symptoms: they are explained as originating from 
her anxiety over her dying father, and her unconscious attempt to lend her living 
body to him. Phelan notes the parallel in which Anna O.'s body is lent to Breuer and 
Freud in order to give life to psychoanalysis. The patient's body is used "as a stage 
for the body of the other" (Phelan, 1996: 97).3 The phantom pregnancy, on the other 
hand, returns Anna O. to her body, "as a body other than her father's or her doctor's" 
(Phelan, 1996: 99). It is a body that "exceeds narration and the will to mastery 
enacted by 'masculine' discourse" (Phelan, 1996: 100). As Lacan notes, there is 
"something which says 'no' to phallic enjoyment"(Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986:188). 
                                                 
3Phelan notes the significance that most hysteric patients were women; their bodies were wombs (also 
the root word for "hysteria") for bearing the body of another (Phelan, 1996: 97). 
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The possibility of this "something" in theatre has been the central question of my 
research. What body performs the uneasy movements of hysteria, and the choked and 
jerky movements of Gregor and Khumalo? There are different theories about this 
body. Moving away from the medical model that focuses on individual pathology, 
feminist academics argue that the symptoms of hysterical women of the nineteenth 
century "seemed like bodily metaphors for the silence, immobility, denial of appetite, 
and hyperfemininity imposed on them by their societies"; lacking "a public voice to 
articulate their economic and sexual oppression", their symptoms spoke for them 
(Showalter, 1998: 54-55). For French feminists, the hysteric embodies the possibility 
of a language that resists dominant phallocentric discourse. Following on from 
Lacan, who understood the women to have been speaking "the discourse of the 
hysteric rather than the discourse of the master", these theorists celebrate the hysteric 
as the speaker of a woman's mother tongue (Showalter, 1998: 56). The hysteric 
"occupies the place of female absence in [phallocentric] linguistic and cultural 
systems" (Showalter, 1998: 57), and this absence or loss is seen as generative.4  
 
Other theorists argue that hysteria is a body performance produced within the 
(masculine) discourse of the analyst. According to Elaine Showalter, many historians 
and analysts explain hysteria as "the product of a dialogue or collaboration between 
the hysterical woman and the medical man" (Showalter, 1998: 11). Some critics of 
Freud argue that "Freud pressured his patients to produce narratives congruent with 
his theories" (Showalter, 1998: 41). The women's oppression, suffered in silence, is 
voiced through being scripted as hysteria, a script that is written by the (male) doctor. 
Hysterical performance becomes a culturally articulated way of manifesting 
unspoken discontent. Showalter states that where a theory of hysterical symptoms is 
articulated by a theorist or therapist, the location becomes a centre (the centre stage – 
see p.126) where incidence of hysteria dramatically rises.5 The analyst's 
interpretation becomes the truth of the hysterical body performance. An example is 
                                                 
4This is explored in chapter 3 regarding the possibility of a language of the African body, linked to 
Cixous's writing on a return to the mother/the sea (see p.90n9).  
5Showalter traces this pattern from nineteenth-century hysteria centred around the Paris hospital La 
Salpêtrière with Jean-Martin Charcot (Showalter, 1998: 30), to modern-day "hysterical epidemics" 
in America such as Gulf War Syndrome, Recovered Memory, and narratives of Satanic ritual 
abuse and alien abduction, disseminated through cultural narratives (for example, the film 
Rosemary's Baby giving rise to narratives of Satanic ritual abuse) and theorists who advocate the 
truthfulness of these narratives.  
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the case of Dora, the most famous of Freud's narratives on hysteria. Freud diagnosed 
her symptoms (chronic cough, headaches, depressions) as hysterical manifestations 
of her repressed attractions to her father, the husband of the woman with whom her 
father was having an affair (Herr K.), and to Freud himself. Decades later, however, 
researchers discovered that Dora's discontent most probably arose from her 
intellectual aspiration and wishes to avoid marriage in the face of oppression; "Dora 
was treated like a pawn or a possession by her father and denied the rights to privacy 
or personal freedom"; she felt that her father had handed her over to Herr K. in 
exchange for his affair with Frau K. (Showalter, 1998: 42-43). The authority of 
Freud's discourse confers an aura of authenticity to the unspoken causes of her 
symptoms, which does violence to the body experiencing trauma. 
 
It is not that the hysterical body performance is fake; it concerns the relation between 
the unspoken/forbidden, and culturally sanctioned ways of articulating distress 
(Showalter, 1998: 15) – the screen that allows images to be formed and seen. But it is 
the viewer of such performances – the analyst – who insists on the truthfulness of his 
narrative. Hysteria as a disease is defined as the lack of narrative order, and the 
analyst takes upon himself the responsibility to reorganize the hysteric's fragmented 
narrative:  
 
In doing so, he had not only to fill gaps in the hysteric's story but also to 
overcome her resistance to his narrative interpretations. For this therapy to 
work, the hysteric has to accept and believe the analyst's story. (Showalter, 
1998: 85) 
 
Contrary to common sense, therefore, it is the performer's body that is often required 
to conform to the viewer's sense of truth. Phelan compares the technique of 
psychoanalysis to the technique of dance, such as the dances of Balanchine. Both 
entail an interrogation of the feminine body under masculine eyes; the ballerina's 
body is scrutinized for a technique which "leaves nothing to be desired" (Phelan, 
1996: 101).6 Psychoanalysis brings the "private theatre" of feminine experience into 
the "social space" of analytic discourse (Phelan, 1996: 96); similarly the ballerina 
performs on a public stage, under the scrutiny of the discourses of dance criticism 
                                                 
6The intended meaning of this phrase, to recall Freud's writing, is that the technique fulfils the 
requirements of "logical consistency". Another interpretation is however possible: the ballerina's 
technique becomes a nothing, the empty objet a of the audience's desire.  
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and dance history (Phelan, 1996: 101).   
 
My thesis begins in chapter 1 by stating my sense of loss. As a theatre performer, I 
am caught in between unspeakable discontent, and the scrutiny of the viewer's 
discourse, always demanding meaning, order, and truth, something with which he 
can identify. The psychoanalyst poses a series of questions to the body of the 
hysteric: "Is she or isn't she? Is she or isn't she making it up?" (Phelan, 1996: 100) 
When the hysteric returns to her own body, however – in Anna O.'s case, a body in 
the throes of a hysterical childbirth – the analyst/viewer cannot handle it. Breuer 
"fled the house in a cold sweat" (Jones, cited in Phelan, 1996: 98). It is not that 
theatre is pure discourse and rationality; we know that art and the unconscious is a 
highly fecund combination. But art is always realized in relation to a receiver; theatre 
in particular must be made at the moment of facing an audience. The meaning-
making process in this exchange relation is what constitutes the event; for Lacan, 
 
psychoanalysis does not deal with feelings as such, but with a questioning of 
emotional states; that is, it is concerned with their meaning, in so far as they are 
represented in the unconscious. (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 168) 
 
The unconscious is understood to be organized "in the form of a questioning, which 
[Lacan] called an 'interrogative voice'" (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986: 168). The 
viewer's interrogation is revealed at moments when the meaning-making relationship 
is unsettled: it can be seen in the politics of representation that informed Bill T. 
Jones's works and the victim art controversy (see chapter 2, p.56), as well as Jones's 
feeling interrogated by critics (see p.79). It can be seen in Gcaleka's aggression 
towards his critics. It can be seen in the threat that Gregor's silent body performance 
poses to his family and friends, when Terence demands: "Damn it ... Answer me!" 
(see above, p.129) – he demands to hear Gregor communicate. The director of He 
Left Quietly, Yael Farber, incorporates this interrogation within the play's narrative: 
Khumalo starts the play by inviting the audience to pose questions to him. Lastly, the 
TRC's mandate of national reconstruction meant that the individual victims' horror is 
inexorably commodified for the nation, their experiences subjected to "a process of 
reporting to the discourse police of re-conciliation and nationalism". Even as the 
commission countered the silence of suffering, it also "retain[ed] the basic structure 
of interrogation" (Praeg, 2000: 241).  
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The work of performance artist Marina Abramović often lays bare this interrogation 
of the viewing subject, and it is for this reason that I now give some space for a re-
telling or re-tracing of her work, as a re-view of the issues of body, spectatorship, 
interrogation and subjecthood raised throughout the thesis. Perhaps, the solutions she 
has taken may point to alternatives that lead out of the impasse between performer 
and viewer. 
 
Abramović’s oeuvre of body art, objects, and more recently video and theatre work, 
engages with and challenges diverse discourses: body and consciousness, mysticism, 
autobiography, history, trauma (war and totalitarianism), identity, gender, risk, even 
theatre. But I wish to examine some of her works by focusing on the issue of 
spectatorship. In Rhythm 0 (1974), the notorious performance in which she remained 
completely passive as an object in front of the crowd, Abramović's body explicitly 
performed the emptiness into which spectators projected their desires.  
 
The crowd at Studio Morra in Naples where Rhythm 0 took place was a mixture of 
"art world aficionados" and people randomly brought in from the street.  
 
The gallery director announced that the artist would remain completely passive 
for six hours (8pm to 2am), during which time the visitors could do whatever 
they wanted with or to her. The parameters were supposedly defined by an 
array of seventy two objects laid out on a table near which Abramović was 
standing. (McEvilley, 1995: 46) 
 
The actions of the "spectators" grew in aggression as time passed: "Abramović was 
stripped, painted, cut, crowned with thorns, and had the muzzle of a loaded gun 
thrust against her head" (McEvilley, 1995: 46). A wide array of randomly chosen 
objects (ranging from the gun, to lipstick, wine, and sulphur) were laid out; but 
according to one account, the "desire, hatred and fear" projected by the spectators  
were recognizably structured by "the classic triad of mother, madonna and whore", 
images of which were reproduced on Abramović's body (Iles, 1995: 40). Her body 
performance can perhaps be understood as symptomatic of the performer's hysterical 
condition, a body constructed by the viewer's discourse.  
 
Abramović and her partner Ulay's Incision (1978) provoked open hostility in a 
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spectator. Incision is described as follows:  
 
Ulay [naked] 
I am fixed to a wall by a stretched rubber cord. 
I move repeatedly towards the audience as far as the elasticity of the material 
permits. 
Marina 
I am standing parallel to the point of maximum expansion.  
(Abramović, 1998: 188) 
 
Abramović describes the building up of aggression in the audience "towards [her] 
passive role" (Abramović, 1998: 193). She expected an attack but did not know when 
it would happen. Photographs of the attack show a man with a leg lifted, jumping 
into the air. The next photograph shows Abramović lying on the floor, and the man 
seems to be landing from a kicking action. The audience's interrogation manifested 
in a spontaneous physical attack.  
 
There are two levels of spectatorship in this work: Abramović functions as an 
observer of Ulay's performance, but she is also performing for the public that is 
watching. It can be said that Abramović's performance of spectating exposes the 
usually invisible act of seeing. Her performance of seeing also provokes the public's 
spectatorship to be exposed, to the extent that it is manifested in aggressive action. 
After the performance, Abramović records, "the public was engaged in an intense 
discussion about the function of the observer and his limits" (Abramović,1998:193).7 
 
Increasingly, Abramović articulated the performance state of emptiness in shamanic 
terms: Abramović's research into Eastern philosophies, rituals and ceremonies, along 
with Ulay's similar interest in Tibetan Buddhism and Tantric, Sufi, and Indian 
philosophies, gave rise to performances in which the emptiness could be reached in 
an alternative state of consciousness (Goldberg, 1995: 12). Abramović compares this 
"mental jump" to the effect of trauma:  
 
In Western cultures, it is necessary to have some trauma, some terrible tragedy 
in your private life, to be able to make a mental jump; perhaps somebody dies, 
or you have an operation, or you half die and then recover. In Eastern cultures 
altered states of minds are a matter of education. Sufi dancers, for instance, 
turn in concentric circles, increasing the speed of the outer circles until those in 
                                                 
7
 Like Jones’s early solos, the exposing of the act of viewing provokes aggression (see chapter 2). 
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the inner circles enter a trance ... (Abramović, 1998: 406) 
 
The "unliving" and "absence" of trauma (Phelan, 1996: 95) becomes a strategy to 
counter the western "cultural rejection of pain"; trauma and physical pain undo this 
repression by "annihilat[ing] the most elemental acts of perception ... 'by destroying 
one's ability simply to see'" (Scarry cited in Pejić, 1998: 32). The risks taken by 
performance artists especially in the 1970s were examples of this strategy: Chris 
Burden is well known for his notorious Shoot (1971), where he arranged for a gun 
shot to be fired at him (in performance, the bullet penetrated his arm). The 
experience of "getting ready to stand there" (Burden, cited in Carr, 1993: 16) and 
take the pain, even to face the possibility of death, was the central context of the 
work (Carr, 1993: 16). Abramović's "Rhythm" series involved risky performances 
which may have resulted in her death.8  
 
The shamanic, meditative performances may involve far less risk, but "seemed to 
correspond to unconscious desires" which lay behind Abramović's earlier 
performances (Goldberg, 1995: 12); the absence of movement, like pain, aimed to 
shatter the seeing of performance. Nightsea Crossing (1981-1987) is one such work: 
it was performed in different locations and with variations, each lasting for several 
hours across consecutive days. It entailed Abramović and Ulay sitting on opposite 
sides of a long table, facing each other, motionless, 
 
installing themselves as tableaux-vivants, as art, but reducing the events to the 
point of zero. Or more precisely, reducing the notion of events as visible 
occurrence to the minimum, since they showed us only their motionless bodies. 
(Pejić, 1998: 29)9 
 
This absence of visual differentiation aimed to quicken perception, subjecting the eye 
to a process of seeing that is different to seeing a painting (Goldberg, 1995: 17).10 
 
                                                 
8Carr lists other examples from the 1970s, for example: in Escalade sanglante (1971), Gina Pane 
climbed a ladder with cutting edges with her bare feet; Dennis Oppenheim in Rocked Circle-Fear 
(1971) stood in a circle while rocks were throw at him from above (Carr, 1993: 17).  
9It is important that the spectator's experience of the work be distinguished from the seeing of 
photographic records of the work, the latter being the usual channel through which performance art 
is disseminated to a wider "audience". The arduous demand on spectators – if they choose to stay 
with the performers – constitutes a totally different spectatorship to reading art books, where 
meanings are communicated instantaneously through visual image. 
10The attempt to use shamanic presence in performance to reach beyond visibility is examined in 
chapter 3.  
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Curiously, such asceticism – whether performed with aggressive cruelty or shamanic 
piety – gave way to glamour, humour, and theatre in Biography (1992), a 
performance of Abramović's own life and work. The performance pieces that each 
lasted for hours are re-performed in this hour-and-a-half theatre performance. The 
work opens with an epic image of Abramović hanging in the air; it is dramatically lit, 
featuring Elvis Presley music and opera, and is performed in proscenium arch 
theatres. The element of risk remains, re-enacting for example the cutting of body in 
the Rhythm series, but "like video clips, for one minute, two minutes" (Abramović, 
cited in Goldberg, 1995: 17). "Finally Abramović, in high heels, and elegantly 
swathed in a black dress, stalks the runway" (Goldberg, 1995: 18).  
 
The stark contrast with earlier asceticism is often linked to Abramović's break up 
with Ulay, and a discovery of other parts to her personality that are humorous, 
sensual, in need of glamour (Goldberg, 1995: 17). This seems to me a partial 
explanation; Thomas McEvilley contextualizes this change as a general shift in the 
reception of performance art:  
 
In terms of the social history of art, the artist's sense of shamanic vocation has 
to do with intensity of commitment. Recently the art audience has learned to 
expect humor and parody from its artists, but twenty-five years ago, when an 
artist seemed to be putting his or her body and life on the line for art, the 
experience of beholding such commitment brought a sense of awe to the 
audience. One might leave the performance space either shaken or inspired. 
Now the sight of such commitment often seems anachronistic and 
embarrassing. (McEvilley, 1998: 23) 
 
The "high artifice" of Biography (Goldberg, 1995: 17) seems to be a shift in strategy 
for a contemporary audience. Expectations of humour and parody from the viewer 
drain the performing body's claim to authenticity and presence. The "real" blood that 
is shed in Biography is mediated in its reference to (its signification of) an original 
performance in the past. And so it "really only works in a theatre set-up" 
(Abramović, cited in Goldberg, 1995: 17), viewed through the perspectival frame of 
the proscenium arch.  
 
Is the performing body inevitably fixed within the discourse of the audience's eyes? 
Abramović's video work, In Between (1996-7), attempted to negotiate the spectator's 
interrogation of her body. The public was asked to sign a contract before viewing the 
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work. The video showed close-up images of a sharp needle, tracing lines on her 
palm, eye and moles on her neck. The needle also pricks her finger and blood is 
smeared over the finger with the needle. This, more than the artifice of theatre, seems 
to remove the spectator from the liveness of the body: today, images of these extreme 
bodily experiences are easily seen on television and the internet, as well as 
performed live in night club settings. The medium of video, removed from the 
body’s presence, is also prone to offering a “parody” of the body experiencing pain. 
One can expect reactions in spectators similar to the medical shows of the nineteenth 
century: a revulsion/fascination in the exotic. However, Abramović tried to engineer 
a different set of conditions of perception: the spectator signed a contract that bound 
him/her to staying the full 40 minutes inside the video installation (Abramović, 1998: 
348). They started the piece wearing blindfolds and headphones, which gave 
instructions to the spectator, such as to loosen belts and jewelry, to release tension in 
the neck by turning the head slowly, to breathe. This lasted for 25 minutes; only then 
were instructions given to take the blindfolds off, and the video images were then 
seen (Abramović, 1998: 47). This new condition of seeing, constructed by drawing 
the spectator's attention to his/her own body, may elicit different responses to pain, 
blood and danger. This may or may not have worked, but at the end the spectator was 
given a "certificate of completion", thanking him/her for the "trust and commitment" 
given to the performer. 
 
This special commitment by the spectators may be understood as "a moral contract" 
between performer and audience (Obrist, 1998: 47).11 The morality of this contract 
comes from a commitment to pay attention to the body in distress – the performer's 
as well as the spectator's – without falling back to the interrogative mode, a position 
which leaves the spectator safely outside of the abjected pain.12  
 
A parallel concern for the viewer's bodily condition can be found in psychoanalysis. 
Clinical data from the object-relations/Kleinian branch of psychoanalysis indicate 
that somatic experiences can form an important part of the analysis. More 
significantly, it is the analyst's somatic experiences (and not just the patient's 
                                                 
11
 See chapter 1, pp.12 & 21-23 for the problematization of “morality” and “ethics”, and p.39 till the 
end of the chapter for an alternative notion of “ethics” as applied to performance. 
12This mode of seeing is "moral" because it explores how experiences of war, pain and horror should 
be received – to rephrase Sontag, how to regard the pain of others (see chapter 2). 
141 
symptoms) that need to enter into the analytic relationship. Ron Balamuth, for 
instance, recounts how his bodily sensations (such as "a sinking feeling in [his] 
stomach, a mounting discomfort") clued him into the transference of his client's 
memories of abandonment that was occurring, although they were not spoken about. 
Previously unaware of these sensations within him, his new somatic awareness 
enabled him to recognize the fragmentation and alienation in the client (Balamuth, 
1998: 266). He sensed a tension between his sensations and his position as analyst: 
 
my body is rebelling and will not let itself be coerced by the familiar pressure 
my mind is exerting on me, pushing me to resume a "knowledgeable" analytic 
posture that does not feel right for now. (Balamuth, 1998: 266) 
 
The body was "rebelling" (with "near-repulsion" and "organic protest": Balamuth, 
1998: 226) against the analyst's "knowledgeable" stance from which he usually 
interpreted the pathology of the client. The talking cure provides the analyst with a 
reassurance of his having something to say (Ogden, cited in Balamuth, 1998: 266). 
But this phallic enjoyment "has to be understood as a defense against the enjoyment 
of the body as an organism" (i.e. the other jouissance); and  
 
the first reaction of the subject will be anxiety ... Indeed, this form of 
enjoyment implies leaving the Symbolic ... and thus entails the disappearance, 
i.e., the death of the subject. (Verhaughe, cited in Robbins) 
 
The viewing subject's anxiety concerning the integrity of his subjecthood is an 
anxiety about his own body. The "death" of the viewing subject unsettles the 
Cartesian perspectival gaze that fixes the body of the other in his projection. The 
return to his own body – the abject that allowed his Self to be – signals the end of his 
fantasy of certainty, the fantasy that was upheld by projecting his desire in the Other 
as a knowing subject, in possession of certainty. The analyst must give up this 
fantasy to access meanings of his client that were unavailable to him. 
 
In theatre, the performer must work "against mutual projection between audience and 
performer", the identification in which "[we] believe so readily in the other as the 
keeper of our treasure and our disease" (Frenkel, cited in Auslander, 1992: 43). To 
rupture this fantasy projection, the audience's body must return to the theatre: "the I 
has to give up the fantasy of the proper self" (Kristeva, cited in Ziarek: 27). The 
"death of the subject" may sound ominous; indeed without the screen on which the 
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subject's fantasy of the Other is projected, he may be left in a state of horror – the 
horror of the disintegration of the self, of meaning. But Balamuth's bodily tensions 
did not impede his clinical work; his body was the crucial link that enabled the work 
to proceed. He describes this ability to (re)connect with the "lived body" as "a sense 
of familiarity and newness", "the feeling of joy" (Balamuth, 1998: 265).  
 
Unfixed from discourses of representation, spiritual transcendence and authenticity, 
(phallocentric) discipline, and the epistemological certainty of the viewing subject, 
the body becomes a foreigner, unknown to the self. Should theatre in South Africa 
strive for constructing citizenship in the image of the nation? What price is paid 
should this course be pursued, not only with regards to non-nationals but to the 
foreigners within ourselves? In our eagerness to perform images of competent 
citizenship, what audience – what community – is constructed? Where are the bodies 
of discontent?  
 
This thesis thus arrives at not an answer, but a question. It seems that making theatre 
in South Africa often means a preoccupation with contesting representation, 
innovating with form, engaging with cultural and social contexts, and struggling with 
questions of resources. But a question seems to remain not only unanswered, but not 
thought of to be asked. Where are the bodies of discontent – on stage, and in the 
audience? Is encore all there is to theatre?  
 
Not having found an answer on the stage, I conclude by once again quoting from 
psychoanalysis. Kristeva's figure of the foreigner, quoted from Strangers to 
Ourselves, remains merely a guide in my search.  
 
The ethics of psychoanalysis implies a politics: it would involve a 
cosmopolitanism of a new sort that, cutting across governments, economies, 
and markets, might work for a mankind whose solidarity is founded on the 
consciousness of its unconscious – desiring, destructive, fearful, empty, 
impossible. Here we are far removed from a call to brotherhood, about which 
one has already ironically pointed out its debt to paternal and divine authority 
... (Kristeva, in Oliver, 1997: 290) 
 
Instead of performing on the centre stage circumscribed by dominant discourses (in 
the current situation, the discourses of governments and markets), the foreigner-
performer teeters at the edge of the stage, at any moment falling into the unconscious 
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– knowing it is dangerous, but knowing the ethical reasons for occupying this 
marginal space. Only if I am willing to fall, will there be any possibility for the 
spectator to fall also with me, to discover “his incoherences and abysses, in short his 
‘strangenesses’” (Kristeva, in Oliver, 1997: 265).  
 
How will this audience be constituted – who will they be, what will they do?  
 
A paradoxical community is emerging, made up of foreigners who are 
reconciled with themselves to the extent that they recognize themselves as 
foreigners. The multinational society would thus be the consequence of an 
extreme individualism, but conscious of its discontents and limits, knowing 
only indomitable people ready to help themselves in their weakness, a 
weakness whose other name is our radical strangeness. (Kristeva, in Oliver, 
1997: 294) 
 
Will there emerge an audience who is ready to acknowledge its weakness, its 
uncertainty? What will be my relation to this audience, what body will I need to 
perform, what techniques to engage with, what performance contexts, to give space 
for these strangenesses to emerge? I fall, away from the stage, away from the 
auditorium, away from the demarcated theatre spaces indoors or outdoors – away 
from the known. It is the only privilege – the only right – accorded to the foreigner in 
discontent.  
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